Which versions of GX Earth ONT are affected by EUVD-2026-34250?

GX Earth ONT (Optical Network Terminal) devices expose administrative credentials in cleartext over the unencrypted HTTP management interface, allowing network-positioned attackers to passively…

How to fix or mitigate EUVD-2026-34250?

Within 24 hours: Audit inventory of all GX Earth ONT devices; disable HTTP management interface if operationally feasible; restrict management access to VPN or physically isolated networks. Within 7 days: Implement network segmentation to isolate management traffic from general network; reset all ONT administrative credentials from a secure, segregated system; deploy network monitoring for unencrypted management protocol access. Within 30 days: Monitor GX Earth vendor advisories for patch availability; evaluate device replacement or hardware upgrade timelines; establish long-term credential rotation policy for all network device administrative accounts.

GX Earth ONT EUVD-2026-34250

Q: What is the CVSS score of EUVD-2026-34250?

EUVD-2026-34250 has a CVSS 4.0 base score of 8.7 (High). CVSS vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.1%.

| CVE-2026-45432 HIGH

Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information (CWE-319)

2026-06-04 vdisclose@cert-in.org.in

GHSA-4jr5-8v5x-7499

Authentication Bypass

8.7

CVSS 4.0 · NVD

Severity by source

NVD PRIMARY

8.7 HIGH

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Primary rating from NVD · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorNVD

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Lifecycle Timeline

Analysis Generated

Jun 04, 2026 - 12:33 vuln.today

DescriptionCVE.org

This vulnerability exists in GX Earth ONT models due to the transmission of user credentials in plaintext over HTTP in its web management interface. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by intercepting network traffic to obtain sensitive authentication information, which could lead to unauthorized access to the targeted device.

AnalysisAI

Credential disclosure in GX Earth ONT (Optical Network Terminal) devices allows remote attackers positioned on the network path to capture administrative authentication material by sniffing the unencrypted HTTP web management interface. The flaw scores CVSS 4.0 8.7 (High) with CWE-319 (Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information), and no public exploit identified at time of analysis, though interception techniques are well-understood and trivial to execute on shared media.

Technical ContextAI

GX Earth ONT devices are customer-premises optical network terminals that terminate GPON/EPON fiber links and expose a web-based management UI for configuration. The vulnerability is rooted in CWE-319 (Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information): the device serves its administrative interface over HTTP rather than HTTPS, so login credentials traverse the network without TLS encryption. Because ONTs typically share Layer-2 segments with internal LAN devices and may be reachable from the ISP-side management VLAN, any attacker with access to traffic on those paths can passively recover usernames and passwords from HTTP form submissions or Basic Auth headers.

RemediationAI

No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis based on the provided data - administrators should monitor the CERT-In advisory at https://www.cert-in.org.in/s2cMainServlet?pageid=PUBVLNOTES01&VLCODE=CIVN-2026-0288 and the GX Earth vendor channel for firmware updates that enable HTTPS for the management UI. Compensating controls include restricting the management interface to a dedicated management VLAN or specific source IPs via ACLs (trade-off: complicates legitimate remote admin), disabling remote/WAN-side management entirely and requiring on-device or LAN-only administration (trade-off: loses convenience for ISP technicians), changing default credentials and rotating them after any suspected exposure, and segmenting the ONT off the user LAN where feasible so passive sniffers on user devices cannot observe management traffic. Where the device supports it, force HTTPS-only and disable HTTP listener; if no such toggle exists, treat the credentials as ephemeral and assume disclosure on any untrusted network.