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Linux Kernel CVE-2025-68183

HIGH
2025-12-16 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
7.8
CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
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Severity by source

Vendor (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67) PRIMARY
7.8 HIGH
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
vuln.today AI
1.9 LOW

Local only (AV:L), gated on a specific IMA/EVM fix-mode config and xattr-write privilege (AC:H, PR:H), no confidentiality or availability impact, only a low integrity-baseline weakening (I:L).

3.1 AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
4.0 AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
SUSE
6.1 MEDIUM
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H
Red Hat
7.1 MEDIUM
qualitative

Primary rating from Vendor (416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67).

CVSS VectorVendor: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67

Attack Vector
Local
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Lifecycle Timeline

2
Analysis Generated
Jul 30, 2026 - 07:26 vuln.today
CVE Published
Dec 16, 2025 - 14:15 cve.org
HIGH 7.8

DescriptionCVE.org

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ima: don't clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr

Currently when both IMA and EVM are in fix mode, the IMA signature will be reset to IMA hash if a program first stores IMA signature in security.ima and then writes/removes some other security xattr for the file.

For example, on Fedora, after booting the kernel with "ima_appraise=fix evm=fix ima_policy=appraise_tcb" and installing rpm-plugin-ima, installing/reinstalling a package will not make good reference IMA signature generated. Instead IMA hash is generated,

getfattr -m - -d -e hex /usr/bin/bash

file: usr/bin/bash

security.ima=0x0404...

This happens because when setting security.selinux, the IMA_DIGSIG flag that had been set early was cleared. As a result, IMA hash is generated when the file is closed.

Similarly, IMA signature can be cleared on file close after removing security xattr like security.evm or setting/removing ACL.

Prevent replacing the IMA file signature with a file hash, by preventing the IMA_DIGSIG flag from being reset.

Here's a minimal C reproducer which sets security.selinux as the last step which can also replaced by removing security.evm or setting ACL,

#include <stdio.h> #include <sys/xattr.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h>

int main() { const char* file_path = "/usr/sbin/test_binary"; const char* hex_string = "030204d33204490066306402304"; int length = strlen(hex_string); char* ima_attr_value; int fd;

fd = open(file_path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644); if (fd == -1) { perror("Error opening file"); return 1; }

ima_attr_value = (char*)malloc(length / 2 ); for (int i = 0, j = 0; i < length; i += 2, j++) { sscanf(hex_string + i, "%2hhx", &ima_attr_value[j]); }

if (fsetxattr(fd, "security.ima", ima_attr_value, length/2, 0) == -1) { perror("Error setting extended attribute"); close(fd); return 1; }

const char* selinux_value= "system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0"; if (fsetxattr(fd, "security.selinux", selinux_value, strlen(selinux_value), 0) == -1) { perror("Error setting extended attribute"); close(fd); return 1; }

close(fd);

return 0; }

AnalysisAI

Integrity protection weakening in the Linux kernel's IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture) subsystem allows a stored IMA file signature to be silently downgraded to a plain IMA hash. When IMA and EVM run in fix mode (e.g. booting with 'ima_appraise=fix evm=fix ima_policy=appraise_tcb'), the kernel incorrectly clears the IMA_DIGSIG flag whenever a non-IMA security xattr (such as security.selinux or security.evm) or an ACL is set or removed after security.ima was written, so on file close a hash is generated instead of preserving the intended signature. A full C reproducer is embedded in the report, but there is no CISA KEV listing and no public weaponized exploit identified at time of analysis; EPSS is 0.17% (7th percentile).

Technical ContextAI

The affected component is the Linux kernel's IMA appraisal code, which works alongside EVM (Extended Verification Module) to protect file integrity via extended attributes (security.ima holds the IMA hash or signature, security.evm binds the security xattr set). Each inode's integrity state carries an IMA_DIGSIG flag indicating that security.ima contains a real digital signature rather than a hash. The bug is a state-management/protection-mechanism failure: on any setxattr/removexattr of a non-IMA security attribute or ACL, IMA reset IMA_DIGSIG, so the subsequent close-time evaluation treated the file as unsigned and generated a hash. No CWE was assigned by the CNA; functionally this is closest to a protection-mechanism failure (CWE-693) / improper clearing of security-relevant state (CWE-460). No CPE strings were provided in the intelligence; affected code is upstream mainline and stable kernel trees.

Affected ProductsAI

The vulnerability is in the mainline Linux kernel IMA subsystem; no exact affected version range or CPE was supplied in the intelligence. Fixes are present as stable-tree commits referenced by NVD (git.kernel.org commits 02aa671c08a4834bef5166743a7b88686fbfa023, 88b4cbcf6b041ae0f2fc8a34554a5b6a83a2b7cd, d2993a7e98eb70c737c6f5365a190e79c72b8407, and edd824eb45e4f7e05ad3ab090dab6dbdb79cd292), indicating backports to multiple stable branches; the exact pre-fix version boundaries are not independently confirmed from the provided data. Only kernels built with IMA appraisal and EVM support, and only systems actually running in fix mode with an appraise policy, exhibit the faulty behavior. The reproducer targets a Fedora configuration using rpm-plugin-ima, but the flaw is generic to any distribution enabling the same IMA/EVM fix-mode setup.

RemediationAI

Upstream fix available (PR/commit); released patched version not independently confirmed - apply the kernel update from your distribution that includes the referenced stable commits (git.kernel.org/stable/c/02aa671c08a4834bef5166743a7b88686fbfa023 and the companion backports 88b4cbcf6b041ae0f2fc8a34554a5b6a83a2b7cd, d2993a7e98eb70c737c6f5365a190e79c72b8407, edd824eb45e4f7e05ad3ab090dab6dbdb79cd292), which stop IMA from resetting the IMA_DIGSIG flag when non-IMA xattrs or ACLs change. As a workaround until patched, avoid running both IMA and EVM in fix mode simultaneously during signing/labeling and instead generate IMA signatures in a controlled step, setting security.ima last so that no subsequent security.selinux/security.evm/ACL write triggers the downgrade - trade-off is added operational complexity in package/provisioning tooling. After any affected install or relabel, audit files with 'getfattr -m - -d -e hex' and re-sign any whose security.ima begins with a hash marker (0x0404...) rather than a signature (0x0302...); this is a detection/remediation control, not a preventive one.

Vendor StatusVendor

SUSE

Severity: Moderate
Product Status
Container suse/sl-micro/6.0/baremetal-os-container:latest Affected
Container suse/sl-micro/6.0/base-os-container:2.1.3-7.95 Image SL-Micro Affected
Container suse/sl-micro/6.0/kvm-os-container:2.1.3-6.115 Affected
Container suse/sl-micro/6.0/rt-os-container:2.1.3-7.146 Affected
Container suse/sl-micro/6.0/toolbox:latest Affected

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CVE-2025-68183 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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