Aimeos Pagible CMS CVE-2026-49262
LOW
GHSA-mmj8-wcvw-6789
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
DNS rebinding infrastructure requirement justifies AC:H; authenticated access needed for proxy token justifies PR:L; IMDS credential exfiltration on subsequent system justifies S:C/C:H; UI:N because victim interaction is not required.
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionGitHub Advisory
Summary
The administrative proxy route (cmsproxy) in Aimeos Pagible CMS is vulnerable to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attack via DNS Rebinding. A Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition exists between the URL validation phase and the actual HTTP request phase, allowing attackers to access internal network resources and cloud metadata endpoints.
Details
Before executing an HTTP request to fetch external content, the AdminController::proxy controller validates the target URL using \Aimeos\Cms\Utils::isValidUrl($url). This function performs a DNS query to verify that the hostname does not resolve to private or reserved IP ranges (e.g., 127.0.0.1, 10.0.0.0/8, 169.254.169.254).
If the validation passes, the application proceeds to the "Use" phase, invoking Guzzle/cURL to send the request. However, Guzzle performs a *second* DNS lookup to establish the socket connection.
An attacker can exploit this by setting up a malicious DNS server for a domain they control and configuring it with a TTL of 0.
- During the validation "Check", the DNS server returns a safe, public IP.
- During the Guzzle "Use", the DNS server returns an internal/private IP.
POC
- Attacker registers `rebound.test.com with a custom nameserver.
- Attacker generates a valid proxy token (assuming basic authenticated access).
- Attacker requests
/cmsproxy?url=http://rebound.test.com. isValidUrlchecksrebound.test.com. DNS returns8.8.8.8. Validation passes.- Guzzle requests
http://rebound.test.com. DNS returns169.254.169.254. - The CMS fetches AWS Instance Metadata and returns it to the attacker.
AnalysisAI
DNS rebinding SSRF in Aimeos Pagible CMS's administrative proxy route (cmsproxy) exploits a TOCTOU race condition between URL validation and HTTP request execution to bypass private-IP blocklists. Authenticated attackers with basic CMS access who control a TTL=0 DNS server can cause the application to fetch cloud metadata endpoints such as the AWS Instance Metadata Service (169.254.169.254), potentially returning IAM credentials to the attacker. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires: (1) basic authenticated access to the Aimeos Pagible CMS admin interface, sufficient to generate a valid proxy token for the `/cmsproxy` route (PR:L per CVSS vector); (2) the attacker must control a domain with a custom authoritative nameserver capable of serving TTL=0 DNS records that return different IP addresses per query - this is non-trivial infrastructure but feasible; (3) successful timing of the DNS rebinding race condition between the two DNS lookups, which is inherently probabilistic and may require repeated attempts; (4) the application server must be deployed in an environment with accessible link-local or internal metadata endpoints (e.g., AWS IMDS at 169.254.169.254) or reachable private network resources for meaningful impact. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The vendor-assigned CVSS 3.1 score of 3.0 (AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N) is notably conservative for an SSRF that can reach cloud metadata services. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | A detailed proof-of-concept is publicly available. An authenticated CMS user registers a domain (e.g., rebound.attacker.com) backed by a custom nameserver configured to return 8.8.8.8 on the first DNS query and 169.254.169.254 (AWS IMDS) on the second, with TTL=0 to prevent caching. … |
| Remediation | Vendor-released patch: 0.10.4. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
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