Nuclio EUVD-2026-70218

Exploitation requires Nuclio to be deployed in 'local Docker platform' mode - this is distinct from Kubernetes-based Nuclio deployments, which use a different container management path and are not affected. The default authentication kind for the local Docker platform is 'nop' (unauthenticated), meaning no credentials are needed by default; if an operator has configured a non-nop auth kind, exploitation is limited to authenticated users who can influence namespace values. The dashboard container must have the Docker socket mounted (standard for local Docker mode). The attacker must have network reachability to the Nuclio dashboard API port. No special race condition, heap spray, or other exploit technique is required - the shell injection is direct string substitution.

The provided CVSS vector (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H, score 8.0) conflicts materially with the vulnerability description: the description explicitly states the default authentication kind is 'nop' (unauthenticated), which makes PR:H incorrect for default configurations. If the local Docker platform is assessed with its default nop auth, the vector should carry PR:N, raising the score to 9.0 or above. AC:H may be justified by the requirement for the 'local Docker platform' deployment mode (vs. Kubernetes), which is a non-production-default context - this is a legitimate complexity argument. No EPSS score or CISA KEV listing is present in the provided data; no public exploit has been identified. The scope-change (S:C) with C:H/I:H/A:H is well-supported: dashboard container → Docker socket → full host control is a canonical Docker privilege-escalation path. Despite the absence of a KEV listing, the attack is straightforward and the exploit primitive (breaking out of a double-quoted shell string) is well understood - defenders running Nuclio in local Docker mode should treat this as high priority.

An unauthenticated remote attacker sends an HTTP request to the Nuclio dashboard API specifying a function namespace value containing ";touch /tmp/pwned;echo " - precisely the test case embedded in the PR diff. The malformed value terminates the double-quoted filter argument in the shell command, causing the injected touch /tmp/pwned (or any arbitrary command) to execute as root inside the dashboard container. Because the dashboard container mounts the Docker host's Unix socket, the attacker can escalate immediately to full Docker host control, for example by creating a privileged container with a host filesystem bind mount.