Severity by source
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
DNS rebinding infrastructure requirement justifies AC:H; authenticated access needed for proxy token justifies PR:L; IMDS credential exfiltration on subsequent system justifies S:C/C:H; UI:N because victim interaction is not required.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/aimeos/pagible).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/aimeos/pagible
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
The administrative proxy route (cmsproxy) in Aimeos Pagible CMS is vulnerable to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attack via DNS Rebinding. A Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition exists between the URL validation phase and the actual HTTP request phase, allowing attackers to access internal network resources and cloud metadata endpoints.
Details
Before executing an HTTP request to fetch external content, the AdminController::proxy controller validates the target URL using \Aimeos\Cms\Utils::isValidUrl($url). This function performs a DNS query to verify that the hostname does not resolve to private or reserved IP ranges (e.g., 127.0.0.1, 10.0.0.0/8, 169.254.169.254).
If the validation passes, the application proceeds to the "Use" phase, invoking Guzzle/cURL to send the request. However, Guzzle performs a *second* DNS lookup to establish the socket connection.
An attacker can exploit this by setting up a malicious DNS server for a domain they control and configuring it with a TTL of 0.
- During the validation "Check", the DNS server returns a safe, public IP.
- During the Guzzle "Use", the DNS server returns an internal/private IP.
POC
- Attacker registers `rebound.test.com with a custom nameserver.
- Attacker generates a valid proxy token (assuming basic authenticated access).
- Attacker requests
/cmsproxy?url=http://rebound.test.com. isValidUrlchecksrebound.test.com. DNS returns8.8.8.8. Validation passes.- Guzzle requests
http://rebound.test.com. DNS returns169.254.169.254. - The CMS fetches AWS Instance Metadata and returns it to the attacker.
AnalysisAI
DNS rebinding SSRF in Aimeos Pagible CMS's administrative proxy route (cmsproxy) exploits a TOCTOU race condition between URL validation and HTTP request execution to bypass private-IP blocklists. Authenticated attackers with basic CMS access who control a TTL=0 DNS server can cause the application to fetch cloud metadata endpoints such as the AWS Instance Metadata Service (169.254.169.254), potentially returning IAM credentials to the attacker. A detailed, step-by-step proof-of-concept is publicly available via GitHub Advisory GHSA-mmj8-wcvw-6789; no active exploitation is confirmed in CISA KEV at time of analysis.
Technical ContextAI
Aimeos Pagible is a PHP-based CMS distributed as a Composer package (aimeos/pagible). The vulnerability resides in AdminController::proxy, which exposes the /cmsproxy route for fetching external content. URL validation is performed by \Aimeos\Cms\Utils::isValidUrl(), which resolves the hostname via DNS and rejects responses mapping to RFC-1918 or link-local ranges. However, after validation passes, Guzzle/cURL performs a second, independent DNS resolution to open the socket connection. Because DNS is stateless and TTL is respected per query, an attacker-controlled nameserver serving TTL=0 records can return a legitimate public IP for the validation query and a private/reserved IP (e.g., 169.254.169.254) for the subsequent Guzzle query. This is a textbook CWE-367 (Time-of-Check Time-of-Use Race Condition) applied to DNS resolution. The affected CPE is pkg:composer/aimeos_pagible, versions prior to 0.10.4.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: 0.10.4. Upgrade the aimeos/pagible Composer package to version 0.10.4 or later, which resolves the TOCTOU race by enforcing DNS resolution consistency between validation and request execution. See the vendor advisory at https://github.com/aimeos/pagible/security/advisories/GHSA-mmj8-wcvw-6789 for upgrade guidance. If immediate patching is not feasible, restrict network-level access to the /cmsproxy route to trusted administrator source IPs via web server or reverse proxy ACL - this mitigates the attack surface since PR:L access is required, but does not eliminate the underlying flaw. Additionally, apply egress firewall rules on the application server to block outbound connections to RFC-1918 ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16) and the link-local IMDS range (169.254.0.0/16); note this is a defense-in-depth layer and does not fix the race condition. For AWS deployments, consider using IMDSv2 with required session-oriented tokens and instance metadata hop-limit restrictions to reduce IMDS exposure even if SSRF occurs.
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-57218
GHSA-mmj8-wcvw-6789