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Cometbft CVE-2023-34450

MEDIUM
Memory Leak (CWE-401)
2023-07-03 security-advisories@github.com
5.3
CVSS 3.1 · NVD
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Vulnerability Assessment

Weakness
CWE
ASVS 5.0
V15 - Secure Coding and Architecture Resource cleanup, leak prevention
Impact

CVSS score of 5.3 (MEDIUM). Attack characteristics: network attack vector, low complexity, no privileges required, no user interaction not required. Public proof-of-concept exploit code is available.

Exploit ScenarioDerived

A remote attacker could exhaust available memory leading to denial of service by sending crafted requests to the affected application. No authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.

This Month Plan within 30 days. Why: MEDIUM severity (CVSS 4.0-6.9).
Patch available 0.9% exploitation probability (EPSS)

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AnalysisAI

CometBFT is a Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) middleware that takes a state transition machine and replicates it on many machines. Rated medium severity (CVSS 5.3), this vulnerability is remotely exploitable, no authentication required, low attack complexity. Public exploit code available.

RemediationAI

A vendor patch is available. Apply the latest security update as soon as possible. Ensure all allocated memory is properly freed. Use RAII patterns or garbage-collected languages.

Affected Packages

go github.com/cometbft/cometbft fix: 0.34.29, 0.37.2

Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)

Affects your stack

Affects 1 package in go

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Technical ContextAI · show details

This vulnerability is classified as Memory Leak (CWE-401), which allows attackers to exhaust available memory leading to denial of service. CometBFT is a Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) middleware that takes a state transition machine and replicates it on many machines. An internal modification made in versions 0.34.28 and 0.37.1 to the way struct PeerState is serialized to JSON introduced a deadlock when new function MarshallJSON is called. This function can be called from two places. The first is via logs, setting the consensus logging module to "debug" level (should not happen in production), and setting the log output format to JSON. The second is via RPC dump_consensus_state. Case 1, which should not be hit in production, will eventually hit the deadlock in most goroutines, effectively halting the node. In case 2, only the data structures related to the first peer will be deadlocked, together with the thread(s) dealing with the RPC request(s). This means that only one of the channels of communication to the node's peers will be blocked. Eventually the peer will timeout and excluded from the list (typically after 2 minutes). The goroutines involved in the deadlock will not be garbage collected, but they will not interfere with the system after the peer is excluded. The theoretical worst case for case 2, is a network with only two validator nodes. In this case, each of the nodes only has one PeerState struct. If dump_consensus_state is called in either node (or both), the chain will halt until the peer connections time out, after which the nodes will reconnect (with different PeerState structs) and the chain will progress again. Then, the same process can be repeated. As the number of nodes in a network increases, and thus, the number of peer struct each node maintains, the possibility of reproducing the perturbation visible with two nodes decreases. Only the first PeerState struct will deadlock, and not the others (RPC dump_consensus_state accesses them in a for loop, so the deadlock at the first iteration causes the rest of the iterations of that "for" loop to never be reached). This regression was fixed in versions 0.34.29 and 0.37.2. Some workarounds are available. For case 1 (hitting the deadlock via logs), either don't set the log output to "json", leave at "plain", or don't set the consensus logging module to "debug", leave it at "info" or higher. For case 2 (hitting the deadlock via RPC dump_consensus_state), do not expose dump_consensus_state RPC endpoint to the public internet (e.g., via rules in one's nginx setup). Affected products include: Cometbft.

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Severity by source

NVD PRIMARY 5.3 MEDIUM
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Primary rating from NVD · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorNVD

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
Low

DescriptionNVD

CometBFT is a Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) middleware that takes a state transition machine and replicates it on many machines. An internal modification made in versions 0.34.28 and 0.37.1 to the way struct PeerState is serialized to JSON introduced a deadlock when new function MarshallJSON is called. This function can be called from two places. The first is via logs, setting the consensus logging module to "debug" level (should not happen in production), and setting the log output format to JSON. The second is via RPC dump_consensus_state.

Case 1, which should not be hit in production, will eventually hit the deadlock in most goroutines, effectively halting the node.

In case 2, only the data structures related to the first peer will be deadlocked, together with the thread(s) dealing with the RPC request(s). This means that only one of the channels of communication to the node's peers will be blocked. Eventually the peer will timeout and excluded from the list (typically after 2 minutes). The goroutines involved in the deadlock will not be garbage collected, but they will not interfere with the system after the peer is excluded.

The theoretical worst case for case 2, is a network with only two validator nodes. In this case, each of the nodes only has one PeerState struct. If dump_consensus_state is called in either node (or both), the chain will halt until the peer connections time out, after which the nodes will reconnect (with different PeerState structs) and the chain will progress again. Then, the same process can be repeated.

As the number of nodes in a network increases, and thus, the number of peer struct each node maintains, the possibility of reproducing the perturbation visible with two nodes decreases. Only the first PeerState struct will deadlock, and not the others (RPC dump_consensus_state accesses them in a for loop, so the deadlock at the first iteration causes the rest of the iterations of that "for" loop to never be reached).

This regression was fixed in versions 0.34.29 and 0.37.2. Some workarounds are available. For case 1 (hitting the deadlock via logs), either don't set the log output to "json", leave at "plain", or don't set the consensus logging module to "debug", leave it at "info" or higher. For case 2 (hitting the deadlock via RPC dump_consensus_state), do not expose dump_consensus_state RPC endpoint to the public internet (e.g., via rules in one's nginx setup).

Threat Intelligence Overview

EPSS Score
0.9%
Top 46% exploitable
Exploit
POC
Public exploit code exists
Data Quality
3 sources
Confidence: Low

How this decision was reached

The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.

SignalValue
Severity MEDIUM
CISA KEV No
Public POC Yes
EPSS 0.9%
Patch available Yes
Active threat No
Deciding rule
MEDIUM severity (CVSS 4.0-6.9)
What every action level means
Emergency Immediate action required. Criteria: CRITICAL + in CISA KEV (actively exploited) without patch, OR CRITICAL + EPSS > 30% without patch, OR CRITICAL + active threat signals without patch.
Act Now Prioritize within 24-48h. Criteria: in KEV with patch available, OR CRITICAL + public POC, OR HIGH + EPSS > 10%, OR CRITICAL + active threat, OR any CRITICAL severity.
This Week Schedule remediation this week. Criteria: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9). Patch within normal change window.
This Month Plan within 30 days. Criteria: MEDIUM severity (CVSS 4.0-6.9), lower exploitation probability. Include in regular patch cycle.
Monitor Track and reassess. Criteria: LOW severity (CVSS 0.1-3.9), minimal exploitation risk. No immediate action needed.

SSVC AssessmentENISA

SSVC Decision· derived
Scheduled
Exploitation· derived
Poc
System Exposure· derived
Open
Automatable· derived
Yes
Human Impact· derived
Medium

Priority Score

47
Low Medium High Critical
KEV: 0
EPSS: +1
CVSS: +26
PoC: +20
Weaponized: 0
Threat intel: 0
Gov advisory: 0

Attack Technique

Information disclosure occurs when an application unintentionally exposes sensitive data that aids attackers in reconnaissance or directly compromises security.

Affected Products (CPE)NVD

cpe:2.3:a:cometbft:cometbft:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cpe:2.3:a:cometbft:cometbft:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

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