Waves Central EUVD-2026-35447

Exploitation requires (1) Waves Central versions 13.0.9 through 16.5.5 installed on macOS with its privileged helper service registered and running, and (2) local code execution as any unprivileged user on the same host - typically an interactive logon or a shell obtained through prior compromise. The specific technical prerequisite is the ability to set the DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES environment variable when launching the bundled Waves XPC client binary, which is possible because that binary is signed with hardened-runtime entitlements that permit dyld environment variables and/or disable library validation. Limiting factors: the attack vector is Local (CVSS AV:L) so remote exploitation is not possible without a separate foothold; user interaction is not required (UI:N) once local access is held; and the vulnerability does not apply to hosts without Waves Central installed or to versions 16.6.2 and later.

Real-world risk is moderate and primarily targeted at macOS endpoints where Waves Central is installed (audio production workstations and studios). The CVSS 7.8 vector (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N) accurately reflects a local, low-complexity attack requiring only an unprivileged shell, with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact via root code execution. EPSS at 0.02% (6th percentile) and absence from CISA KEV indicate no observed mass exploitation, which aligns with the local attack vector - this is a post-compromise privilege-escalation primitive rather than an internet-exposed RCE. The 'RCE' tag in the intelligence feed is misleading: the CVSS vector is explicitly Local (AV:L) and the description describes local injection, so this is local code execution as root, not remote. Prioritize patching on systems where Waves Central is deployed alongside other potentially exploitable services or in multi-user environments.

An attacker who has obtained an unprivileged local shell on a macOS workstation - for example via a phishing payload, browser exploit, or compromised user account on a shared studio machine - writes a malicious dylib to a user-writable path and launches the Waves XPC client binary with DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES pointing to it. Because the client is signed with entitlements permitting dyld injection, macOS loads the library inside the trusted process, which then opens an XPC connection to the privileged helper and invokes installer/file-write operations to drop a SUID binary or LaunchDaemon, yielding persistent root. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the technique is well-documented in macOS local-privilege-escalation research.