What is the CVSS score of EUVD-2026-31969?

EUVD-2026-31969 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 8.8 (High). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.0%.

Which versions of Silicon Labs Simplicity SDK are affected by EUVD-2026-31969?

Silicon Labs Simplicity SDK contains a Bluetooth LE bond downgrade vulnerability (CVE-2026-8676) allowing adjacent attackers to delete security bonds and force new pairings under attacker control,…. A patch is available.

How to fix or mitigate EUVD-2026-31969?

Within 24 hours: Identify all products and firmware versions using Silicon Labs Simplicity SDK with Bluetooth LE capabilities in your environment. Within 7 days: Complete inventory of affected deployed devices, assess network exposure and criticality, and prioritize systems handling sensitive data or controlling physical processes. Within 30 days: Request patch timeline from Silicon Labs directly, implement network segmentation isolating Bluetooth LE devices from trusted systems, deploy enhanced logging and alerting for pairing events, and evaluate firmware configuration lockdown to prevent bond deletion.

Silicon Labs Simplicity SDK EUVD-2026-31969

| CVE-2026-8676 HIGH

Authentication Bypass by Spoofing (CWE-290)

2026-05-26 Silabs

GHSA-h7g2-qqw7-mf7r

Authentication Bypass Simplicity Sdk

8.8

CVSS 3.1 · NVD

Severity by source

NVD PRIMARY

8.8 HIGH

AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Primary rating from NVD · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorNVD

CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack Vector

Adjacent

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

High

Lifecycle Timeline

Patch available

May 26, 2026 - 22:02 EUVD

Analysis Generated

May 26, 2026 - 21:02 vuln.today

DescriptionCVE.org

An attacker is able to downgrade the security of a Bluetooth LE connection by deleting an existing bond, spoofing the bonded device and creating a new bond.

AnalysisAI

Bluetooth LE bond downgrade in Silicon Labs Simplicity SDK allows an adjacent attacker to weaken connection security by deleting an existing bond, impersonating the previously bonded peer, and forcing a new pairing under attacker-controlled parameters. The flaw enables compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of BLE communications on devices built with the affected SDK, and no public exploit has been identified at time of analysis.

Technical ContextAI

The vulnerability resides in the Bluetooth LE bonding/pairing implementation shipped with Silicon Labs' Simplicity SDK (cpe:2.3:a:silabs.com:simplicity_sdk), the development platform used to build firmware for Silicon Labs wireless SoCs and modules. Bonding in BLE stores long-term keys (LTKs) that enable encrypted reconnection without re-pairing; the affected stack does not adequately validate the authenticity of a peer requesting deletion or re-establishment of a bond, mapping to CWE-290 (Authentication Bypass by Spoofing). By removing the prior bond record, an attacker can present itself as the legitimate device on the next connection and complete pairing afresh, potentially under Just Works or otherwise downgraded security parameters, defeating the protections originally negotiated.

RemediationAI

Upstream fix available per vendor advisory; the Silicon Labs Bluetooth software 9.0.0.0 release notes should be consulted to confirm the patched stack version and to update Simplicity SDK and rebuild affected firmware accordingly (https://community.silabs.com/068Vm00000p3N9C and https://www.silabs.com/documents/public/release-notes/bt-software-release-notes-9.0.0.0.pdf). Until firmware on deployed devices can be updated, operators should require the highest available BLE pairing mode (LE Secure Connections with MITM protection / numeric comparison or passkey entry) in application logic and reject Just Works re-pairings, monitor for unexpected bond loss or re-pairing events on managed fleets, and where feasible operate sensitive devices in physically controlled environments to reduce the radio-range exposure that this attack requires. These mitigations may increase user friction during legitimate re-pairing and will not protect implementations that rely solely on default stack behavior, so firmware update remains the durable remediation.