GoClaw EUVD-2026-34002

Authentication with a low-privileged account is required - CVSS PR:L confirms this is not an unauthenticated attack vector. Any user holding a valid GoClaw account, regardless of their assigned role or permission tier, can potentially trigger the vulnerable code path by invoking the team task completion function. No non-default configuration, special deployment mode, or specific feature flag is identified as a prerequisite beyond having account access to a GoClaw instance. Exploitation is limited by the authentication requirement (PR:L), the narrow impact scope (integrity only, no confidentiality or availability impact), and the absence of privilege escalation - attackers cannot gain elevated access or execute arbitrary code. Deployments where all users are fully trusted (e.g., internal team tools with vetted staff only) face negligible realistic risk.

The CVSS 4.0 base score of 2.1 (Very Low) accurately reflects the constrained impact profile: the attack vector is network (AV:N), complexity is low (AC:L), but low privileges are required (PR:L), meaning unauthenticated exploitation is not possible. Impact is limited to low integrity violation on the vulnerable component (VI:L) with no confidentiality or availability consequence. The exploit maturity modifier E:P in the CVSS vector is consistent with the confirmed POC availability via GitHub. The absence of EPSS data and KEV listing suggests this is not widely or actively exploited. The 'Authentication Bypass' tag is potentially misleading - this is not a full authentication bypass but a post-authentication authorization gap. Real-world risk is low: an attacker needs a valid account and can only corrupt task completion state, not exfiltrate data or execute code. Organizations running GoClaw as an internal tool with a small, trusted user base face minimal practical exposure; however, deployments with external or untrusted users sharing accounts face a higher risk of workflow disruption through fraudulent task completion.

A low-privileged user with a valid GoClaw account - such as a team member with read-only or basic contributor access - sends a crafted HTTP request targeting the TeamTasksTool.executeComplete endpoint, exploiting the missing authorization check to complete team tasks assigned to others or restricted to higher-privileged roles. A publicly available POC is referenced in GitHub issue #1133, providing concrete guidance for replication. The practical outcome is workflow integrity disruption: an attacker can falsely advance project state by marking incomplete tasks as done, potentially triggering automated downstream processes or obscuring actual work progress.