Zephyr UpdateHub CVE-2026-11811
LOWSeverity by source
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
AC:H reflects required on-path positioning; A:L for gradual, reboot-recoverable DoS; C and I both N as confirmed by the description explicitly.
Primary rating from Vendor (zephyrproject).
CVSS VectorVendor: zephyrproject
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
The UpdateHub over-the-air update client's start_coap_client() in subsys/mgmt/updatehub/updatehub.c leaks the CoAP/DTLS socket descriptor on its connection-setup failure paths. The shared error: cleanup gated socket closing on a ret > 0 flag, but ret was set to -1 immediately after the socket was created, so when zsock_setsockopt() (DTLS) or zsock_connect() subsequently failed the gate was false and cleanup_connection() was never called. The open descriptor in the global ctx.sock was then overwritten by the next attempt, permanently leaking it from the socket / net_context pool until reboot.
The failing setup path is reached every time the OTA client tries to contact the UpdateHub server and the connection cannot be established - driven automatically by the periodic autohandler() poll (and on demand via the updatehub_probe()/updatehub_update() API or the updatehub run shell command). The DTLS handshake/connect outcome is influenceable by a network or on-path attacker who drops, resets, or otherwise disrupts traffic to the server, and also fails naturally whenever the server is unreachable.
Each failed attempt permanently leaks one descriptor; once the shared socket pool is exhausted, networking degrades device-wide until the device is rebooted, a denial-of-service condition. Severity is low because the leak rate is bounded by the configured OTA poll interval (default once per 24 hours), the effect is gradual and recovered by reboot, and only builds with the UpdateHub client enabled are affected. There is no memory-corruption, information-disclosure, or authentication impact.
AnalysisAI
Socket descriptor exhaustion in Zephyr RTOS's UpdateHub OTA client allows a network on-path attacker - or simply an unreachable update server - to gradually deplete the device's shared net_context pool, causing device-wide networking degradation until reboot. The defect is a resource-management bug (CWE-772) in start_coap_client(): ret was set to -1 immediately after socket creation, making the ret > 0 cleanup gate permanently unreachable, so cleanup_connection() was never invoked on any DTLS or connect failure path. …
Unlock full vulnerability intelligence
- Risk assessment & exploitation conditions
- Attack chain visualization
- Remediation with exact patch versions
- Threat intelligence from 22 sources
- Personal watchlist & email alerts
Free forever · No credit card required
Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Two conditions must hold simultaneously: (1) the target firmware must be compiled with CONFIG_UPDATEHUB enabled - devices without this build flag are entirely unaffected regardless of network exposure; (2) an attacker must be able to disrupt traffic between the device and the UpdateHub server via on-path network positioning, routing manipulation, or firewall control. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The assigned CVSS 3.7 (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L) accurately reflects the low real-world urgency. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | Apply the upstream fix from commit 29e3476501a65c0bcd469abd275749d324008ce2 (https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/29e3476501a65c0bcd469abd275749d324008ce2), which corrects the cleanup guard from the broken 'if (ret > 0)' to 'if (ret != 0 && ctx.sock >= 0)', ensuring the descriptor is closed on all failure paths. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Threat intelligence, references, and detailed analysis are available after sign-in.
Same technique Information Disclosure
View allShare
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today