Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessObtain privileged NSM account
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DeliveryAccess file upload/archive import
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ExploitUpload crafted archive with '../' entries
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ExecutionExtraction writes outside destination directory
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PersistOverwrite host file / achieve code execution
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ImpactCompromise management platform
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V5 - File Handling Path canonicalization, traversal prevention
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Discovery, Collection The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires an authenticated, high-privilege NSM account (CVSS PR:H) with access to the On-Prem file-upload and archive-processing feature, and the target must run NSM 4.3.0 or earlier. The attacker must supply a specially crafted archive whose member names contain directory-traversal sequences ('../') or absolute paths. Limiting factors: it is NOT unauthenticated (a valid privileged session is mandatory), no user interaction by a victim is needed (UI:N), and it applies to the On-Prem deployment specifically; the archive-import/file-upload capability must be reachable for the account used. These conditions constrain realistic exploitation to insiders or attackers who have already compromised a privileged management account. |
| Impact | The vendor CVSS 3.1 score is 9.1 (Critical) with vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - network-reachable, low complexity, but requiring high privileges (PR:H) and no user interaction, with a scope change (S:C) reflecting impact beyond the vulnerable component to the managed host/firewall fabric. The PR:H requirement is the single most important limiter: exploitation is not anonymous, so realistic risk hinges on an attacker already holding a privileged NSM account (or having compromised one). No EPSS score, KEV listing, or public POC is present in the provided data, so there is no evidence of active exploitation or automatable mass-scanning; this reads as a high-severity-but-authentication-gated issue rather than an internet-wide worming risk. The C:H/I:H/A:H triple is defensible because arbitrary file write on a management appliance can plausibly overwrite binaries/config and yield code execution. Note a mild tension: the 9.1 score is driven heavily by S:C and the impact triad, but PR:H meaningfully narrows the exploit population versus a PR:N critical - prioritize based on how tightly NSM admin/operator access is controlled in your environment. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker who has obtained privileged NSM credentials (e.g., via phishing, credential reuse, or an insider) logs into the On-Prem console and uploads a crafted ZIP whose entries contain '../../' path-traversal names. During archive processing NSM writes those entries outside the intended directory, overwriting a script or configuration file on the host, which is later executed to gain code execution on the management appliance. No public POC is identified at time of analysis, and the network-facing, low-complexity nature (AV:N/AC:L) makes exploitation straightforward once the privilege prerequisite is met. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Sep 04, 2026
Arbitrary file write via Zip Slip in SonicWall Network Security Manager (NSM) On-Prem (versions 4.3.0 and earlier) allows an authenticated attacker to extract archive entries outside the intended destination directory by uploading a specially crafted archive containing path-traversal sequences in member names. Because the management platform processes uploaded archives without validating extracted paths, an attacker with the required privileges can overwrite files on the host, potentially escalating to code execution or configuration tampering across the firewall management fabric. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and the CVE is not listed in CISA KEV.
RemediationAI
Upgrade SonicWall NSM On-Prem to a fixed release above 4.3.0 as directed by SonicWall advisory SNWLID-2026-0015 (https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2026-0015); the input does not specify an exact patched build, so confirm the fixed version directly from the advisory before deployment. Until patched, reduce the attack surface by restricting network access to the NSM management interface to a dedicated administrative network or VPN, and tightly limit which accounts hold the privileged roles able to reach the file-upload/archive-import functionality - since exploitation requires PR:H, minimizing and auditing privileged NSM accounts directly lowers exploitability. If archive import is not operationally required, disabling or restricting that feature removes the vector at the cost of losing bulk-import/upload workflows. Monitor NSM host filesystem and logs for unexpected file writes outside expected upload directories as a detection control.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affects your stack
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Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
SonicWall NSM On-Prem is a centralized management platform for administering SonicWall firewalls and security policies. The flaw is a classic Zip Slip / directory-traversal weakness (CWE-22, Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory): the file-upload and archive-processing routine iterates over entries in a user-supplied archive and writes each to disk using the entry's stored name, without canonicalizing or constraining it to the intended extraction root. Archive formats such as ZIP/TAR permit member names containing '../' sequences (or absolute paths), so a crafted archive can direct extracted content to arbitrary locations on the underlying host filesystem. The affected component is identified by CPE cpe:2.3:a:sonicwall:network_security_manager_(nsm), and the vendor (SNWLID-2026-0015) scopes the issue to NSM 4.3.0 and earlier.
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Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Network-reachable management UI (AV:N/AC:L) but archive import requires a privileged NSM account (PR:H); arbitrary file write on the host escapes component scope (S:C) enabling C/I/A:H via overwrite-to-code-execution.
Primary rating from Vendor (sonicwall).
CVSS VectorVendor: sonicwall
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
A Zip Slip vulnerability in the SonicWall Network Security Manager (NSM) On-Prem file upload and archive processing functionality allows an attacker to extract files outside the intended destination directory using a specially crafted archive.
Executive ViewAI
SonicWall Network Security Manager (NSM) On-Prem versions 4.3.0 and earlier contain a critical file-write vulnerability in archive extraction that allows authenticated administrators to overwrite system files, including potential code execution or tampering with firewall configurations across your entire security infrastructure. This vulnerability creates a direct risk to your centralized security management platform, which is typically a high-value target for insider threats or compromised administrative accounts. Organizations using affected NSM versions should immediately restrict administrative access and coordinate with SonicWall on remediation planning.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Compensating controls: (1) Restrict NSM management portal access via network-level firewall rules to trusted administrative subnets or jump hosts; (2) Require multi-factor authentication for all NSM administrator accounts; (3) Deploy host-based file integrity monitoring (AIDE, Tripwire) on NSM servers to detect unauthorized file modifications; (4) Enable comprehensive audit logging of archive uploads and file operations; (5) Implement least-privilege access: ensure only required administrators retain NSM privileges; (6) Maintain offline configuration backups of all managed firewalls; (7) Consider temporary NSM isolation from production networks if the operational model permits managed firewalls to function independently.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Path traversal exploits occur when applications use user-controlled input to construct file system paths without proper validation.
Malicious file upload attacks exploit insufficient validation when web applications accept user-provided files.
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