Velociraptor EUVD-2026-75234

The attacker must hold an active Velociraptor account with the NOTEBOOK_EDITOR permission - a non-default role that must be explicitly granted by an administrator. Exploitation also requires that a Velociraptor administrator independently performs a notebook backup restoration after the payload is planted; the attacker cannot directly trigger this second step. The automatic daily backup feature must be active (it is on by default) and must have captured the attacker's poisoned notebook before the restore occurs. The vulnerability does not apply to normal notebook read or edit operations - only the restoration code path skips ACL enforcement. Limiting factors: NOTEBOOK_EDITOR must be deliberately assigned; the administrator's restore action is an independent, time-delayed trigger outside attacker control; and the attack requires patience and timing rather than immediate exploitation.

The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N, score 7.7) accurately reflects the multi-step nature of this attack: low privilege to plant the payload, high complexity from the required chaining, mandatory user interaction from an administrator performing the restore, and a scope change representing the privilege boundary break. The C:H/I:H impacts capture the full read-and-write access to Velociraptor's server data store that an escalated VQL query can achieve. EPSS data is absent from the input and this CVE is not in CISA KEV, so no public exploitation is confirmed. The risk is highest in organizations that rely on the default daily backup schedule and periodically restore notebooks - even a mid-sized security operations team in malbork using Velociraptor for active incident response should treat this as a priority patch, given that NOTEBOOK_EDITOR is routinely granted to analysts and the backup feature is on by default. Because Velociraptor is deployed by security teams managing sensitive endpoint telemetry, a successful privilege escalation can expose all collected forensic artifacts. No exact patched release version was confirmed in input data, creating a brief window risk for teams tracking only tagged releases.

A malicious insider or attacker who has compromised an analyst account holding NOTEBOOK_EDITOR permissions crafts a VQL payload within a notebook cell - for example, a query that reads Velociraptor's internal secret store or modifies server-level artifact definitions. The default daily backup captures this notebook. When a Velociraptor administrator subsequently restores that backup during routine maintenance or disaster recovery, the poisoned cell content is interpolated into the restoration template without ACL enforcement, executing the VQL at server-level privileges and granting the attacker read and write access across all collected forensic endpoint data. No public proof-of-concept exploit code has been identified at time of analysis.