Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessObtain valid execution resume token
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DeliveryCraft waiting-webhook request with alternate node reference
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ExploitBypass Send-and-Wait HMAC validation
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ExecutionApprove victim's waiting execution
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ImpactRun downstream actions as workflow owner
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A05:2025 - Injection
ASVS 5.0
V1 - Encoding and Sanitization Leading special element handling
|
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires that the attacker possess a valid resume token for an existing Send-and-Wait (waiting) execution - this is the explicit AT:P attack requirement and the primary limiting factor; an attacker with no access to a resume token cannot trigger the bypass. The affected feature is specifically the waiting-webhook endpoint used by n8n's Send-and-Wait / human-approval nodes, so only workflows that use waiting executions are exposed. Given PR:N in the CVSS vector, no account authentication to n8n itself is needed beyond holding the token, and no user interaction is required. Realistic impact is bounded by what the target workflow's downstream nodes do under the owner's credentials - command execution is possible only where the workflow is configured to perform such actions. Affects n8n before 2.41.4 and 2.42.x before 2.42.1. |
| Impact | This is a credible, moderate-to-high priority issue for organisations running n8n, but not a drop-everything emergency. The authoritative signal is the CVSS 4.0 vector (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N, base 7.0), which indicates a network-reachable, low-complexity flaw requiring no authentication (PR:N) and no user interaction (UI:N), but carrying an explicit Attack Requirement (AT:P) - the attacker must already hold a valid execution resume token. Vulnerable-system impact is only Low/Low (VC:L/VI:L), yet the subsequent-system impact is High/High (SC:H/SI:H): approving a waiting execution runs downstream actions under the workflow owner's credentials, potentially reaching command execution. That gap between low direct impact and high downstream impact is the real story - the bug's danger comes from privilege inheritance, not from the endpoint itself. No EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public POC were supplied, so there is no evidence of active exploitation or widespread automated attack; the AT:P token prerequisite also argues against mass, indiscriminate exploitation and toward targeted abuse by someone who can obtain or intercept resume tokens. CWE-180 (validate-before-canonicalize) is consistent with the description's 'selects validation before normalising an alternate node reference form.' Net: a genuine privilege/signature-bypass worth prompt patching, tempered by the token precondition and the absence of exploitation telemetry. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker who has obtained a valid resume token for a Send-and-Wait execution (for example, a leaked or intercepted approval link intended for another approver) sends a crafted request to the waiting-webhook endpoint using an alternate node reference form that bypasses the HMAC signature check. The endpoint approves the execution and runs its downstream nodes under the workflow owner's stored credentials, potentially triggering command execution. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and exploitation is gated on possessing a resume token. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Oct 14, 2026
A signature bypass in n8n's waiting-webhook endpoint allows attackers who possess a valid resume token for an existing Send-and-Wait execution to approve waiting executions intended for other users, causing downstream workflow actions to run under the workflow owner's credentials, which may include command execution if the workflow is configured to perform such actions. Affects n8n versions before 2.41.4 and 2.42.x before 2.42.1. No public exploit identified at time of analysis; exploitation requires a valid resume token (no authentication to n8n itself is needed beyond the token), and the impact is bounded by the target workflow's downstream nodes. This is a moderate-to-high priority issue for organizations running n8n, but not a drop-everything emergency.
RemediationAI
Upgrade to n8n 2.41.4 or 2.42.1 (or later) - these versions contain the vendor-released patch. If immediate upgrade is not possible, restrict access to the waiting-webhook endpoint (e.g., via reverse proxy IP allowlisting or network segmentation) to limit exposure, but this may break legitimate human-approval workflows that rely on external callbacks. Additionally, treat resume tokens as sensitive secrets, rotate them if suspicious activity is detected, and monitor for unexpected approvals of waiting executions. Refer to the vendor advisory at https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-728h-pmr2-7cgh and the VulnCheck advisory at https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/n8n-before-2.41.4-and-2.42.1-send-and-wait-hmac-signature-bypass-via-waiting-webhook for details.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
n8n is a workflow automation platform where nodes perform actions, and the Send-and-Wait (human-approval) node pauses workflow execution and waits for an external webhook call to resume. The waiting-webhook endpoint handles these resume requests and relies on HMAC signatures for validation. The vulnerability is CWE-180: Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize. Specifically, the endpoint selects Send-and-Wait validation using an alternate node reference form before normalizing that reference. This ordering flaw allows an attacker with a valid resume token to bypass the signature check and target a different waiting execution. The root cause is that validation occurs before canonicalization, so a crafted request can pass validation while pointing to another execution. Only workflows that use waiting executions (Send-and-Wait or human-approval nodes) are exposed. Affected versions are n8n before 2.41.4 and 2.42.x before 2.42.1.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
Network-reachable with no auth (PR:N), but the required resume-token precondition maps to AC:H; actions run under the owner's credentials so S:C, with Low direct confidentiality/integrity impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (vulncheck).
CVSS VectorVendor: vulncheck
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
n8n before 2.41.4 and 2.42.x before 2.42.1 contains a signature bypass in the waiting-webhook endpoint, which selects Send-and-Wait validation before normalising an alternate node reference form. Attackers holding an execution's resume token can approve waiting executions meant for others, running downstream actions under the workflow owner's credentials, potentially including command execution.
Technical POC Analysis
Evidence note: the only artefact supplied is advisory GHSA-728h-pmr2-7cgh.
Full technical POC analysis - root cause, step-by-step exploitation and patch breakdown - is part of the Pro and Business plans.
Executive ViewAI
A signature-validation flaw in the n8n workflow automation platform allows anyone holding a valid resume token for an existing Send-and-Wait execution to approve waiting executions belonging to other users, causing downstream workflow actions to run with the workflow owner's credentials. Organizations running n8n are affected because compromised workflows can inherit the privileges and connected credentials of the workflow owner, including command execution where a workflow is configured to perform it. The blast radius is bounded by each target workflow's downstream nodes, and no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, but the issue rates as a high-severity concern for any team with untrusted users able to obtain or guess resume tokens.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations: restrict network access to n8n waiting-webhook and resume endpoints (do not expose them to the internet); treat resume tokens as privileged secrets by rotating them, shortening their lifetimes, and eliminating sharing across users or external parties; review and cancel stale or abandoned Send-and-Wait executions whose tokens may still be valid; audit downstream nodes of Send-and-Wait workflows and disable or require manual approval for any node capable of command execution, credential access, or privileged API calls; enforce least privilege on workflow owner accounts and connected credentials; and monitor logs for unexpected resume-token approvals or executions triggered outside normal user activity. Apply the vendor fix as soon as a supported release outside the affected range is confirmed available.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Authentication bypass attacks exploit flaws in the verification mechanisms that control access to systems and applications.
EUVD-2026-101729
GHSA-vp7q-xcmw-hq44
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Exploit-DB