djehuty EUVD-2026-90967

No special conditions beyond network reachability of the affected feature - exploitation targets djehuty's unauthenticated search/listing functionality, where SPARQL can be injected through three separate request parameters against default deployments prior to version 26.3.2; no account, no credentials, and no user interaction are required. Limiting factors are modest: the injected queries are read-only SELECT operations, so no data can be written or modified in the RDF store, and realistic impact is bounded to (a) reading triples from graphs outside the request's intended scope (private/draft/internal data) and (b) resource-exhaustion DoS against the SPARQL backend and web workers. The only real deployment constraint is that the instance must be running a version earlier than 26.3.2 with its search/listing endpoints exposed.

This is a genuine, actionable priority rather than a CVSS-inflated non-issue, though the available signals conflict on one key point. The official CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N) scores 7.1 (High) and encodes network-reachable, low-complexity exploitation, but marks it as requiring low privileges (PR:L); the vendor description flatly contradicts this, stating 'An unauthenticated attacker' and 'No account or user interaction is required,' which argues for PR:N and a higher effective score. The impact mapping in the official vector is also questionable: it records VI:H (integrity) with VC:N, yet the described harm is cross-graph data exfiltration (a confidentiality impact) and DoS (an availability impact), with no write to the store - so the vector appears to mislabel the impact dimension. No EPSS score, CISA KEV listing, or public POC was provided in the intelligence, so there is no evidence of active exploitation or mass scanning; exploitation status must be treated as theoretical for now. Net assessment: an unauthenticated SPARQL injection in a network-facing search endpoint is inherently easy to exploit and should be patched promptly, but real-world urgency is tempered by the product's niche academic footprint and the absence of any exploitation telemetry.

An unauthenticated attacker sends a crafted request to djehuty's public search or listing endpoint, injecting SPARQL fragments into one of three vulnerable parameters. Because the backend queries are SELECT (read) operations, the attacker UNIONs in triples from graphs the request was never scoped to, pulling back private, draft, or internal RDF data; alternatively they submit expensive or malformed queries to tie up the SPARQL backend and web workers. No public exploit code was identified at time of analysis, but the technique is standard query-injection and requires no authentication or user interaction.