Unitree Go2 CVE-2026-115996

Exploitation requires the attacker to occupy a man-in-the-middle position on the network path between the Go2's chat_go WSS client and its server, because WebSocketClient.connect in websocket.py performs no TLS server-certificate validation, so a forged certificate is accepted. Limiting factors: high attack complexity (a privileged intercept position must be established), the vendor's own rating of exploitability as 'difficult,' and scope confined to devices running affected firmware (up to 1.1.13/1.1.14.1/1.1.15.1) that use the chat_go component. No end-user interaction and no authentication are required (PR:N/UI:N) once the intercept position exists.

This is a moderate, not emergency, priority. The vendor-supplied CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N) scores 6.3 and is driven down by high attack complexity; the vendor itself reports exploitability as 'difficult.' Improper TLS certificate validation (CWE-295) in the chat_go WSS client is only exploitable by an attacker who can already interpose on the network path (a man-in-the-middle position), which is what the AC:H rating reflects - this is not a trivially remote, drive-by flaw despite AV:N. There is no CISA KEV listing and no confirmed public exploit code, so this is not actively exploited at time of analysis. EPSS is not provided in the input, so exploitation probability cannot be quantified. The vuln.today decision label is 'this_month,' consistent with a real-but-not-urgent issue. One signal conflict must be flagged: the tag labels this 'Information Disclosure' and the root cause (disabled server-certificate validation) classically enables interception/decryption of traffic, yet the vendor's 4.0 vector sets VC:N and only VI:L (integrity, low) - the impact metrics and the stated impact category do not align, and the realistic consequence of a cert-validation bypass should be independently verified with the vendor.

An attacker positioned on the network path between a Unitree Go2's chat_go component and its WSS endpoint presents a forged or self-signed certificate; because WebSocketClient.connect does not validate the server certificate, the client accepts it, letting the attacker intercept or tamper with the WebSocket session. This requires a privileged man-in-the-middle position and is rated difficult by the vendor; no public exploit code is identified at time of analysis.