Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb/client: fix out-of-bounds read in smb2_compound_op() If a server sends a truncated response but a large OutputBufferLength, and terminates the EA list early, check_wsl_eas() returns success without validating that the entire OutputBufferLength fits within iov_len. Then smb2_compound_op() does: memcpy(idata->wsl.eas, data[0], size[0]); Where size[0] is OutputBufferLength. If iov_len is smaller than size[0], memcpy can read beyond the end of the rsp_iov allocation and leak adjacent kernel heap memory.

{weight,idle,bandwidth}() cache scx_root before acquiring scx_cgroup_ops_rwsem, so the pointer can be stale by the time the op runs. If the loaded scheduler is disabled and freed (via RCU work) and another is enabled between the naked load and the rwsem acquire, the reader sees scx_cgroup_enabled=true (the new scheduler's) but dereferences the freed one - UAF on SCX_HAS_OP(sch, ...) / SCX_CALL_OP(sch, ...). scx_cgroup_enabled is toggled only under scx_cgroup_ops_rwsem write (scx_cgroup_{init,exit}), so reading scx_root inside the rwsem read section correlates @sch with the enabled snapshot.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: 8021q: delete cleared egress QoS mappings vlan_dev_set_egress_priority() currently keeps cleared egress priority mappings in the hash as tombstones. Repeated set/clear cycles with distinct skb priorities therefore accumulate mapping nodes until device teardown and leak memory. Delete mappings when vlan_prio is cleared instead of keeping tombstones. Now that the egress mapping lists are RCU protected, the node can be unlinked safely and freed after a grace period.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: drop stray 'static' from fast-RX rx_result ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx() is documented as safe for parallel RX, but its per-invocation rx_result is declared static. Concurrent callers then share one instance and can overwrite each other's result between ieee80211_rx_mesh_data() and the switch on res. That can make a packet that was queued or consumed by ieee80211_rx_mesh_data() fall through into ieee80211_rx_8023(), or make a packet that should continue return as queued. Make res an automatic variable so each invocation keeps its own result.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: usblp: fix heap leak in IEEE 1284 device ID via short response usblp_ctrl_msg() collapses the usb_control_msg() return value to 0/-errno, discarding the actual number of bytes transferred. A broken printer can complete the GET_DEVICE_ID control transfer short and the driver has no way to know. usblp_cache_device_id_string() reads the 2-byte big-endian length prefix from the response and trusts it (clamped only to the buffer bounds). The buffer is kmalloc(1024) at probe time. A device that sends exactly two bytes (e.g. 0x03 0xFF, claiming a 1023-byte ID) leaves device_id_string[2..1022] holding stale kmalloc heap. That stale data is then exposed: - via the ieee1284_id sysfs attribute (sprintf("%s", buf+2), truncated at the first NUL in the stale heap), and - via the IOCNR_GET_DEVICE_ID ioctl, which copy_to_user()s the full claimed length regardless of NULs, up to 1021 bytes of uninitialized heap, with the leak size chosen by the device. Fix this up by just zapping the buffer with zeros before each request sent to the device.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fanotify: fix false positive on permission events fsnotify_get_mark_safe() may return false for a mark on an unrelated group, which results in bypassing the permission check. Fix by skipping over detached marks that are not in the current group.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: configfs: Bound snprintf() return in tg_pt_gp_members_show() target_tg_pt_gp_members_show() formats LUN paths with snprintf() into a 256-byte stack buffer, then will memcpy() cur_len bytes from that buffer. snprintf() returns the length the output would have had, which can exceed the buffer size when the fabric WWN is long because iSCSI IQN names can be up to 223 bytes. The check at the memcpy() site only guards the destination page write, not the source read, so memcpy() will read past the stack buffer and copy adjacent stack contents to the sysfs reader, which when CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE is enabled, fortify_panic() will be triggered. Commit 27e06650a5ea ("scsi: target: target_core_configfs: Add length check to avoid buffer overflow") added the same bound to the target_lu_gp_members_show() but the tg_pt_gp variant was missed so resolve that here.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: microchip-core-qspi: control built-in cs manually The coreQSPI IP supports only a single chip select, which is automagically operated by the hardware - set low when the transmit buffer first gets written to and set high when the number of bytes written to the TOTALBYTES field of the FRAMES register have been sent on the bus. Additional devices must use GPIOs for their chip selects. It was reported to me that if there are two devices attached to this QSPI controller that the in-built chip select is set low while linux tries to access the device attached to the GPIO. This went undetected as the boards that connected multiple devices to the SPI controller all exclusively used GPIOs for chip selects, not relying on the built-in chip select at all. It turns out that this was because the built-in chip select, when controlled automagically, is set low when active and high when inactive, thereby ruling out its use for active-high devices or devices that need to transmit with the chip select disabled. Modify the driver so that it controls chip select directly, retaining the behaviour for mem_ops of setting the chip select active for the entire duration of the transfer in the exec_op callback. For regular transfers, implement the set_cs callback for the core to use. As part of this, the existing setup callback, mchp_coreqspi_setup_op(), is removed. Modifying the CLKIDLE field is not safe to do during operation when there are multiple devices, so this code is removed entirely. Setting the MASTER and ENABLE fields is something that can be done once at probe, it doesn't need to be re-run for each device. Instead the new setup callback sets the built-in chip select to its inactive state for active-low devices, as the reset value of the chip select in software controlled mode is low.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: Fix pin leak and publication ordering in __pkvm_init_vcpu() Two bugs exist in the vCPU initialisation path: 1. If a check fails after hyp_pin_shared_mem() succeeds, the cleanup path jumps to 'unlock' without calling unpin_host_vcpu() or unpin_host_sve_state(), permanently leaking pin references on the host vCPU and SVE state pages. Extract a register_hyp_vcpu() helper that performs the checks and the store. When register_hyp_vcpu() returns an error, call unpin_host_vcpu() and unpin_host_sve_state() inline before falling through to the existing 'unlock' label. 2. register_hyp_vcpu() publishes the new vCPU pointer into 'hyp_vm->vcpus[]' with a bare store, allowing a concurrent caller of pkvm_load_hyp_vcpu() to observe a partially initialised vCPU object. Ensure the store uses smp_store_release() and the load uses smp_load_acquire(). While 'vm_table_lock' currently serialises the store and the load, these barriers ensure the reader sees the fully initialised 'hyp_vcpu' object even if there were a lockless path or if the lock's own ordering guarantees were insufficient for nested object initialization.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb-audio: Avoid potential endless loop in convert_chmap_v3() The convert_chmap_v3() has a loop with its increment size of cs_desc->wLength, but we forgot to validate cs_desc->wLength itself, which may lead to potential endless loop by a malformed descriptor. Add a proper size check to abort the loop for plugging the hole.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/mana: Validate rx_hash_key_len Sashiko points out that rx_hash_key_len comes from a uAPI structure and is blindly passed to memcpy, allowing the userspace to trash kernel memory. Bounds check it so the memcpy cannot overflow.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/mana: Fix error unwind in mana_ib_create_qp_rss() Sashiko points out that mana_ib_cfg_vport_steering() is leaked, the normal destroy path cleans it up.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: qcom: q6apm-lpass-dai: Fix multiple graph opens As prepare can be called mulitple times, this can result in multiple graph opens for playback path. This will result in a memory leaks, fix this by adding a check before opening.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: libwx: fix VF illegal register access Register WX_CFG_PORT_ST is a PF restricted register. When a VF is initialized, attempting to read this register triggers an illegal register access, which lead to a system hang. When the device is VF, the bus function ID can be obtained directly from the PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/xive: fix kmemleak caused by incorrect chip_data lookup The kmemleak reports the following memory leak: Unreferenced object 0xc0000002a7fbc640 (size 64): comm "kworker/8:1", pid 540, jiffies 4294937872 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 09 04 00 04 00 00 ................ 