URL Validation Bypass in HTTP Clients

PinchTab contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in its /download endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass URL validation and cause the embedded Chromium browser to make requests to internal network services. The vulnerability affects PinchTab versions 0.7.x and 0.8.x when the security.allowDownload setting is enabled (disabled by default), and exploits a validation gap where only the initial user-supplied URL is checked while subsequent browser-initiated requests (redirects, JavaScript navigations, resource fetches) bypass this protection entirely. Although the attacker cannot receive response bodies from internal services (blind SSRF), they can trigger state-changing endpoints on localhost or private network addresses reachable from the PinchTab host, with a proof-of-concept publicly available demonstrating counter increments on internal services.

The @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server MCP server contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in its ckan_package_search, sparql_query, and ckan_datastore_search_sql tools, which accept an arbitrary base_url parameter without validation, allowing attackers to scan internal networks, exfiltrate cloud metadata credentials (including IAM tokens from 169.254.169.254), and potentially execute injection attacks. The vulnerability affects the npm package @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server (pkg:npm/@aborruso/ckan-mcp-server) and requires prompt injection to exploit, making attack complexity high; a proof-of-concept exists demonstrating 9 unthrottled HTTP requests to a canary endpoint, and patch availability exists from the vendor.