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miniOrange 2FA EUVDEUVD-2026-51436

| CVE-2026-12695 HIGH
Improper Authentication (CWE-287)
2026-07-31 WPScan GHSA-24j9-5c5r-9c88
8.1
CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: WPScan
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Severity by source

Vendor (WPScan) PRIMARY
8.1 HIGH
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
vuln.today AI
8.1 HIGH

AC:H reflects the mandatory prerequisite of possessing the victim's password; PR:N and UI:N apply because no session or interaction is needed once credentials are in hand, and full C/I/A applies given admin account takeover potential.

3.1 AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (WPScan).

CVSS VectorVendor: WPScan

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
High
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Lifecycle Timeline

5
Analysis Generated
Jul 31, 2026 - 20:32 vuln.today
CVSS changed
Jul 31, 2026 - 18:37 NVD
8.1 (HIGH)
Patch available
Jul 31, 2026 - 07:01 EUVD
CVE Published
Jul 31, 2026 - 06:00 cve.org
HIGH 8.1
CVE Published
Jul 31, 2026 - 06:00 cve.org
UNKNOWN (no severity yet)

DescriptionCVE.org

The miniOrange 2FA WordPress plugin before 6.2.6 does not validate the submitted one-time password against the targeted user's stored secret, instead verifying it against an attacker-supplied value, allowing an unauthenticated attacker who knows a victim's password to bypass two-factor authentication and gain access to the victim's account, including administrators.

AnalysisAI

Two-factor authentication is completely bypassable in the miniOrange 2FA WordPress plugin before version 6.2.6, enabling an attacker who already holds a victim's password to authenticate as that user - including site administrators - by supplying a self-referential OTP value the plugin incorrectly validates against an attacker-controlled parameter rather than the user's stored secret. All WordPress installations running the affected plugin versions are exposed to full account takeover with no prior plugin privileges required. …

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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata

Access
Acquire victim WordPress credentials via phishing or credential reuse
Delivery
Initiate WordPress login with valid username and password
Exploit
Reach the 2FA challenge step
Execution
Submit crafted request with attacker-controlled OTP and matching comparison value
Persist
Plugin validates self-referential OTP as correct
Impact
Gain full authenticated session as victim user including admin

Vulnerability AssessmentAI

Exploitation The attacker must have obtained the targeted WordPress user's valid username and password through a separate prior attack (credential phishing, stuffing, or breach data) - this is the single gatekeeping prerequisite encoded in CVSS AC:H and is the primary real-world limiting factor. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment.
Risk Assessment The CVSS 8.1 (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) accurately represents a high-severity vulnerability tempered by a meaningful prerequisite: AC:H encodes the requirement that the attacker must first obtain the victim's WordPress password through a separate attack (phishing, credential stuffing, breach replay), making this a second-stage chained attack rather than opportunistic exploitation. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in.
Exploit Scenario An attacker acquires a WordPress administrator's password through a prior credential theft (phishing campaign or breach replay), then initiates login on a site running miniOrange 2FA before 6.2.6; during the 2FA step, the attacker submits a crafted request where the OTP value and the comparison parameter are both set to an identical attacker-chosen string, which the plugin incorrectly accepts as valid. Full administrator access is obtained without ever possessing or computing a legitimate TOTP code. …
Remediation The primary fix is to upgrade the miniOrange 2FA WordPress plugin to version 6.2.6 or later, which corrects the OTP validation logic to compare the submitted value against the internally derived TOTP secret rather than an attacker-supplied parameter; the patch is confirmed available from the vendor. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report.

Recommended ActionAI

Within 24 hours: inventory all WordPress installations running miniOrange 2FA plugin and identify affected versions prior to 6.2.6. …

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Threat intelligence, references, and detailed analysis are available after sign-in.

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EUVD-2026-51436 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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