00 00 a7 81 00 00 0a c0 00 00 08 04 00 04 00 00 ................ backtrace (crc 177d48f6): __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x520/0x730 xive_irq_alloc_data.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 xive_irq_domain_alloc+0xd0/0x1b0 irq_domain_alloc_irqs_parent+0x44/0x6c pseries_irq_domain_alloc+0x1cc/0x354 irq_domain_alloc_irqs_parent+0x44/0x6c msi_domain_alloc+0xb0/0x220 irq_domain_alloc_irqs_locked+0x138/0x4d0 __irq_domain_alloc_irqs+0x8c/0xfc __msi_domain_alloc_irqs+0x214/0x4d8 msi_domain_alloc_irqs_all_locked+0x70/0xf8 pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs+0x60/0x78 __pci_enable_msix_range+0x54c/0x98c pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0x16c/0x1d4 nvme_pci_enable+0xac/0x9c0 [nvme] nvme_probe+0x340/0x764 [nvme] This occurs when allocating MSI-X vectors for an NVMe device. During allocation the XIVE code creates a struct xive_irq_data and stores it in irq_data->chip_data. When the MSI-X irqdomain is later freed, xive_irq_free_data() is responsible for retrieving this structure and freeing it. However, after commit cc0cc23babc9 ("powerpc/xive: Untangle xive from child interrupt controller drivers"), xive_irq_free_data() retrieves the chip_data using irq_get_chip_data(), which looks up the data through the child domain. This is incorrect because the XIVE-specific irq data is associated with the XIVE (parent) domain. As a result the lookup fails and the allocated struct xive_irq_data is never freed, leading to the kmemleak report shown above. Fix this by retrieving the irq_data from the correct domain using irq_domain_get_irq_data() and then accessing the chip_data via irq_data_get_irq_chip_data().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btmtk: validate WMT event SKB length before struct access btmtk_usb_hci_wmt_sync() casts the WMT event response SKB data to struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt (7 bytes) and struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt_funcc (9 bytes) without first checking that the SKB contains enough data. A short firmware response causes out-of-bounds reads from SKB tailroom. Use skb_pull_data() to validate and advance past the base WMT event header. For the FUNC_CTRL case, pull the additional status field bytes before accessing them.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: use kzalloc to zero-initialize security descriptor buffer Commit 62e7dd0a39c2d ("smb: common: change the data type of num_aces to le16") split struct smb_acl's __le32 num_aces field into __le16 num_aces and __le16 reserved. The reserved field corresponds to Sbz2 in the MS-DTYP ACL wire format, which must be zero [1]. When building an ACL descriptor in build_sec_desc(), we are using a kmalloc()'ed descriptor buffer and writing the fields explicitly using le16() writes now. This never writes to the 2 byte reserved field, leaving it as uninitialized heap data. When the reserved field happens to contain non-zero slab garbage, Samba rejects the security descriptor with "ndr_pull_security_descriptor failed: Range Error", causing chmod to fail with EINVAL. Change kmalloc() to kzalloc() to ensure the entire buffer is zero-initialized. [1] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-dtyp/20233ed8-a6c6-4097-aafa-dd545ed24428

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix OOB read and infinite loop in hci_le_create_big_complete_evt hci_le_create_big_complete_evt() iterates over BT_BOUND connections for a BIG handle using a while loop, accessing ev->bis_handle[i++] on each iteration. However, there is no check that i stays within ev->num_bis before the array access. When a controller sends a LE_Create_BIG_Complete event with fewer bis_handle entries than there are BT_BOUND connections for that BIG, or with num_bis=0, the loop reads beyond the valid bis_handle[] flex array into adjacent heap memory. Since the out-of-bounds values typically exceed HCI_CONN_HANDLE_MAX (0x0EFF), hci_conn_set_handle() rejects them and the connection remains in BT_BOUND state. The same connection is then found again by hci_conn_hash_lookup_big_state(), creating an infinite loop with hci_dev_lock held. Fix this by terminating the BIG if in case not all BIS could be setup properly.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: pm: ADD_ADDR rtx: fix potential data-race This mptcp_pm_add_timer() helper is executed as a timer callback in softirq context. To avoid any data races, the socket lock needs to be held with bh_lock_sock(). If the socket is in use, retry again soon after, similar to what is done with the keepalive timer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7921: fix a potential clc buffer length underflow The buf_len is used to limit the iterations for retrieving the country power setting and may underflow under certain conditions due to changes in the power table in CLC. This underflow leads to an almost infinite loop or an invalid power setting resulting in driver initialization failure.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet-tcp: fix race between ICReq handling and queue teardown nvmet_tcp_handle_icreq() updates queue->state after sending an Initialization Connection Response (ICResp), but it does so without serializing against target-side queue teardown. If an NVMe/TCP host sends an Initialization Connection Request (ICReq) and immediately closes the connection, target-side teardown may start in softirq context before io_work drains the already buffered ICReq. In that case, nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue() sets queue->state to NVMET_TCP_Q_DISCONNECTING and drops the queue reference under state_lock. If io_work later processes that ICReq, nvmet_tcp_handle_icreq() can still overwrite the state back to NVMET_TCP_Q_LIVE. That defeats the DISCONNECTING-state guard in nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue() and allows a later socket state change to re-enter teardown and issue a second kref_put() on an already released queue. The ICResp send failure path has the same problem. If teardown has already moved the queue to DISCONNECTING, a send error can still overwrite the state with NVMET_TCP_Q_FAILED, again reopening the window for a second teardown path to drop the queue reference. Fix this by serializing both post-send state transitions with state_lock and bailing out if teardown has already started. Use -ESHUTDOWN as an internal sentinel for that bail-out path rather than propagating it as a transport error like -ECONNRESET. Keep nvmet_tcp_socket_error() setting rcv_state to NVMET_TCP_RECV_ERR before honoring that sentinel so receive-side parsing stays quiesced until the existing release path completes.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/chrome: cros_ec_typec: Init mutex in Thunderbolt registration cros_typec_register_thunderbolt() missed initializing the `adata->lock` mutex. This leads to a NULL dereference when the mutex is later acquired (e.g. in cros_typec_altmode_work()). Initialize the mutex in cros_typec_register_thunderbolt() to fix the issue.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Reject unknown opcodes before ICRC processing Even after applying commit 7244491dab34 ("RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv"), a single unauthenticated UDP packet can still trigger panic. That patch handled payload_size() underflow only for valid opcodes with short packets, not for packets carrying an unknown opcode. The unknown-opcode OOB read described below predates that commit and reaches back to the initial Soft RoCE driver. The check added there reads pkt->paylen < header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE where header_size(pkt) expands to rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].length. The rxe_opcode[] array has 256 entries but is only populated for defined IB opcodes; any other entry (for example opcode 0xff) is zero-initialized, so length == 0 and the check degenerates to pkt->paylen < 0 + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE which does not constrain pkt->paylen enough. rxe_icrc_hdr() then computes rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].length - RXE_BTH_BYTES which underflows when length == 0 and passes a huge value to rxe_crc32(), causing an out-of-bounds read of the skb payload. Reproduced on v7.0-rc7 with that fix applied, QEMU/KVM with CONFIG_RDMA_RXE=y and CONFIG_KASAN=y, after rdma link add rxe0 type rxe netdev eth0 A single 48-byte UDP packet to port 4791 with BTH opcode=0xff and QPN=IB_MULTICAST_QPN triggers: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in crc32_le+0x115/0x170 Read of size 1 at addr ... The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 704-byte region Call Trace: crc32_le+0x115/0x170 rxe_icrc_hdr.isra.0+0x226/0x300 rxe_icrc_check+0x13f/0x3a0 rxe_rcv+0x6e1/0x16e0 rxe_udp_encap_recv+0x20a/0x320 udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x7ed/0x12c0 Subsequent packets with the same shape fault on unmapped memory and panic the kernel. The trigger requires only module load and "rdma link add"; no QP, no connection, and no authentication. Fix this by rejecting packets whose opcode has no rxe_opcode[] entry, detected via the zero mask or zero length, before any length arithmetic runs.

