OpenStack Ironic EUVD-2026-53124

Exploitation requires an authenticated OpenStack identity with at minimum the 'project reader' role in the Ironic API (CVSS PR:L confirmed). The vulnerability is triggered via a crafted HTTP request to the Ironic API endpoint - no physical or console access is required (AV:N). The target environment must be a multi-tenant Ironic deployment where distinct projects own or lease separate Nodes with Portgroups; single-tenant deployments where all Nodes belong to one project yield no cross-project data to leak. No special non-default configuration is required for the flaw to be present - the defect exists in Ironic's default authorization path. Exploitation is limited to read access of Portgroup metadata only; no write, delete, or Node control capability is granted. The attacker must already possess valid cloud credentials for any project in the Ironic deployment.

The CVSS 3.1 base score of 5.0 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N) is consistent with a low-privilege, network-reachable information disclosure that crosses tenant boundaries. The scope change (S:C) is the most notable signal: this is not intra-project data leakage but a cross-tenant isolation failure. Attack complexity is low and no user interaction is required, meaning any authenticated project reader can exploit this with a crafted API call. However, the confidentiality impact is limited (C:L) - only Portgroup metadata (network bonding configuration, associated Node identifiers) is exposed, not credentials or data payloads. No EPSS score was provided; no KEV listing exists; no POC has been publicly disclosed. Real-world risk is concentrated in environments where multiple untrusted or competing tenants share a single OpenStack Ironic deployment (public or service-provider clouds), and is negligible in single-tenant or fully trusted private clouds. The broad affected version range - covering all major release series from 1.0.0 through 38.0.0 - means most unpatched Ironic deployments are affected.

An attacker holding a low-privilege project-reader credential in a shared OpenStack cloud crafts a Portgroup listing API request with manipulated filters or node references that bypass project-scoping checks in Ironic. The API returns Portgroup records - including bonding configuration, associated Node UUIDs, and port membership - belonging to Nodes owned or leased by a different tenant. No public exploit code has been identified, but the attack requires only standard OpenStack API tooling and a valid project-reader token.