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Linux CVE-2022-49201

MEDIUM
Race Condition (CWE-362)
2025-02-26 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
4.7
CVSS 3.1 · NVD
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Severity by source

NVD PRIMARY
4.7 MEDIUM
AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
SUSE
MEDIUM
qualitative
Red Hat
4.7 MEDIUM
qualitative

Primary rating from NVD.

CVSS VectorNVD

Attack Vector
Local
Attack Complexity
High
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Analysis Generated
Mar 28, 2026 - 18:28 vuln.today
Patch released
Mar 28, 2026 - 18:28 nvd
Patch available
CVE Published
Feb 26, 2025 - 07:00 nvd
MEDIUM 4.7

DescriptionNVD

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ibmvnic: fix race between xmit and reset

There is a race between reset and the transmit paths that can lead to ibmvnic_xmit() accessing an scrq after it has been freed in the reset path. It can result in a crash like:

Kernel attempted to read user page (0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0080000016189f8 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] ... NIP [c0080000016189f8] ibmvnic_xmit+0x60/0xb60 [ibmvnic] LR [c000000000c0046c] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11c/0x280 Call Trace: [c008000001618f08] ibmvnic_xmit+0x570/0xb60 [ibmvnic] (unreliable) [c000000000c0046c] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11c/0x280 [c000000000c9cfcc] sch_direct_xmit+0xec/0x330 [c000000000bfe640] __dev_xmit_skb+0x3a0/0x9d0 [c000000000c00ad4] __dev_queue_xmit+0x394/0x730 [c008000002db813c] __bond_start_xmit+0x254/0x450 [bonding] [c008000002db8378] bond_start_xmit+0x40/0xc0 [bonding] [c000000000c0046c] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11c/0x280 [c000000000c00ca4] __dev_queue_xmit+0x564/0x730 [c000000000cf97e0] neigh_hh_output+0xd0/0x180 [c000000000cfa69c] ip_finish_output2+0x31c/0x5c0 [c000000000cfd244] __ip_queue_xmit+0x194/0x4f0 [c000000000d2a3c4] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x434/0x9b0 [c000000000d2d1e0] __tcp_retransmit_skb+0x1d0/0x6a0 [c000000000d2d984] tcp_retransmit_skb+0x34/0x130 [c000000000d310e8] tcp_retransmit_timer+0x388/0x6d0 [c000000000d315ec] tcp_write_timer_handler+0x1bc/0x330 [c000000000d317bc] tcp_write_timer+0x5c/0x200 [c000000000243270] call_timer_fn+0x50/0x1c0 [c000000000243704] __run_timers.part.0+0x324/0x460 [c000000000243894] run_timer_softirq+0x54/0xa0 [c000000000ea713c] __do_softirq+0x15c/0x3e0 [c000000000166258] __irq_exit_rcu+0x158/0x190 [c000000000166420] irq_exit+0x20/0x40 [c00000000002853c] timer_interrupt+0x14c/0x2b0 [c000000000009a00] decrementer_common_virt+0x210/0x220 --- interrupt: 900 at plpar_hcall_norets_notrace+0x18/0x2c

The immediate cause of the crash is the access of tx_scrq in the following snippet during a reset, where the tx_scrq can be either NULL or an address that will soon be invalid:

ibmvnic_xmit() { ... tx_scrq = adapter->tx_scrq[queue_num]; txq = netdev_get_tx_queue(netdev, queue_num); ind_bufp = &tx_scrq->ind_buf;

if (test_bit(0, &adapter->resetting)) { ... }

But beyond that, the call to ibmvnic_xmit() itself is not safe during a reset and the reset path attempts to avoid this by stopping the queue in ibmvnic_cleanup(). However just after the queue was stopped, an in-flight ibmvnic_complete_tx() could have restarted the queue even as the reset is progressing.

Since the queue was restarted we could get a call to ibmvnic_xmit() which can then access the bad tx_scrq (or other fields).