{ __u8 broadcast[32]; }; The function then copies dev->broadcast into it using dev->addr_len as the length: memcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev->broadcast, dev->addr_len); On Ethernet devices (the overwhelming majority of SR-IOV NICs) dev->addr_len is 6, so only the first 6 bytes of broadcast[] are written. The remaining 26 bytes retain whatever was previously on the kernel stack. The full struct is then handed to userspace via: nla_put(skb, IFLA_VF_BROADCAST, sizeof(vf_broadcast), &vf_broadcast) leaking up to 26 bytes of uninitialised kernel stack per VF per RTM_GETLINK request, repeatable. The other vf_* structs in the same function are explicitly zeroed for exactly this reason - see the memset() calls for ivi, vf_vlan_info, node_guid and port_guid a few lines above. vf_broadcast was simply missed when it was added. Reachability: any unprivileged local process can open AF_NETLINK / NETLINK_ROUTE without capabilities and send RTM_GETLINK with an IFLA_EXT_MASK attribute carrying RTEXT_FILTER_VF. The kernel walks each VF and emits IFLA_VF_BROADCAST, leaking 26 bytes of stack per VF per request. Stack residue at this call site can include return addresses and transient sensitive data; KASAN with stack instrumentation, or KMSAN, will flag the nla_put() when reproduced. Zero the on-stack struct before the partial memcpy, matching the existing pattern used for the other vf_* structs in the same function.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: check for nEPT/nNPT in slow flush hypercalls Checking is_guest_mode(vcpu) is incorrect, because translate_nested_gpa() is only valid if an L2 guest is running *with nested EPT/NPT enabled*. Instead use the same condition as translate_nested_gpa() itself.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-verity-fec: fix reading parity bytes split across blocks (take 3) fec_decode_bufs() assumes that the parity bytes of the first RS codeword it decodes are never split across parity blocks. This assumption is false. Consider v->fec->block_size == 4096 && v->fec->roots == 17 && fio->nbufs == 1, for example. In that case, each call to fec_decode_bufs() consumes v->fec->roots * (fio->nbufs << DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_RS_BITS) = 272 parity bytes. Considering that the parity data for each message block starts on a block boundary, the byte alignment in the parity data will iterate through 272*i mod 4096 until the 3 parity blocks have been consumed. On the 16th call (i=15), the alignment will be 4080 bytes into the first block. Only 16 bytes remain in that block, but 17 parity bytes will be needed. The code reads out-of-bounds from the parity block buffer. Fortunately this doesn't normally happen, since it can occur only for certain non-default values of fec_roots *and* when the maximum number of buffers couldn't be allocated due to low memory. For example with block_size=4096 only the following cases are affected: fec_roots=17: nbufs in [1, 3, 5, 15] fec_roots=19: nbufs in [1, 229] fec_roots=21: nbufs in [1, 3, 5, 13, 15, 39, 65, 195] fec_roots=23: nbufs in [1, 89] Regardless, fix it by refactoring how the parity blocks are read.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix double free in create_space_info() error path When kobject_init_and_add() fails, the call chain is: create_space_info() -> btrfs_sysfs_add_space_info_type() -> kobject_init_and_add() -> failure -> kobject_put(&space_info->kobj) -> space_info_release() -> kfree(space_info) Then control returns to create_space_info(): btrfs_sysfs_add_space_info_type() returns error -> goto out_free -> kfree(space_info) This causes a double free. Keep the direct kfree(space_info) for the earlier failure path, but after btrfs_sysfs_add_space_info_type() has called kobject_put(), let the kobject release callback handle the cleanup.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipmi: Check event message buffer response for bad data The event message buffer response data size got checked later when processing, but check it right after the response comes back. It appears some BMCs may return an empty message instead of an error when fetching events. There are apparently some new BMCs that make this error, so we need to compensate.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/ocrdma: Don't NULL deref uctx on errors in ocrdma_copy_pd_uresp() Sashiko points out that pd->uctx isn't initialized until late in the function so all these error flow references are NULL and will crash. Use the uctx that isn't NULL.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/mana: Fix mana_destroy_wq_obj() cleanup in mana_ib_create_qp_rss() Sashiko points out there are two bugs here in the error unwind flow, both related to how the WQ table is unwound. First there is a double i-- on the first failure path due to the while loop having a i--, remove it. Second if mana_ib_install_cq_cb() fails then mana_create_wq_obj() is not undone due to the above i--.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: remove station if connection prep fails If connection preparation fails for MLO connections, then the interface is completely reset to non-MLD. In this case, we must not keep the station since it's related to the link of the vif being removed. Delete an existing station. Any "new_sta" is already being removed, so that doesn't need changes. This fixes a use-after-free/double-free in debugfs if that's enabled, because a vif going from MLD (and to MLD, but that's not relevant here) recreates its entire debugfs.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: isofs: validate block number from NFS file handle in isofs_export_iget isofs_fh_to_dentry() and isofs_fh_to_parent() pass an attacker- controlled block number (ifid->block or ifid->parent_block) from the NFS file handle to isofs_export_iget(), which only rejects block == 0 before calling isofs_iget() and ultimately sb_bread(). A crafted file handle with fh_len sufficient to pass the check added by commit 0405d4b63d08 ("isofs: Prevent the use of too small fid") can still drive the server to read any in-range block on the backing device as if it were an iso_directory_record. That earlier fix was assigned CVE-2025-37780. sb_bread() on an out-of-range block returns NULL cleanly via the EIO path, so there is no memory-safety violation. For in-range reads of adjacent-partition data on the same block device, the unrelated bytes end up in iso_inode_info fields that reach the NFS client as dentry metadata. The deployment surface (isofs exported over NFS from loop-mounted images) is narrow and requires an authenticated NFS peer, but the malformed-file-handle class is reportable as hardening next to the existing CVE-2025-37780 fix. Reject block >= ISOFS_SB(sb)->s_nzones in isofs_export_iget() so the check covers both isofs_fh_to_dentry() and isofs_fh_to_parent() call sites with a single line.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: virtio_bt: clamp rx length before skb_put virtbt_rx_work() calls skb_put(skb, len) where len comes directly from virtqueue_get_buf() with no validation against the buffer we posted to the device. The RX skb is allocated in virtbt_add_inbuf() and exposed to virtio as exactly 1000 bytes via sg_init_one(). Checking len against skb_tailroom(skb) is not sufficient because alloc_skb() can leave more tailroom than the 1000 bytes actually handed to the device. A malicious or buggy backend can therefore report used.len between 1001 and skb_tailroom(skb), causing skb_put() to include uninitialized kernel heap bytes that were never written by the device. The same path also accepts len == 0, in which case skb_put(skb, 0) leaves the skb empty but virtbt_rx_handle() still reads the pkt_type byte from skb->data, consuming uninitialized memory. Define VIRTBT_RX_BUF_SIZE once and reuse it in alloc_skb() and sg_init_one(), and gate virtbt_rx_work() on that same constant so the bound checked matches the buffer actually exposed to the device. Reject used.len == 0 in the same gate so an empty completion can no longer reach virtbt_rx_handle(). Use bt_dev_err_ratelimited() because the length value comes from an untrusted backend that can otherwise flood the kernel log. Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 ("net/9p: Fix buffer overflow in USB transport layer"), which hardened the USB 9p transport against unchecked device-reported length.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: b43: enforce bounds check on firmware key index in b43_rx() The firmware-controlled key index in b43_rx() can exceed the dev->key[] array size (58 entries). The existing B43_WARN_ON is non-enforcing in production builds, allowing an out-of-bounds read. Make the B43_WARN_ON check enforcing by dropping the frame when the firmware returns an invalid key index.

