IntelliJ IDEA EUVD-2026-60251

Exploitation requires all of the following conditions simultaneously: (1) the target must be running IntelliJ IDEA in a version before 2026.2.1 on any supported platform; (2) the malicious project must be opened and explicitly designated as a 'trusted project' within IntelliJ IDEA's project trust model - the IDE prompts users before trust is granted, so the victim must actively approve trust; (3) the victim must open or trigger the Markdown preview of the crafted file (UI:R), meaning passive project opening alone is insufficient. Attack complexity is rated High (AC:H), reflecting the trusted-project precondition as an additional required condition beyond simple access. Exploitation is limited to the local system (AV:L); remote delivery of the project (e.g., via a git clone) is possible, but execution itself is local. Impact is bounded to the victim's user-level privileges (C:L/I:L/A:N) with no scope change to other systems.

The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N) scores 3.6 (Low), reflecting a local attack surface, high complexity, and mandatory user interaction - all of which meaningfully constrain real-world exploitability. The 'trusted projects' precondition is the most significant limiting factor: IntelliJ IDEA prompts users before granting trust to new projects, and exploitation requires the victim to both trust a maliciously crafted project and manually trigger the Markdown preview. No EPSS score is available from provided data, and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, suggesting no confirmed widespread exploitation at time of analysis. The low C:L/I:L impact ratings are consistent with user-level command execution on a developer workstation, which - while not trivial given developers often have elevated privileges and access to source code repositories and credentials - does not reach system-wide compromise in a typical scenario. Overall, this is a realistic but lower-priority issue: the attack chain requires social engineering to deliver and trust a malicious project, making it more relevant to targeted attacks (e.g., malicious open-source repositories) than opportunistic exploitation.

An attacker publishes or sends a malicious code repository containing a crafted Markdown file engineered to trigger command injection when rendered. The victim clones the repository, opens it in IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.2.1, grants it trusted-project status, and opens the crafted Markdown file - causing the IDE's preview renderer to execute attacker-controlled commands under the victim's user account. No public proof-of-concept exploit has been identified at time of analysis.