We cannot however simply have ibmvnic_complete_tx() check the ->resetting bit and skip starting the queue. This can race at the "back-end" of a good reset which just restarted the queue but has not cleared the ->resetting bit yet. If we skip restarting the queue due to ->resetting being true, the queue would remain stopped indefinitely potentially leading to transmit timeouts.

IOW ->resetting is too broad for this purpose. Instead use a new flag that indicates whether or not the queues are active. Only the open/ reset paths control when the queues are active. ibmvnic_complete_tx() and others wake up the queue only if the queue is marked active.

So we will have: A. reset/open thread in ibmvnic_cleanup() and __ibmvnic_open()

->resetting = true ->tx_queues_active = false disable tx queues ... ->tx_queues_active = true start tx queues

B. Tx interrupt in ibmvnic_complete_tx():

if (->tx_queues_active) netif_wake_subqueue();

To ensure that ->tx_queues_active and state of the queues are consistent, we need a lock which:

  • must also be taken in the interrupt path (ibmvnic_complete_tx())
  • shared across the multiple

---truncated---

AnalysisAI

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ibmvnic: fix race between xmit and reset There is a race between reset and the transmit paths that can lead to ibmvnic_xmit(). Rated medium severity (CVSS 4.7).

Technical ContextAI

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-362. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ibmvnic: fix race between xmit and reset There is a race between reset and the transmit paths that can lead to ibmvnic_xmit() accessing an scrq after it has been freed in the reset path. It can result in a crash like: Kernel attempted to read user page (0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0080000016189f8 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] ... NIP [c0080000016189f8] ibmvnic_xmit+0x60/0xb60 [ibmvnic] LR [c000000000c0046c] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11c/0x280 Call Trace: [c008000001618f08] ibmvnic_xmit+0x570/0xb60 [ibmvnic] (unreliable) [c000000000c0046c] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11c/0x280 [c000000000c9cfcc] sch_direct_xmit+0xec/0x330 [c000000000bfe640] __dev_xmit_skb+0x3a0/0x9d0 [c000000000c00ad4] __dev_queue_xmit+0x394/0x730 [c008000002db813c] __bond_start_xmit+0x254/0x450 [bonding] [c008000002db8378] bond_start_xmit+0x40/0xc0 [bonding] [c000000000c0046c] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11c/0x280 [c000000000c00ca4] __dev_queue_xmit+0x564/0x730 [c000000000cf97e0] neigh_hh_output+0xd0/0x180 [c000000000cfa69c] ip_finish_output2+0x31c/0x5c0 [c000000000cfd244] __ip_queue_xmit+0x194/0x4f0 [c000000000d2a3c4] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x434/0x9b0 [c000000000d2d1e0] __tcp_retransmit_skb+0x1d0/0x6a0 [c000000000d2d984] tcp_retransmit_skb+0x34/0x130 [c000000000d310e8] tcp_retransmit_timer+0x388/0x6d0 [c000000000d315ec] tcp_write_timer_handler+0x1bc/0x330 [c000000000d317bc] tcp_write_timer+0x5c/0x200 [c000000000243270] call_timer_fn+0x50/0x1c0 [c000000000243704] __run_timers.part.0+0x324/0x460 [c000000000243894] run_timer_softirq+0x54/0xa0 [c000000000ea713c] __do_softirq+0x15c/0x3e0 [c000000000166258] __irq_exit_rcu+0x158/0x190 [c000000000166420] irq_exit+0x20/0x40 [c00000000002853c] timer_interrupt+0x14c/0x2b0 [c000000000009a00] decrementer_common_virt+0x210/0x220 --- interrupt: 900 at plpar_hcall_norets_notrace+0x18/0x2c The immediate cause of the crash is the access of tx_scrq in the following snippet during a reset, where the tx_scrq can be either NULL or an address that will soon be invalid: ibmvnic_xmit() { ... tx_scrq = adapter->tx_scrq[queue_num]; txq = netdev_get_tx_queue(netdev, queue_num); ind_bufp = &tx_scrq->ind_buf; if (test_bit(0, &adapter->resetting)) { ... } But beyond that, the call to ibmvnic_xmit() itself is not safe during a reset and the reset path attempts to avoid this by stopping the queue in ibmvnic_cleanup(). However just after the queue was stopped, an in-flight ibmvnic_complete_tx() could have restarted the queue even as the reset is progressing. Since the queue was restarted we could get a call to ibmvnic_xmit() which can then access the bad tx_scrq (or other fields). We cannot however simply have ibmvnic_complete_tx() check the ->resetting bit and skip starting the queue. This can race at the "back-end" of a good reset which just restarted the queue but has not cleared the ->resetting bit yet. If we skip restarting the queue due to ->resetting being true, the queue would remain stopped indefinitely potentially leading to transmit timeouts. IOW ->resetting is too broad for this purpose. Instead use a new flag that indicates whether or not the queues are active. Only the open/ reset paths control when the queues are active. ibmvnic_complete_tx() and others wake up the queue only if the queue is marked active. So we will have: A. reset/open thread in ibmvnic_cleanup() and __ibmvnic_open() ->resetting = true ->tx_queues_active = false disable tx queues ... ->tx_queues_active = true start tx queues B. Tx interrupt in ibmvnic_complete_tx(): if (->tx_queues_active) netif_wake_subqueue(); To ensure that ->tx_queues_active and state of the queues are consistent, we need a lock which: - must also be taken in the interrupt path (ibmvnic_complete_tx()) - shared across the multiple ---truncated--- Affected products include: Linux Linux Kernel.