{on,off}line committing to DAMON. The reads for parameters committing are protected by damon_sysfs_lock to avoid the sysfs files being destroyed while any of the parameters are being read. But the user-driven direct reads and writes are not protected by any lock, while the write is deallocating the memcg_path-pointing buffer. As a result, the readers could read the already freed buffer (user-after-free). Note that the user-reads don't race when the same open file is used by the writer, due to kernfs's open file locking. Nonetheless, doing the reads and writes with separate open files would be common. Fix it by protecting both the user-direct reads and writes with damon_sysfs_lock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ip6_gre: Use cached t->net in ip6erspan_changelink(). After commit 5e72ce3e3980 ("net: ipv6: Use link netns in newlink() of rtnl_link_ops"), ip6erspan_newlink() correctly resolves the per-netns ip6gre hash via link_net. ip6erspan_changelink() was not converted in that series and still uses dev_net(dev), which diverges from the device's creation netns after IFLA_NET_NS_FD migration. This re-inserts the tunnel into the wrong per-netns hash. The original netns keeps a stale entry. When that netns is later destroyed, ip6gre_exit_rtnl_net() walks the stale entry, producing a slab-use-after-free reported by KASAN, followed by a kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c (LIST_POISON1) in unregister_netdevice_many_notify(). Reachable from an unprivileged user namespace (unshare --user --map-root-user --net). ip6gre_changelink() earlier in the same file already uses the cached t->net; only ip6erspan_changelink() has the wrong shape.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: Fix slab-out-of-bounds access in auth message processing If a (potentially corrupted) message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY contains a positive value in its result field, it is treated as an error code by ceph_handle_auth_reply() and returned to handle_auth_reply(). Thereafter, an attempt is made to send the preallocated message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH, where the returned value is interpreted as the size of the front segment to send. If the result value in the message is greater than the size of the memory buffer allocated for the front segment, an out-of-bounds access occurs, and the content of the memory region beyond this buffer is sent out. This patch fixes the issue by treating only negative values in the result field as errors. Positive values are therefore treated as success in the same way as a zero value. Additionally, a BUG_ON is added to __send_prepared_auth_request() comparing the len parameter to front_alloc_len to prevent sending the message if it exceeds the bounds of the allocation and to make it easier to catch any logic flaws leading to this.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pseries/papr-hvpipe: Fix null ptr deref in papr_hvpipe_dev_create_handle() commit 6d3789d347a7 ("papr-hvpipe: convert papr_hvpipe_dev_create_handle() to FD_PREPARE()"), changed the create handle to FD_PREPARE(), but it caused kernel null-ptr-deref because after call to retain_and_null_ptr(src_info), src_info is re-used for adding it to the global list. Getting the following kernel panic in papr_hvpipe_dev_create_handle() when trying to add src_info to the list. Kernel attempted to write user page (0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on write at 0x00000000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000001b44a0 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] ... Call Trace: papr_hvpipe_dev_ioctl+0x1f4/0x48c (unreliable) sys_ioctl+0x528/0x1064 system_call_exception+0x128/0x360 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec Now, the error handling with FD_PREPARE's file cleanup and __free(kfree) auto cleanup is getting too convoluted. This is mainly because we need to ensure only 1 user get the srcID handle. To simplify this, we allocate prepare the src_info in the beginning and add it to the global list under a spinlock after checking that no duplicates exist. This simplify the error handling where if the FD_ADD fails, we can simply remove the src_info from the list and consume any pending msg in hvpipe to be cleared, after src_info became visible in the global list.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/mana: Remove user triggerable WARN_ON() in mana_ib_create_qp_rss() Sashiko points out that the user can specify WQs sharing the same CQ as a part of the uAPI and this will trigger the WARN_ON() then go on to corrupt the kernel. Just reject it outright and fail the QP creation.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: defensively unhash xfrm_state lists in __xfrm_state_delete KASAN reproduces a slab-use-after-free in __xfrm_state_delete()'s hlist_del_rcu calls under syzkaller load on linux-6.12.y stable (reproduced on 6.12.47, also reachable via the same code path on torvalds/master and on the ipsec tree). Nine unique signatures cluster in the xfrm_state lifecycle, the load-bearing one being: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __hlist_del include/linux/list.h:990 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hlist_del_rcu include/linux/rculist.h:516 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __xfrm_state_delete net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881198bcb70 by task kworker/u8:9/435 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net Call Trace: __hlist_del / hlist_del_rcu __xfrm_state_delete xfrm_state_delete xfrm_state_flush xfrm_state_fini ops_exit_list cleanup_net The other observed signatures hit the same slab object from __xfrm_state_lookup, xfrm_alloc_spi, __xfrm_state_insert and an OOB write variant of __xfrm_state_delete, all on the byseq/byspi hash chains. __xfrm_state_delete() guards its byseq and byspi unhashes with value-based predicates: if (x->km.seq) hlist_del_rcu(&x->byseq); if (x->id.spi) hlist_del_rcu(&x->byspi); while everywhere else in the file (e.g. state_cache, state_cache_input) the safer hlist_unhashed() check is used. xfrm_alloc_spi() sets x->id.spi = newspi inside xfrm_state_lock and then immediately inserts into byspi, but a path that observes x->id.spi != 0 outside of xfrm_state_lock can still skip-or-hit the byspi unhash inconsistently with whether x is actually on the list. The same holds for x->km.seq versus byseq, and the bydst/bysrc unhashes have no predicate at all, so a second __xfrm_state_delete() on the same object writes through LIST_POISON pprev. The defensive change here: - Use hlist_del_init_rcu() instead of hlist_del_rcu() on bydst, bysrc, byseq and byspi so a second deletion is a no-op rather than a write through LIST_POISON pprev. The byseq/byspi nodes are already initialised in xfrm_state_alloc(). - Test hlist_unhashed() rather than the value predicate for byseq/byspi, so the unhash decision tracks list state rather than mutable scalar fields. Empirical verification: applied this patch on top of v6.12.47, rebuilt, and re-ran the same syzkaller harness for 1h16m on a previously-crashy configuration that produced ~100 hits each of slab-use-after-free Read in xfrm_alloc_spi / Read in __xfrm_state_lookup / Write in __xfrm_state_delete. After the patch, 7.1M execs across 32 VMs at ~1550 exec/sec produced zero xfrm_state UAF/OOB hits. /proc/slabinfo confirms the xfrm_state slab is actively allocated and freed during the run (~143 KiB resident), so the fuzzer is still exercising those code paths -- they just no longer crash. Reproduction: - Linux 6.12.47 x86_64 + KASAN_GENERIC + KASAN_INLINE + KCOV - syzkaller @ 746545b8b1e4c3a128db8652b340d3df90ce61db - 32 QEMU/KVM VMs x 2 vCPU on AWS c5.metal bare metal - 9 unique signatures collected in ~9h, all within xfrm_state lifecycle

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: add pgmap check to biovec_phys_mergeable biovec_phys_mergeable() is used by the request merge, DMA mapping, and integrity merge paths to decide if two physically contiguous bvec segments can be coalesced into one. It currently has no check for whether the segments belong to different dev_pagemaps. When zone device memory is registered in multiple chunks, each chunk gets its own dev_pagemap. A single bio can legitimately contain bvecs from different pgmaps -- iov_iter_extract_bvecs() breaks at pgmap boundaries but the outer loop in bio_iov_iter_get_pages() continues filling the same bio. If such bvecs are physically contiguous, biovec_phys_mergeable() will coalesce them, making it impossible to recover the correct pgmap for the merged segment via page_pgmap(). Add a zone_device_pages_have_same_pgmap() check to prevent merging bvec segments that span different pgmaps.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Reject non-8-byte ATOMIC_WRITE payloads atomic_write_reply() at drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c unconditionally dereferences 8 bytes at payload_addr(pkt): value = *(u64 *)payload_addr(pkt); check_rkey() previously accepted an ATOMIC_WRITE request with pktlen == resid == 0 because the length validation only compared pktlen against resid. A remote initiator that sets the RETH length to 0 therefore reaches atomic_write_reply() with a zero-byte logical payload, and the responder reads sizeof(u64) bytes from past the logical end of the packet into skb->head tailroom, then writes those 8 bytes into the attacker's MR via rxe_mr_do_atomic_write(). That is a remote disclosure of 4 bytes of kernel tailroom per probe (the other 4 bytes are the packet's own trailing ICRC). IBA oA19-28 defines ATOMIC_WRITE as exactly 8 bytes. Anything else is protocol-invalid. Hoist a strict length check into check_rkey() so the responder never reaches the unchecked dereference, and keep the existing WRITE-family length logic for the normal RDMA WRITE path. Reproduced on mainline with an unmodified rxe driver: a sustained zero-length ATOMIC_WRITE probe repeatedly leaks adjacent skb head-buffer bytes into the attacker's MR, including recognisable kernel strings and partial kernel-direct-map pointer words. With this patch applied the responder rejects the PDU and the MR stays all-zero.