Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Description states unauthenticated exploitation via a public endpoint with no user interaction (PR:N/UI:N/AC:L), and account takeover yields full C/I/A impact; PR:N chosen over the input's PR:L per the description.
Primary rating from Vendor (WPScan).
CVSS VectorVendor: WPScan
Lifecycle Timeline
4DescriptionCVE.org
The AllCoach WordPress plugin before 1.0.2 does not verify that an email address submitted to a public account-registration endpoint is not already associated with an existing user before overwriting that user's password, allowing unauthenticated attackers to reset the password of arbitrary accounts, including administrators, and take over the site.
Articles & Coverage 1
AnalysisAI
Account takeover in the AllCoach WordPress plugin before 1.0.2 lets remote attackers overwrite the password of any existing account - including administrators - by re-submitting that account's email address to the public account-registration endpoint, which fails to check whether the email is already tied to a user before writing a new password. Publicly available exploit code exists and a vendor patch (1.0.2) has been released, but there is no public exploit identified as actively exploited in the wild; EPSS is low (0.14%, 4th percentile) and CISA SSVC rates exploitation as 'none' despite a 'total' technical impact. The provided CVSS vector lists PR:L, which conflicts with the description's explicit 'unauthenticated attackers' claim and should be verified.
Technical ContextAI
The affected component is AllCoach, a third-party WordPress plugin that exposes its own public account-registration endpoint rather than relying solely on WordPress core registration. The root cause is a missing uniqueness/ownership check: during registration the plugin accepts an arbitrary email address and, when that email already belongs to a registered user, updates (overwrites) the stored password hash for the matching wp_users record instead of rejecting the request or requiring proof of email ownership. No CWE was assigned in the source data, but the behavior maps to CWE-640 (Weak Password Recovery / improper account-identity verification) and CWE-620 (Unverified Password Change). Because WordPress stores all roles in the same users table, the flaw applies equally to subscriber and administrator accounts. The CPE 'cpe:2.3:a:unknown:allcoach:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*' reflects that the vendor namespace is not yet formally catalogued.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade the AllCoach plugin to version 1.0.2 or later, which adds the missing check that the submitted registration email is not already associated with an existing account. This is the primary and sufficient fix; apply it immediately on all sites running AllCoach. If you cannot patch right away, deactivate and remove the AllCoach plugin (this disables the vulnerable registration endpoint entirely but also removes AllCoach functionality from the site), or restrict or disable public access to the plugin's account-registration endpoint at the web-server/WAF layer - trade-off: this may break legitimate new-user self-registration. As an interim detection/containment control, audit wp_users and recent password-change/login events for unexpected admin credential changes and force-reset administrator passwords plus invalidate active sessions, since a prior compromise would not be undone by upgrading. Reference the WPScan advisory (https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/194e35d8-08ca-402d-a9bb-52383bc3dfab/) for authoritative fix confirmation.
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-41818
GHSA-pp48-7mg5-mw8x