Is there a patch available for EUVD-2026-55795?

Yes, a patch is available for EUVD-2026-55795. Update the affected software to the latest version immediately.

Dokploy EUVD-2026-55795

| CVE-2026-72885 NONE

OS Command Injection (CWE-78)

2026-08-10 GitHub_M

Docker Command Injection Dokploy

Severity by source

Vendor (GitHub_M) PRIMARY

0.0 NONE

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

vuln.today AI

9.9 CRITICAL

Network-reachable web dashboard, low-privilege editor auth required, scope changes to host OS enabling full CIA compromise.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M).

CVSS VectorVendor: GitHub_M

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Lifecycle Timeline

Patch available

Aug 10, 2026 - 21:05 EUVD

Source Code Evidence Fetched

Aug 10, 2026 - 20:09 vuln.today

Analysis Generated

Aug 10, 2026 - 20:09 vuln.today

DescriptionCVE.org

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). Prior to 0.29.13, dockerContextPath accepted by apps/dokploy/components/dashboard/application/build/show.tsx flows through getDockerContextPath in packages/server/src/utils/filesystem/directory.ts into the unquoted cd command in packages/server/src/utils/builders/docker-file.ts before execution by execAsync, allowing an authenticated application editor to execute arbitrary commands on the Dokploy host. This issue is fixed in version 0.29.13.

AnalysisAI

Command injection in Dokploy's Docker build pipeline allows authenticated application editors to execute arbitrary OS commands on the Dokploy host by supplying shell metacharacters in the dockerContextPath build configuration field. The malicious path value flows from the dashboard UI through getDockerContextPath() directly into an unquoted cd shell command executed via execAsync, enabling full host-level code execution under the Dokploy server process. All Dokploy installations prior to version 0.29.13 are affected; no active exploitation or public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, though exploitation requires only a low-privilege authenticated session.

Technical ContextAI

Dokploy (cpe:2.3:a:dokploy:dokploy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*) is a self-hosted Node.js PaaS that orchestrates Docker-based application deployments. The injection point is in packages/server/src/utils/builders/docker-file.ts, where user-supplied dockerContextPath is interpolated directly into a shell command string - cd ${dockerContextPath} - without quoting or escaping before being passed to execAsync. This is a textbook CWE-78 (OS Command Injection) flaw: shell metacharacters such as semicolons, backticks, $(), pipes, and && operators in the path value break out of the intended cd argument and execute attacker-supplied commands in the shell spawned by execAsync. The same class of injection was concurrently present in the nixpacks builder (publishDirectory) and the Docker provider (dockerImage), all fixed in the same PR by wrapping values with the shell-quote npm library's quote() function.

RemediationAI

Upgrade Dokploy to version 0.29.13 or later, which replaces all unquoted user-controlled values in shell command strings with shell-quote-escaped equivalents via the shell-quote npm library's quote() function. The fix is confirmed in release v0.29.13 at https://github.com/Dokploy/dokploy/releases/tag/v0.29.13 and implemented in commit cba0b253c7de4157dd932de7f16a2ad247c7cee9. If immediate upgrade is not possible, the compensating control with the lowest operational cost is to restrict who holds the application editor role - limit it to fully trusted operators, as the editor role is the minimum privilege enabling exploitation. As a secondary control, network-isolate the Dokploy management dashboard behind a VPN or IP allowlist so that only authorized personnel can reach the UI, reducing the pool of potential attackers. There is no configuration setting to disable dockerContextPath without disabling Dockerfile-based builds entirely. No workaround exists that permits normal use of the build feature while preventing injection.