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Cosign CVE-2022-23649

LOW
Improper Certificate Validation (CWE-295)
2022-02-18 security-advisories@github.com
3.3
CVSS 3.1 · NVD

Severity by source

NVD PRIMARY
3.3 LOW
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Primary rating from NVD · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorNVD

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Attack Vector
Local
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

1
CVE Published
Feb 18, 2022 - 22:15 nvd
LOW 3.3

DescriptionNVD

Cosign provides container signing, verification, and storage in an OCI registry for the sigstore project. Prior to version 1.5.2, Cosign can be manipulated to claim that an entry for a signature exists in the Rekor transparency log even if it doesn't. This requires the attacker to have pull and push permissions for the signature in OCI. This can happen with both standard signing with a keypair and "keyless signing" with Fulcio. If an attacker has access to the signature in OCI, they can manipulate cosign into believing the entry was stored in Rekor even though it wasn't. The vulnerability has been patched in v1.5.2 of Cosign. The signature in the signedEntryTimestamp provided by Rekor is now compared to the signature that is being verified. If these don't match, then an error is returned. If a valid bundle is copied to a different signature, verification should fail. Cosign output now only informs the user that certificates were verified if a certificate was in fact verified. There is currently no known workaround.

AnalysisAI

Cosign provides container signing, verification, and storage in an OCI registry for the sigstore project. Rated low severity (CVSS 3.3), this vulnerability is low attack complexity.

Technical ContextAI

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-295. Cosign provides container signing, verification, and storage in an OCI registry for the sigstore project. Prior to version 1.5.2, Cosign can be manipulated to claim that an entry for a signature exists in the Rekor transparency log even if it doesn't. This requires the attacker to have pull and push permissions for the signature in OCI. This can happen with both standard signing with a keypair and "keyless signing" with Fulcio. If an attacker has access to the signature in OCI, they can manipulate cosign into believing the entry was stored in Rekor even though it wasn't. The vulnerability has been patched in v1.5.2 of Cosign. The signature in the signedEntryTimestamp provided by Rekor is now compared to the signature that is being verified. If these don't match, then an error is returned. If a valid bundle is copied to a different signature, verification should fail. Cosign output now only informs the user that certificates were verified if a certificate was in fact verified. There is currently no known workaround. Affected products include: Sigstore Cosign. Version information: version 1.5.2.

RemediationAI

A vendor patch is available. Apply the latest security update as soon as possible. Apply vendor patches when available. Implement network segmentation and monitoring as interim mitigations.

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CVE-2022-23649 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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