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: Fix shadow paging use-after-free due to unexpected GFN The shadow MMU computes GFNs for direct shadow pages using sp->gfn plus the SPTE index. This assumption breaks for shadow paging if the guest page tables are modified between VM entries (similar to commit aad885e77496, "KVM: x86/mmu: Drop/zap existing present SPTE even when creating an MMIO SPTE", 2026-03-27). The flow is as follows: - a PDE is installed for a 2MB mapping, and a page in that area is accessed. KVM creates a kvm_mmu_page consisting of 512 4KB pages; the kvm_mmu_page is marked by FNAME(fetch) as direct-mapped because the guest's mapping is a huge page (and thus contiguous). - the PDE mapping is changed from outside the guest. - the guest accesses another page in the same 2MB area. KVM installs a new leaf SPTE and rmap entry; the SPTE uses the "correct" GFN (i.e. based on the new mapping, as changed in the previous step) but that GFN is outside of the [sp->gfn, sp->gfn + 511] range; therefore the rmap entry cannot be found and removed when the kvm_mmu_page is zapped. - the memslot that covers the first 2MB mapping is deleted, and the kvm_mmu_page for the now-invalid GPA is zapped. However, rmap_remove() only looks at the [sp->gfn, sp->gfn + 511] range established in step 1, and fails to find the rmap entry that was recorded by step 3. - any operation that causes an rmap walk for the same page accessed by step 3 then walks a stale rmap and dereferences a freed kvm_mmu_page. This includes dirty logging or MMU notifier invalidations (e.g., from MADV_DONTNEED). The underlying issue is that KVM's walking of shadow PTEs assumes that if a SPTE is present when KVM wants to install a non-leaf SPTE, then the existing kvm_mmu_page must be for the correct gfn. Because the only way for the gfn to be wrong is if KVM messed up and failed to zap a SPTE... which shouldn't happen, but *actually* only happens in response to a guest write. That bug dates back literally forever, as even the first version of KVM assumes that the GFN matches and walks into the "wrong" shadow page. However, that was only an imprecision until 2032a93d66fa ("KVM: MMU: Don't allocate gfns page for direct mmu pages") came along. Fix it by checking for a target gfn mismatch and zapping the existing SPTE. That way the old SP and rmap entries are gone, KVM installs the rmap in the right location, and everyone is happy.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/hns: Fix unlocked call to hns_roce_qp_remove() Sashiko points out that hns_roce_qp_remove() requires the caller to hold locks. The error flow in hns_roce_create_qp_common() doesn't hold those locks for the error unwind so it risks corrupting memory. Grab the same locks the other two callers use.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_conn: fix potential UAF in create_big_sync Add hci_conn_valid() check in create_big_sync() to detect stale connections before proceeding with BIG creation. Handle the resulting -ECANCELED in create_big_complete() and re-validate the connection under hci_dev_lock() before dereferencing, matching the pattern used by create_le_conn_complete() and create_pa_complete(). Keep the hci_conn object alive across the async boundary by taking a reference via hci_conn_get() when queueing create_big_sync(), and dropping it in the completion callback. The refcount and the lock are complementary: the refcount keeps the object allocated, while hci_dev_lock() serializes hci_conn_hash_del()'s list_del_rcu() on hdev->conn_hash, as required by hci_conn_del(). hci_conn_put() is called outside hci_dev_unlock() so the final put (which resolves to kfree() via bt_link_release) does not run under hdev->lock, though the release path would be safe either way. Without this, create_big_complete() would unconditionally dereference the conn pointer on error, causing a use-after-free via hci_connect_cfm() and hci_conn_del().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: stmmac: Prevent NULL deref when RX memory exhausted The CPU receives frames from the MAC through conventional DMA: the CPU allocates buffers for the MAC, then the MAC fills them and returns ownership to the CPU. For each hardware RX queue, the CPU and MAC coordinate through a shared ring array of DMA descriptors: one descriptor per DMA buffer. Each descriptor includes the buffer's physical address and a status flag ("OWN") indicating which side owns the buffer: OWN=0 for CPU, OWN=1 for MAC. The CPU is only allowed to set the flag and the MAC is only allowed to clear it, and both must move through the ring in sequence: thus the ring is used for both "submissions" and "completions." In the stmmac driver, stmmac_rx() bookmarks its position in the ring with the `cur_rx` index. The main receive loop in that function checks for rx_descs[cur_rx].own=0, gives the corresponding buffer to the network stack (NULLing the pointer), and increments `cur_rx` modulo the ring size. After the loop exits, stmmac_rx_refill(), which bookmarks its position with `dirty_rx`, allocates fresh buffers and rearms the descriptors (setting OWN=1). If it fails any allocation, it simply stops early (leaving OWN=0) and will retry where it left off when next called. This means descriptors have a three-stage lifecycle (terms my own): - `empty` (OWN=1, buffer valid) - `full` (OWN=0, buffer valid and populated) - `dirty` (OWN=0, buffer NULL) But because stmmac_rx() only checks OWN, it confuses `full`/`dirty`. In the past (see 'Fixes:'), there was a bug where the loop could cycle `cur_rx` all the way back to the first descriptor it dirtied, resulting in a NULL dereference when mistaken for `full`. The aforementioned commit resolved that *specific* failure by capping the loop's iteration limit at `dma_rx_size - 1`, but this is only a partial fix: if the previous stmmac_rx_refill() didn't complete, then there are leftover `dirty` descriptors that the loop might encounter without needing to cycle fully around. The current code therefore panics (see 'Closes:') when stmmac_rx_refill() is memory-starved long enough for `cur_rx` to catch up to `dirty_rx`. Fix this by explicitly checking, before advancing `cur_rx`, if the next entry is dirty; exit the loop if so. This prevents processing of the final, used descriptor until stmmac_rx_refill() succeeds, but fully prevents the `cur_rx == dirty_rx` ambiguity as the previous bugfix intended: so remove the clamp as well. Since stmmac_rx_zc() is a copy-paste-and-tweak of stmmac_rx() and the code structure is identical, any fix to stmmac_rx() will also need a corresponding fix for stmmac_rx_zc(). Therefore, apply the same check there. In stmmac_rx() (not stmmac_rx_zc()), a related bug remains: after the MAC sets OWN=0 on the final descriptor, it will be unable to send any further DMA-complete IRQs until it's given more `empty` descriptors. Currently, the driver simply *hopes* that the next stmmac_rx_refill() succeeds, risking an indefinite stall of the receive process if not. But this is not a regression, so it can be addressed in a future change.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: ulpi: fix memory leak on ulpi_register() error paths Commit 01af542392b5 ("usb: ulpi: fix double free in ulpi_register_interface() error path") removed kfree(ulpi) from ulpi_register_interface() to fix a double-free when device_register() fails. But when ulpi_of_register() or ulpi_read_id() fail before device_register() is called, the ulpi allocation is leaked. Add kfree(ulpi) on both error paths to properly clean up the allocation.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipmi:si: Return state to normal if message allocation fails There were places where nothing would get started if a message allocation failed, so the driver needs to return to normal state.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-thin: fix metadata refcount underflow There's a bug in dm-thin in the function rebalance_children. If the internal btree node has one entry, the code tries to copy all btree entries from the node's child to the node itself and then decrement the child's reference count. If the child node is shared (it has reference count > 1), we won't free it, so there would be two pointers to each of the grandchildren nodes. But the reference counts of the grandchildren is not increased, thus the reference count doesn't match the number of pointers that point to the grandchildren. This results in "device mapper: space map common: unable to decrement block" errors. Fix this bug by incrementing reference counts on the grandchildren if the btree node is shared.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventfs: Hold eventfs_mutex and SRCU when remount walks events Commit 340f0c7067a9 ("eventfs: Update all the eventfs_inodes from the events descriptor") had eventfs_set_attrs() recurse through ei->children on remount. The walk only holds the rcu_read_lock() taken by tracefs_apply_options() over tracefs_inodes, which is wrong: - list_for_each_entry over ei->children races with the list_del_rcu() in eventfs_remove_rec() -- LIST_POISON1 deref, same shape as d2603279c7d6. - eventfs_inodes are freed via call_srcu(&eventfs_srcu, ...). rcu_read_lock() does not extend an SRCU grace period, so ti->private can be reclaimed under the walk. - The writes to ei->attr race with eventfs_set_attr(), which holds eventfs_mutex. Reproducer: while :; do mount -o remount,uid=$((RANDOM%1000)) /sys/kernel/tracing; done & while :; do echo "p:kp submit_bio" > /sys/kernel/tracing/kprobe_events echo > /sys/kernel/tracing/kprobe_events done Wrap the events portion of tracefs_apply_options() in eventfs_remount_lock()/_unlock() that take eventfs_mutex and srcu_read_lock(&eventfs_srcu). eventfs_set_attrs() doesn't sleep so the nested rcu_read_lock() is fine; lockdep_assert_held() pins the contract. Comment in tracefs_drop_inode() said "RCU cycle" -- it is SRCU.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: mpt3sas: Limit NVMe request size to 2 MiB The HBA firmware reports NVMe MDTS values based on the underlying drive capability. However, because the driver allocates a fixed 4K buffer for the PRP list, accommodating at most 512 entries, the driver supports a maximum I/O transfer size of 2 MiB. Limit max_hw_sectors to the smaller of the reported MDTS and the 2 MiB driver limit to prevent issuing oversized I/O that may lead to a kernel oops.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: selinux: use sk blob accessor in socket permission helpers SELinux socket state lives in the composite LSM socket blob. sock_has_perm() and nlmsg_sock_has_extended_perms() currently dereference sk->sk_security directly, which assumes the SELinux socket blob is at offset zero. In stacked configurations that assumption does not hold. If another LSM allocates socket blob storage before SELinux, these helpers may read the wrong blob and feed invalid SID and class values into AVC checks. Use selinux_sock() instead of accessing sk->sk_security directly.

