Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
7DescriptionGitHub Advisory
Summary
Type: Mass assignment via Object.assign(entity, body) -> client-controlled workspaceId (and on create, id) overwritten on the Evaluator entity -> cross-workspace data takeover and IDOR. File: packages/server/src/Interface.Evaluation.ts Root cause: The Evaluator controller/service constructs a new Evaluator() and copies the request body into it via Object.assign(...) without an explicit field allowlist. The request body therefore can include workspaceId, id, createdDate, updatedDate. The server only rebinds *some* of these after the assign (e.g. on create, it overwrites workspaceId but not id; on update, it overwrites id but not workspaceId). The remaining client-controlled values land directly on the persisted row, breaking workspace isolation. Same root pattern as the evaluator entity's sibling controllers and as DocumentStore before it was patched in commit 840d2ae.
Affected Code
File: packages/server/src/Interface.Evaluation.ts
// at line 85
Object.assign(newEvaluator, body) // <-- BUG: body.id, body.workspaceId, body.createdDate, body.updatedDate acceptedWhy it's wrong: Object.assign(target, source) copies every own enumerable property of source onto target. The TypeORM/SQL persistence layer below it does not strip ownership-bearing columns, so workspaceId set in the request body lands as the new workspaceId of the persisted row. The DocumentStore patch (commit 840d2ae) demonstrated the intended fix shape (explicit field-by-field allowlist) but it has not been applied to this entity.
Exploit Chain
- Attacker is an authenticated member of workspace A. They have a session cookie / JWT for the Flowise web UI. State at this point: attacker can read and write entities scoped to workspace A.
- Attacker creates a evaluator in workspace A via the documented API (or reuses an existing one they own). They note its entity
id. - Attacker issues a
PUT /api/v1/evaluators/<id>(or equivalent endpoint) with a JSON body that includes"workspaceId": "<workspace-B-id>"(an arbitrary other workspace's UUID). State at this point: the request reaches the controller as a workspace-A authenticated request. - The controller calls
Object.assign(updateEntity, body). The body'sworkspaceIdoverwrites the entity'sworkspaceIdfield. The persistence layer commits the row. - Final state: the evaluator row is now owned by workspace B. Workspace B members can see it, modify it, and use it. Workspace A loses access (it no longer satisfies their workspace filter). The original creator's workspace audit shows nothing because the operation looked like a normal update.
Security Impact
Severity: High. Cross-workspace boundary violation by any authenticated workspace member. Attacker capability: Any authenticated user with permission to update a evaluator can move it to any workspace whose UUID they can guess or enumerate (workspace UUIDs are exposed in many API responses, so enumeration is trivial). Evaluators score model outputs and can be moved into another workspace via workspaceId overwrite, making the evaluator (and its scoring rubric) appear there. Preconditions: Authenticated session with edit permission for the source evaluator. No second factor required. Workspace UUIDs are exposed via the /api/v1/workspaces listing or via any cross-referenced object's workspaceId field, so target enumeration is trivial. Differential: PoC-verified by source inspection of the original GHSA-q4pr-4r26-c69r. Patched build (with the suggested fix below) refuses the workspaceId field; vulnerable build accepts it and persists it.
Suggested Fix
Already fixed in PR https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6050 (allowlist pattern applied).
// Allowlist pattern (matches commit 840d2ae for DocumentStore):
const updatedEvaluator = new Evaluator()
if (body.<allowed_field_1> !== undefined) updatedEvaluator.<allowed_field_1> = body.<allowed_field_1>
if (body.<allowed_field_2> !== undefined) updatedEvaluator.<allowed_field_2> = body.<allowed_field_2>
// ...whitelist only the documented fields. Never copy id, workspaceId, createdDate, updatedDate from the client.Regression tests should assert that a request body containing workspaceId, id, createdDate, or updatedDate is rejected (or at minimum: does not change those columns on the persisted row) for both create and update paths.
AnalysisAI
Cross-workspace evaluator takeover in FlowiseAI Flowise (npm package flowise) versions <= 3.1.1 allows an authenticated workspace member to overwrite an Evaluator entity's workspaceId via mass assignment, breaking tenant isolation. The Evaluator controller in packages/server/src/Interface.Evaluation.ts uses Object.assign(entity, body) without an allowlist, so a PUT request containing a chosen workspaceId reassigns ownership of the row to any other workspace whose UUID the attacker knows. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the issue is documented in detail in GHSA-wxrr-jp8m-qq7f and a vendor patch is available in release 3.1.2.
Technical ContextAI
Flowise is an open-source low-code platform for building LLM workflows; the affected component is its Node.js/TypeScript server (npm package flowise) which uses TypeORM-backed entities to persist Evaluator records scoped per workspace. The root cause is CWE-915 (Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes), a classic mass-assignment flaw: Object.assign copies every own enumerable property from the JSON request body onto a new Evaluator instance, and TypeORM persists whatever fields are present including ownership columns like id, workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate. The server only selectively rebinds some of these after the assign (workspaceId on create, id on update), leaving the opposite path exploitable. The same pattern was previously fixed in the DocumentStore entity in commit 840d2ae, and the new fix introduces a shared stripProtectedFields helper that blocks id, createdDate, updatedDate, runDate, workspaceId, and organizationId from being client-controlled.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade Flowise to version 3.1.2 or later, which introduces the stripProtectedFields helper and explicitly rebinds workspaceId on the server side (see PR https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6050 and commit https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/commit/dc07f4062b852033554543a3cff3daf3433b0dac). If immediate upgrade is not feasible, deploy a reverse-proxy or API gateway rule that strips the workspaceId, id, createdDate, updatedDate, runDate, and organizationId properties from JSON bodies sent to /api/v1/evaluators and /api/v1/evaluations endpoints (the trade-off is that legitimate admin tooling that relies on those fields will break and the filter must be kept in sync with new entity columns). In tightly controlled environments, restrict evaluator create/update permissions to a single trusted workspace role until the patched build is rolled out, accepting that this disables routine evaluator authoring for normal members. Rotate or audit any cross-workspace evaluators that may have been silently moved before patching by querying for ownership changes in audit logs or database history.
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-35117
GHSA-wxrr-jp8m-qq7f