CVE-2025-21834

MEDIUM
2025-03-06 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
5.5
CVSS 3.1
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CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Attack Vector
Local
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Analysis Generated
Mar 28, 2026 - 18:30 vuln.today
Patch Released
Mar 28, 2026 - 18:30 nvd
Patch available
CVE Published
Mar 06, 2025 - 17:15 nvd
MEDIUM 5.5

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering When attaching uretprobes to processes running inside docker, the attached process is segfaulted when encountering the retprobe. The reason is that now that uretprobe is a system call the default seccomp filters in docker block it as they only allow a specific set of known syscalls. This is true for other userspace applications which use seccomp to control their syscall surface. Since uretprobe is a "kernel implementation detail" system call which is not used by userspace application code directly, it is impractical and there's very little point in forcing all userspace applications to explicitly allow it in order to avoid crashing tracked processes. Pass this systemcall through seccomp without depending on configuration. Note: uretprobe is currently only x86_64 and isn't expected to ever be supported in i386. [kees: minimized changes for easier backporting, tweaked commit log]

Analysis

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering When attaching uretprobes to processes running inside docker, the. Rated medium severity (CVSS 5.5), this vulnerability is low attack complexity.

Technical Context

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering When attaching uretprobes to processes running inside docker, the attached process is segfaulted when encountering the retprobe. The reason is that now that uretprobe is a system call the default seccomp filters in docker block it as they only allow a specific set of known syscalls. This is true for other userspace applications which use seccomp to control their syscall surface. Since uretprobe is a "kernel implementation detail" system call which is not used by userspace application code directly, it is impractical and there's very little point in forcing all userspace applications to explicitly allow it in order to avoid crashing tracked processes. Pass this systemcall through seccomp without depending on configuration. Note: uretprobe is currently only x86_64 and isn't expected to ever be supported in i386. [kees: minimized changes for easier backporting, tweaked commit log] Affected products include: Linux Linux Kernel.

Affected Products

Linux Linux Kernel.

Remediation

A vendor patch is available. Apply the latest security update as soon as possible. Apply vendor patches when available. Implement network segmentation and monitoring as interim mitigations.

Priority Score

28
Low Medium High Critical
KEV: 0
EPSS: +0.0
CVSS: +28
POC: 0

Vendor Status

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CVE-2025-21834 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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