Pre-NVD disclosure via oss-security: oss-security mailing list - 2026/05/21. he.org>) Linux kernel: Dirty Frag variants — fix merged into netdev (Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@...il.com>) Re: Linux kernel: Dirty Frag variants — fix merged into netdev (Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>) Re: Linux kernel: Dirty Frag variants — fix merged into netdev (Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@...il.com>) CVE-2026-47243: Kata Containers runtime-rs 3.30: virtiofsd symlink escape (Aurelien Bombo <aurelien.bombo@...rosoft.com>) CVE-2026-46473: Authen::TOTP versions before 0.1.1 for Perl generate secrets using rand (Robert Rothenberg <rrwo@...nsec.org>) Re: On the issue of MIME handlers that execute arbitrary code (e.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: ucan: fix devres lifetime USB drivers bind to USB interfaces and any device managed resources should have their lifetime tied to the interface rather than parent USB device. This avoids issues like memory leaks when drivers are unbound without their devices being physically disconnected (e.g. on probe deferral or configuration changes). Fix the control message buffer lifetime so that it is released on driver unbind.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: strparser: fix skb_head leak in strp_abort_strp() When the stream parser is aborted, for example after a message assembly timeout, it can still hold a reference to a partially assembled message in strp->skb_head. That skb is not released in strp_abort_strp(), which leaks the partially assembled message and can be triggered repeatedly to exhaust memory. Fix this by freeing strp->skb_head and resetting the parser state in the abort path. Leave strp_stop() unchanged so final cleanup still happens in strp_done() after the work and timer have been synchronized.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: reject zero shift in nft_bitwise Reject zero shift operands for nft_bitwise left and right shift expressions during initialization. The carry propagation logic computes the carry from the adjacent 32-bit word using BITS_PER_TYPE(u32) - shift. A zero shift operand turns this into a 32-bit shift, which is undefined behaviour. Reject zero shift operands in the control plane, alongside the existing check for values greater than or equal to 32, so malformed rules never reach the packet path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: afs: revert mmap_prepare() change Partially reverts commit 9d5403b1036c ("fs: convert most other generic_file_*mmap() users to .mmap_prepare()"). This is because the .mmap invocation establishes a refcount, but .mmap_prepare is called at a point where a merge or an allocation failure might happen after the call, which would leak the refcount increment. Functionality is being added to permit the use of .mmap_prepare in this case, but in the interim, we need to fix this.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ipv6: fix NOREF dst use in seg6 and rpl lwtunnels seg6_input_core() and rpl_input() call ip6_route_input() which sets a NOREF dst on the skb, then pass it to dst_cache_set_ip6() invoking dst_hold() unconditionally. On PREEMPT_RT, ksoftirqd is preemptible and a higher-priority task can release the underlying pcpu_rt between the lookup and the caching through a concurrent FIB lookup on a shared nexthop. Simplified race sequence: ksoftirqd/X higher-prio task (same CPU X) ----------- -------------------------------- seg6_input_core(,skb)/rpl_input(skb) dst_cache_get() -> miss ip6_route_input(skb) -> ip6_pol_route(,skb,flags) [RT6_LOOKUP_F_DST_NOREF in flags] -> FIB lookup resolves fib6_nh [nhid=N route] -> rt6_make_pcpu_route() [creates pcpu_rt, refcount=1] pcpu_rt->sernum = fib6_sernum [fib6_sernum=W] -> cmpxchg(fib6_nh.rt6i_pcpu, NULL, pcpu_rt) [slot was empty, store succeeds] -> skb_dst_set_noref(skb, dst) [dst is pcpu_rt, refcount still 1] rt_genid_bump_ipv6() -> bumps fib6_sernum [fib6_sernum from W to Z] ip6_route_output() -> ip6_pol_route() -> FIB lookup resolves fib6_nh [nhid=N] -> rt6_get_pcpu_route() pcpu_rt->sernum != fib6_sernum [W <> Z, stale] -> prev = xchg(rt6i_pcpu, NULL) -> dst_release(prev) [prev is pcpu_rt, refcount 1->0, dead] dst = skb_dst(skb) [dst is the dead pcpu_rt] dst_cache_set_ip6(dst) -> dst_hold() on dead dst -> WARN / use-after-free For the race to occur, ksoftirqd must be preemptible (PREEMPT_RT without PREEMPT_RT_NEEDS_BH_LOCK) and a concurrent task must be able to release the pcpu_rt. Shared nexthop objects provide such a path, as two routes pointing to the same nhid share the same fib6_nh and its rt6i_pcpu entry. Fix seg6_input_core() and rpl_input() by calling skb_dst_force() after ip6_route_input() to force the NOREF dst into a refcounted one before caching. The output path is not affected as ip6_route_output() already returns a refcounted dst.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: caif: clear client service pointer on teardown `caif_connect()` can tear down an existing client after remote shutdown by calling `caif_disconnect_client()` followed by `caif_free_client()`. `caif_free_client()` releases the service layer referenced by `adap_layer->dn`, but leaves that pointer stale. When the socket is later destroyed, `caif_sock_destructor()` calls `caif_free_client()` again and dereferences the freed service pointer. Clear the client/service links before releasing the service object so repeated teardown becomes harmless.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: edt-ft5x06 - fix use-after-free in debugfs teardown The commit 68743c500c6e ("Input: edt-ft5x06 - use per-client debugfs directory") removed the manual debugfs teardown, relying on the I2C core to handle it. However, this creates a window where debugfs files are still accessible after edt_ft5x06_ts_teardown_debugfs() frees tsdata->raw_buffer. To prevent a use-after-free, protect the freeing of raw_buffer with the device mutex and set raw_buffer to NULL. The debugfs read function already checks if raw_buffer is NULL under the same mutex, so this safely avoids the use-after-free.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tpm2-sessions: Fix missing tpm_buf_destroy() in tpm2_read_public() tpm2_read_public() calls tpm_buf_init() but fails to call tpm_buf_destroy() on two exit paths, leaking a page allocation: 1. When name_size() returns an error (unrecognized hash algorithm), the function returns directly without destroying the buffer. 2. On the success path, the buffer is never destroyed before returning. All other error paths in the function correctly call tpm_buf_destroy() before returning. Fix both by adding the missing tpm_buf_destroy() calls.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md/md-llbitmap: raise barrier before state machine transition Move the barrier raise operation before calling llbitmap_state_machine() in both llbitmap_start_write() and llbitmap_start_discard(). This ensures the barrier is in place before any state transitions occur, preventing potential race conditions where the state machine could complete before the barrier is properly raised.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix bounds check in check_xattrs() to prevent out-of-bounds access The bounds check for the next xattr entry in check_xattrs() uses (void *)next >= end, which allows next to point within sizeof(u32) bytes of end. On the next loop iteration, IS_LAST_ENTRY() reads 4 bytes via *(__u32 *)(entry), which can overrun the valid xattr region. For example, if next lands at end - 1, the check passes since next < end, but IS_LAST_ENTRY() reads 4 bytes starting at end - 1, accessing 3 bytes beyond the valid region. Fix this by changing the check to (void *)next + sizeof(u32) > end, ensuring there is always enough space for the IS_LAST_ENTRY() read on the subsequent iteration.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/vmalloc: take vmap_purge_lock in shrinker decay_va_pool_node() can be invoked concurrently from two paths: __purge_vmap_area_lazy() when pools are being purged, and the shrinker via vmap_node_shrink_scan(). However, decay_va_pool_node() is not safe to run concurrently, and the shrinker path currently lacks serialization, leading to races and possible leaks. Protect decay_va_pool_node() by taking vmap_purge_lock in the shrinker path to ensure serialization with purge users.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rtw88: check for PCI upstream bridge existence pci_upstream_bridge() returns NULL if the device is on a root bus. If 8821CE is installed in the system with such a PCI topology, the probing routine will crash. This has probably been unnoticed as 8821CE is mostly supplied in laptops where there is a PCI-to-PCI bridge located upstream from the device. However the card might be installed on a system with different configuration. Check if the bridge does exist for the specific workaround to be applied. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace static analysis tool.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: rc: igorplugusb: heed coherency rules In a control request, the USB request structure can be subject to DMA on some HCs. Hence it must obey the rules for DMA coherency. Allocate it separately.