RemediationAI

A vendor patch is available. Apply the latest security update as soon as possible. Apply vendor patches when available. Implement network segmentation and monitoring as interim mitigations.

Vendor StatusVendor

SUSE

Severity: Medium
Product Status
Container suse/sle-micro-rancher/5.2:latest Image SLES15-SP3-BYOS-Azure Image SLES15-SP3-HPC-BYOS-Azure Image SLES15-SP3-Micro-5-2-BYOS-Azure Image SLES15-SP3-Micro-5-2-BYOS-EC2-HVM Image SLES15-SP3-Micro-5-2-BYOS-GCE Image SLES15-SP3-SAPCAL-Azure Affected
Container suse/sle-micro-rancher/5.3:latest Container suse/sle-micro-rancher/5.4:latest Image SLES15-SP4-BYOS Image SLES15-SP4-BYOS-Azure Image SLES15-SP4-BYOS-EC2 Image SLES15-SP4-BYOS-GCE Image SLES15-SP4-CHOST-BYOS Image SLES15-SP4-CHOST-BYOS-Aliyun Image SLES15-SP4-CHOST-BYOS-Azure Image SLES15-SP4-CHOST-BYOS-EC2 Image SLES15-SP4-CHOST-BYOS-GCE Image SLES15-SP4-CHOST-BYOS-SAP-CCloud Image SLES15-SP4-HPC-BYOS Image SLES15-SP4-HPC-BYOS-Azure Image SLES15-SP4-HPC-BYOS-EC2 Image SLES15-SP4-HPC-BYOS-GCE Image SLES15-SP4-HPC-EC2 Image SLES15-SP4-HPC-GCE Image SLES15-SP4-Hardened-BYOS Image SLES15-SP4-Hardened-BYOS-Azure Image SLES15-SP4-Hardened-BYOS-EC2 Image SLES15-SP4-Hardened-BYOS-GCE Image SLES15-SP4-Manager-Proxy-4-3-BYOS Image SLES15-SP4-Manager-Proxy-4-3-BYOS-Azure Image SLES15-SP4-Manager-Proxy-4-3-BYOS-EC2 Image SLES15-SP4-Manager-Proxy-4-3-BYOS-GCE Image SLES15-SP4-Manager-Server-4-3-BYOS Image SLES15-SP4-Manager-Server-4-3-BYOS-Azure Image SLES15-SP4-Manager-Server-4-3-BYOS-EC2 Image SLES15-SP4-Manager-Server-4-3-BYOS-GCE Image SLES15-SP4-Micro-5-3 Image SLES15-SP4-Micro-5-3-BYOS Image SLES15-SP4-Micro-5-3-BYOS-Azure Image SLES15-SP4-Micro-5-3-BYOS-EC2 Image SLES15-SP4-Micro-5-3-BYOS-GCE Image SLES15-SP4-Micro-5-3-EC2 Image SLES15-SP4-Micro-5-4 Image SLES15-SP4-Micro-5-4-BYOS Image SLES15-SP4-Micro-5-4-BYOS-Azure Image SLES15-SP4-Micro-5-4-BYOS-EC2 Image SLES15-SP4-Micro-5-4-BYOS-GCE Image SLES15-SP4-Micro-5-4-EC2 Image SLES15-SP4-Micro-5-4-GCE Image SLES15-SP4-SAP Image SLES15-SP4-SAP-Azure Image SLES15-SP4-SAP-EC2 Image SLES15-SP4-SAP-GCE Image SLES15-SP4-SAPCAL Image SLES15-SP4-SAPCAL-Azure Image SLES15-SP4-SAPCAL-EC2 Image SLES15-SP4-SAPCAL-GCE Affected
