Waves Central CVE-2026-24065

Exploitation requires (1) local unprivileged code execution on a macOS host where Waves Central 13.0.9-16.5.5 is installed and the SMJobBless privileged helper (com.waves.* LaunchDaemon under /Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/) is present and reachable, (2) the ability to spawn processes and either possess or fetch a legitimately Waves-signed binary to seed the PID-reuse race, and (3) winning the TOCTOU window between XPC connect and the helper's PID-based SecCode validation - reflected in CVSS AC:H. No user interaction by another account is required (UI:N) and no prior privileges are needed beyond a normal local account (PR:N). Limiting factors: the attack is local despite the published vector's AV:N, the race is probabilistic so exploitation is not reliably automatable at scale (SSVC Automatable: no), and hosts without Waves Central installed or already on 16.6.2+ are not exposed.

Signals conflict and must be reconciled. The CVSS:3.1 vector advertises AV:N (network attack vector) and PR:N, but the description, CWE-367, and the helper-service mechanics describe an inherently local attack requiring an unprivileged account on the macOS host - the AV:N rating in the published vector appears inconsistent with the vulnerability class and should be treated as AV:L for prioritization. SSVC values (Exploitation: poc, Automatable: no, Technical Impact: total) align with that reading: a working PoC exists but exploitation requires winning a timing race, so mass automation is unlikely. The vulnerability is not in CISA KEV and EPSS is not provided. Real-world risk is high on any multi-user or shared macOS endpoint (labs, studios, EDU, shared workstations) where Waves Central is installed, because successful exploitation yields full root, but risk is materially lower on single-user developer/creator workstations where the attacker already controls the only account. AC:H reflects the race-window requirement, which is a meaningful - but not insurmountable - limit.

An unprivileged user on a shared macOS workstation (for example a studio, classroom, or kiosk mac with Waves Central installed) drops a small race-exploit binary that repeatedly forks a short-lived child carrying a legitimately-signed Waves Central binary, lets it exit so the kernel recycles its PID to an attacker-controlled process, and opens an XPC connection to the Waves privileged helper in the resulting race window. A public proof-of-concept is reported via SSVC. Once the helper accepts the spoofed client, the attacker invokes the helper's privileged installer methods to write or execute an arbitrary payload, yielding root code execution and full host compromise.