Which versions of TRENDnet TEW-432BRP are affected by CVE-2026-10179?

TRENDnet TEW-432BRP wireless routers (discontinued in 2009) enable attackers to achieve full system compromise through publicly available exploit code, with no vendor-provided patch available as the…

How to fix or mitigate CVE-2026-10179?

24 hours: Conduct comprehensive inventory identifying all TEW-432BRP units in operation. 7 days: Implement network access controls isolating these devices and disable remote management; initiate procurement of replacement routers from supported vendors. 30 days: Complete hardware replacement and retire all TEW-432BRP devices.

TRENDnet TEW-432BRP CVE-2026-10179

Q: What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-10179?

CVE-2026-10179 has a CVSS 4.0 base score of 7.4 (High). CVSS vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.0%.

EUVD-2026-33499 HIGH

Buffer Overflow (CWE-119)

2026-05-31 cna@vuldb.com

GHSA-7grq-p359-8hc8

Buffer Overflow

7.4

CVSS 4.0 · NVD

Severity by source

NVD PRIMARY

7.4 HIGH

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Primary rating from NVD · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorNVD

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

Low

User Interaction

None

Scope

Lifecycle Timeline

Analysis Generated

May 31, 2026 - 11:30 vuln.today

DescriptionCVE.org

A flaw has been found in TRENDnet TEW-432BRP 3.10B20. This issue affects the function formSetWlanEncrypt of the file /goform/formSetWlanEncrypt. This manipulation of the argument webpage causes stack-based buffer overflow. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been published and may be used. The vendor explains: "This product has been EOL for 15 years (since 2009). As the item has been EOL for such a long time, we are not able to replicate or fix any vulnerabilities." This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.

AnalysisAI

Stack-based buffer overflow in TRENDnet TEW-432BRP 3.10B20 wireless router allows authenticated remote attackers to corrupt memory and likely achieve code execution by manipulating the 'webpage' argument in the formSetWlanEncrypt handler at /goform/formSetWlanEncrypt. Publicly available exploit code exists per the VulDB submission, and the vendor has explicitly refused to patch because the device has been end-of-life since 2009, making any deployed units permanently vulnerable.

Technical ContextAI

The TEW-432BRP is a legacy 802.11g consumer wireless router whose administrative web interface is implemented as a /goform/* CGI-style handler set typical of Realtek/Broadcom SDK-derived embedded HTTP daemons (boa/mini_httpd variants). The vulnerable formSetWlanEncrypt routine handles wireless encryption configuration submissions and copies the user-supplied 'webpage' POST/GET argument into a fixed-size stack buffer without bounds checking - a textbook CWE-119 (Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer) issue that manifests as classic stack smashing. On MIPS/ARM embedded targets like this one, such overflows typically allow overwriting the saved return address and pivoting execution, especially since these 2009-era firmwares lack ASLR, stack canaries, and NX protections.

RemediationAI

No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis, and the vendor has publicly declined to issue one given the 15-year EOL status, so the only durable remediation is to decommission and replace the TEW-432BRP with a currently supported router from any vendor. Until replacement is possible, compensating controls include restricting access to the router's web administration interface to a single trusted wired management host via the router's own access control list (eliminates remote LAN exploitation but breaks remote admin convenience), ensuring the WAN-side admin interface is disabled (default on most firmwares but worth confirming, as exposure to the internet would make exploitation trivial), changing default administrator credentials to a long random password to raise the bar against the PR:L authentication requirement, and segmenting the device onto an isolated VLAN so that compromise does not pivot into the broader network. Reference: https://vuldb.com/vuln/367460.