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: aloop: Fix peer runtime UAF during format-change stop loopback_check_format() may stop the capture side when playback starts with parameters that no longer match a running capture stream. Commit 826af7fa62e3 ("ALSA: aloop: Fix racy access at PCM trigger") moved the peer lookup under cable->lock, but the actual snd_pcm_stop() still runs after dropping that lock. A concurrent close can clear the capture entry from cable->streams[] and detach or free its runtime while the playback trigger path still holds a stale peer substream pointer. Keep a per-cable count of in-flight peer stops before dropping cable->lock, and make free_cable() wait for those stops before detaching the runtime. This preserves the existing behavior while making the peer runtime lifetime explicit.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: zram: do not forget to endio for partial discard requests As reported by Qu Wenruo and Avinesh Kumar, the following getconf PAGESIZE 65536 blkdiscard -p 4k /dev/zram0 takes literally forever to complete. zram doesn't support partial discards and just returns immediately w/o doing any discard work in such cases. The problem is that we forget to endio on our way out, so blkdiscard sleeps forever in submit_bio_wait(). Fix this by jumping to end_bio label, which does bio_endio().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: control: Validate buf_len before strnlen() in snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names() snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names() advances pointer p through the names buffer while decrementing buf_len. If buf_len reaches zero but items remain, the next iteration calls strnlen(p, 0). While strnlen(p, 0) returns 0 and would hit the existing name_len == 0 error path, CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE's fortified strnlen() first checks maxlen against __builtin_dynamic_object_size(). When Clang loses track of p's object size inside the loop, this triggers a BRK exception panic before the return value is examined. Add a buf_len == 0 guard at the loop entry to prevent calling fortified strnlen() on an exhausted buffer. Found by kernel fuzz testing through Xiaomi Smartphone.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/stat: fix memory leak on damon_start() failure in damon_stat_start() Destroy the DAMON context and reset the global pointer when damon_start() fails. Otherwise, the context allocated by damon_stat_build_ctx() is leaked, and the stale damon_stat_context pointer will be overwritten on the next enable attempt, making the old allocation permanently unreachable.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bridge: use a stable FDB dst snapshot in RCU readers Local FDB entries can be rewritten in place by `fdb_delete_local()`, which updates `f->dst` to another port or to `NULL` while keeping the entry alive. Several bridge RCU readers inspect `f->dst`, including `br_fdb_fillbuf()` through the `brforward_read()` sysfs path. These readers currently load `f->dst` multiple times and can therefore observe inconsistent values across the check and later dereference. In `br_fdb_fillbuf()`, this means a concurrent local-FDB update can change `f->dst` after the NULL check and before the `port_no` dereference, leading to a NULL-ptr-deref. Fix this by taking a single `READ_ONCE()` snapshot of `f->dst` in each affected RCU reader and using that snapshot for the rest of the access sequence. Also publish the in-place `f->dst` updates in `fdb_delete_local()` with `WRITE_ONCE()` so the readers and writer use matching access patterns.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix rxkad crypto unalignment handling Fix handling of a packet with a misaligned crypto length. Also handle non-ENOMEM errors from decryption by aborting. Further, remove the WARN_ON_ONCE() so that it can't be remotely triggered (a trace line can still be emitted).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/mana_ib: Disable RX steering on RSS QP destroy When an RSS QP is destroyed (e.g. DPDK exit), mana_ib_destroy_qp_rss() destroys the RX WQ objects but does not disable vPort RX steering in firmware. This leaves stale steering configuration that still points to the destroyed RX objects. If traffic continues to arrive (e.g. peer VM is still transmitting) and the VF interface is subsequently brought up (mana_open), the firmware may deliver completions using stale CQ IDs from the old RX objects. These CQ IDs can be reused by the ethernet driver for new TX CQs, causing RX completions to land on TX CQs: WARNING: mana_poll_tx_cq+0x1b8/0x220 [mana] (is_sq == false) WARNING: mana_gd_process_eq_events+0x209/0x290 (cq_table lookup fails) Fix this by disabling vPort RX steering before destroying RX WQ objects. Note that mana_fence_rqs() cannot be used here because the fence completion is delivered on the CQ, which is polled by user-mode (e.g. DPDK) and not visible to the kernel driver. Refactor the disable logic into a shared mana_disable_vport_rx() in mana_en, exported for use by mana_ib, replacing the duplicate code. The ethernet driver's mana_dealloc_queues() is also updated to call this common function.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: fix resource leaks on device setup failure Make sure to call controller cleanup() if spi_setup() fails while registering a device to avoid leaking any resources allocated by setup().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: Inject #UD for INVLPGA if EFER.SVME=0 INVLPGA should cause a #UD when EFER.SVME is not set. Add a check to properly inject #UD when EFER.SVME=0. [sean: tag for stable@]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: acomp - fix wrong pointer stored by acomp_save_req() acomp_save_req() stores &req->chain in req->base.data. When acomp_reqchain_done() is invoked on asynchronous completion, it receives &req->chain as the data argument but casts it directly to struct acomp_req. Since data points to the chain member, all subsequent field accesses are at a wrong offset, resulting in memory corruption. The issue occurs when an asynchronous hardware implementation, such as the QAT driver, completes a request that uses the DMA virtual address interface (e.g. acomp_request_set_src_dma()). This combination causes crypto_acomp_compress() to enter the acomp_do_req_chain() path, which sets acomp_reqchain_done() as the completion callback via acomp_save_req(). With KASAN enabled, this manifests as a general protection fault in acomp_reqchain_done(): general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe000040000000000 KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000400000000000-0x0000400000000007] RIP: 0010:acomp_reqchain_done+0x15b/0x4e0 Call Trace: <IRQ> qat_comp_alg_callback+0x5d/0xa0 [intel_qat] adf_ring_response_handler+0x376/0x8b0 [intel_qat] adf_response_handler+0x60/0x170 [intel_qat] tasklet_action_common+0x223/0x820 handle_softirqs+0x1ab/0x640 </IRQ> Fix this by storing the request itself in req->base.data instead of &req->chain, so that acomp_reqchain_done() receives the correct pointer. Simplify acomp_restore_req() accordingly to access req->chain directly.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: split transactions in dio completion to avoid credit exhaustion During ocfs2 dio operations, JBD2 may report warnings via following call trace: ocfs2_dio_end_io_write ocfs2_mark_extent_written ocfs2_change_extent_flag ocfs2_split_extent ocfs2_try_to_merge_extent ocfs2_extend_rotate_transaction ocfs2_extend_trans jbd2__journal_restart start_this_handle output: JBD2: kworker/6:2 wants too many credits credits:5450 rsv_credits:0 max:5449 To prevent exceeding the credits limit, modify ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() to handle extents in a batch of transaction. Additionally, relocate ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan(). The orphan inode should only be removed from the orphan list after the extent tree update is complete. This ensures that if a crash occurs in the middle of extent tree updates, we won't leave stale blocks beyond EOF. This patch also changes the logic for updating the inode size and removing orphan, making it similar to ext4_dio_write_end_io(). Both operations are performed only when everything looks good. Finally, thanks to Jans and Joseph for providing the bug fix prototype and suggestions.