Container suse/sle-micro/base-5.5:2.0.4-5.8.160 Image SLES15-SP5-BYOS-Azure Image SLES15-SP5-BYOS-EC2 Image SLES15-SP5-BYOS-GCE Image SLES15-SP5-CHOST-BYOS-Aliyun Image SLES15-SP5-CHOST-BYOS-Azure Image SLES15-SP5-CHOST-BYOS-EC2 Image SLES15-SP5-CHOST-BYOS-GCE Image SLES15-SP5-CHOST-BYOS-GDC Image SLES15-SP5-CHOST-BYOS-SAP-CCloud Image SLES15-SP5-EC2 Image SLES15-SP5-GCE Image SLES15-SP5-HPC-BYOS-Azure Image SLES15-SP5-HPC-BYOS-EC2 Image SLES15-SP5-HPC-BYOS-GCE Image SLES15-SP5-Hardened-BYOS-Azure Image SLES15-SP5-Hardened-BYOS-EC2 Image SLES15-SP5-Hardened-BYOS-GCE Image SLES15-SP5-Manager-Proxy-5-0-BYOS Image SLES15-SP5-Manager-Proxy-5-0-BYOS-Azure Image SLES15-SP5-Manager-Proxy-5-0-BYOS-EC2 Image SLES15-SP5-Manager-Proxy-5-0-BYOS-GCE Image SLES15-SP5-Manager-Server-5-0 Image SLES15-SP5-Manager-Server-5-0-Azure-llc Image SLES15-SP5-Manager-Server-5-0-Azure-ltd Image SLES15-SP5-Manager-Server-5-0-BYOS Image SLES15-SP5-Manager-Server-5-0-BYOS-Azure Image SLES15-SP5-Manager-Server-5-0-BYOS-EC2 Image SLES15-SP5-Manager-Server-5-0-BYOS-GCE Image SLES15-SP5-Manager-Server-5-0-EC2-llc Image SLES15-SP5-Manager-Server-5-0-EC2-ltd Image SLES15-SP5-Micro-5-5 Image SLES15-SP5-Micro-5-5-Azure Image SLES15-SP5-Micro-5-5-BYOS Image SLES15-SP5-Micro-5-5-BYOS-Azure Image SLES15-SP5-Micro-5-5-BYOS-EC2 Image SLES15-SP5-Micro-5-5-BYOS-GCE Image SLES15-SP5-Micro-5-5-EC2 Image SLES15-SP5-Micro-5-5-GCE Image SLES15-SP5-SAPCAL-Azure Image SLES15-SP5-SAPCAL-EC2 Image SLES15-SP5-SAPCAL-GCE Affected
Container suse/sle-micro/kvm-5.5:2.0.4-3.5.304 Affected
Container suse/sle-micro/rt-5.5:2.0.4-4.5.352 Affected

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CVE-2022-49201 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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