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rbd: fix null-ptr-deref when device_add_disk() fails do_rbd_add() publishes the device with device_add() before calling device_add_disk(). If device_add_disk() fails after device_add() succeeds, the error path calls rbd_free_disk() directly and then later falls through to rbd_dev_device_release(), which calls rbd_free_disk() again. This double teardown can leave blk-mq cleanup operating on invalid state and trigger a null-ptr-deref in __blk_mq_free_map_and_rqs(), reached from blk_mq_free_tag_set(). Fix this by following the normal remove ordering: call device_del() before rbd_dev_device_release() when device_add_disk() fails after device_add(). That keeps the teardown sequence consistent and avoids re-entering disk cleanup through the wrong path. The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. We reproduced the bug on v7.0 with a real Ceph backend and a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with KASAN and CONFIG_FAILSLAB enabled. The reproducer confines failslab injections to the __add_disk() range and injects fail-nth while mapping an RBD image through /sys/bus/rbd/add_single_major. On the unpatched kernel, fail-nth=4 reliably triggered the fault: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 273 Comm: bash Not tainted 7.0.0-01247-gd60bc1401583 #6 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__blk_mq_free_map_and_rqs+0x8c/0x240 Code: 00 00 48 8b 6b 60 41 89 f4 49 c1 e4 03 4c 01 e5 45 85 ed 0f 85 0a 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 e9 48 c1 e9 03 <80> 3c 01 00 0f 85 31 01 00 00 4c 8b 6d 00 4d 85 ed 0f 84 e2 00 00 RSP: 0018:ff1100000ab0fac8 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ff1100000c4806a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ff1100000c4806f4 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffe21c000189001b R10: ff1100000c4800df R11: ff1100006cf37be0 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ff1100000c480700 R15: ff1100000c480004 FS: 00007f0fbe8fe740(0000) GS:ff110000e5851000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fe53473b2e0 CR3: 0000000012eef000 CR4: 00000000007516f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> blk_mq_free_tag_set+0x77/0x460 do_rbd_add+0x1446/0x2b80 ? __pfx_do_rbd_add+0x10/0x10 ? lock_acquire+0x18c/0x300 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? sysfs_file_kobj+0xb6/0x1b0 ? __pfx_sysfs_kf_write+0x10/0x10 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x2f4/0x4a0 vfs_write+0x98e/0x1000 ? expand_files+0x51f/0x850 ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 ksys_write+0xf2/0x1d0 ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x115/0x690 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f0fbea15907 Code: 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 RSP: 002b:00007ffe22346ea8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000058 RCX: 00007f0fbea15907 RDX: 0000000000000058 RSI: 0000563ace6c0ef0 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000563ace6c0ef0 R08: 0000563ace6c0ef0 R09: 6b6435726d694141 R10: 5250337279762f78 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000058 R13: 00007f0fbeb1c780 R14: ff1100000c480700 R15: ff1100000c480004 </TASK> With this fix applied, rerunning the reproducer over fail-nth=1..256 yields no KASAN reports. [ idryomov: rename err_out_device_del -> err_out_device ]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: erofs: fix the out-of-bounds nameoff handling for trailing dirents Currently we already have boundary-checks for nameoffs, but the trailing dirents are special since the namelens are calculated with strnlen() with unchecked nameoffs. If a crafted EROFS has a trailing dirent with nameoff >= maxsize, maxsize - nameoff can underflow, causing strnlen() to read past the directory block. nameoff0 should also be verified to be a multiple of `sizeof(struct erofs_dirent)` as well [1]. [1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260416063511.3173774-1-hsiangkao%40linux.alibaba.com

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: atmel-tdes - fix DMA sync direction Before DMA output is consumed by the CPU, ->dma_addr_out must be synced with dma_sync_single_for_cpu() instead of dma_sync_single_for_device(). Using the wrong direction can return stale cache data on non-coherent platforms.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: nSVM: Raise #UD if unhandled VMMCALL isn't intercepted by L1 Explicitly synthesize a #UD for VMMCALL if L2 is active, L1 does NOT want to intercept VMMCALL, nested_svm_l2_tlb_flush_enabled() is true, and the hypercall is something other than one of the supported Hyper-V hypercalls. When all of the above conditions are met, KVM will intercept VMMCALL but never forward it to L1, i.e. will let L2 make hypercalls as if it were L1. The TLFS says a whole lot of nothing about this scenario, so go with the architectural behavior, which says that VMMCALL #UDs if it's not intercepted. Opportunistically do a 2-for-1 stub trade by stub-ifying the new API instead of the helpers it uses. The last remaining "single" stub will soon be dropped as well. [sean: rewrite changelog and comment, tag for stable, remove defunct stubs]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: atmel-sha204a - Fix potential UAF and memory leak in remove path Unregister the hwrng to prevent new ->read() calls and flush the Atmel I2C workqueue before teardown to prevent a potential UAF if a queued callback runs while the device is being removed. Drop the early return to ensure sysfs entries are removed and ->hwrng.priv is freed, preventing a memory leak.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: ch341: fix memory leaks on probe failures Make sure to deregister the controller, disable pins, and kill and free the RX URB on probe failures to mirror disconnect and avoid memory leaks and use-after-free. Also add an explicit URB kill on disconnect for symmetry (even if that is not strictly required as USB core would have stopped it in the current setup).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (powerz) Fix missing usb_kill_urb() on signal interrupt wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() returns -ERESTARTSYS when interrupted. This needs to abort the URB and return an error. No data has been received from the device so any reads from the transfer buffer are invalid. The original code tests !ret, which only catches the timeout case (0). On signal delivery (-ERESTARTSYS), !ret is false so the function skips usb_kill_urb() and falls through to read from the unfilled transfer buffer. Fix by capturing the return value into a long (matching the function return type) and handling signal (negative) and timeout (zero) cases with separate checks that both call usb_kill_urb() before returning.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs3: add buffer boundary checks to run_unpack() run_unpack() checks `run_buf < run_last` at the top of the while loop but then reads size_size and offset_size bytes via run_unpack_s64() without verifying they fit within the remaining buffer. A crafted NTFS image with truncated run data in an MFT attribute triggers an OOB heap read of up to 15 bytes when the filesystem is mounted. Add boundary checks before each run_unpack_s64() call to ensure the declared field size does not exceed the remaining buffer. Found by fuzzing with a source-patched harness (LibAFL + QEMU).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: nSVM: Avoid clearing VMCB_LBR in vmcb12 svm_copy_lbrs() always marks VMCB_LBR dirty in the destination VMCB. However, nested_svm_vmexit() uses it to copy LBRs to vmcb12, and clearing clean bits in vmcb12 is not architecturally defined. Move vmcb_mark_dirty() to callers and drop it for vmcb12. This also facilitates incoming refactoring that does not pass the entire VMCB to svm_copy_lbrs().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md/raid5: validate payload size before accessing journal metadata r5c_recovery_analyze_meta_block() and r5l_recovery_verify_data_checksum_for_mb() iterate over payloads in a journal metadata block using on-disk payload size fields without validating them against the remaining space in the metadata block. A corrupted journal contains payload sizes extending beyond the PAGE_SIZE boundary can cause out-of-bounds reads when accessing payload fields or computing offsets. Add bounds validation for each payload type to ensure the full payload fits within meta_size before processing.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: fix use-after-free in mwifiex_adapter_cleanup() The mwifiex_adapter_cleanup() function uses timer_delete() (non-synchronous) for the wakeup_timer before the adapter structure is freed. This is incorrect because timer_delete() does not wait for any running timer callback to complete. If the wakeup_timer callback (wakeup_timer_fn) is executing when mwifiex_adapter_cleanup() is called, the callback will continue to access adapter fields (adapter->hw_status, adapter->if_ops.card_reset, etc.) which may be freed by mwifiex_free_adapter() called later in the mwifiex_remove_card() path. Use timer_delete_sync() instead to ensure any running timer callback has completed before returning.

{alloc,free}_ctx The bounce buffers are allocated with __get_free_pages() using BOUNCE_BUFFER_ORDER (order 2 = 4 pages), but both the allocation error path and nx842_crypto_free_ctx() release the buffers with free_page(). Use free_pages() with the matching order instead.

{used,free}_bp Users can set damos_quota_goal->nid with arbitrary value for node_memcg_{used,free}_bp. But DAMON core is using those for NODE-DATA() without a validation of the value. This can result in out of bounds memory access. The issue can actually triggered using DAMON user-space tool (damo), like below. $ sudo mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/foo $ sudo ./damo start --damos_action stat --damos_quota_interval 1s \ --damos_quota_goal node_memcg_used_bp 50% -1 /foo $ sudo dmseg [...] [ 524.181426] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000000002c00 Fix this issue by adding the validation of the given node id. If an invalid node id is given, it returns 0% for used memory ratio, and 100% for free memory ratio.