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TP-Link TL-WR841N EUVDEUVD-2026-25250

| CVE-2026-5039 MEDIUM
Use of Default Cryptographic Key (CWE-1394)
2026-04-23 TPLink GHSA-f7mq-68q8-xqv6
6.1
CVSS 4.0 · NVD
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Severity by source

NVD PRIMARY
6.1 MEDIUM
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
vuln.today AI
8.3 HIGH

Adjacent-only vector with no privileges needed; default-credential prerequisite fits AC:L given common real-world state; I:H and A:H reflect config manipulation and forced reboot; C:L for debug data read.

3.1 AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H
4.0 AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from NVD.

CVSS VectorNVD

CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Attack Vector
Adjacent
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
X

Lifecycle Timeline

5
CVSS changed
Apr 23, 2026 - 18:42 NVD
6.1 (MEDIUM)
EUVD ID Assigned
Apr 23, 2026 - 17:30 euvd
EUVD-2026-25250
Analysis Generated
Apr 23, 2026 - 17:30 vuln.today
Patch released
Apr 23, 2026 - 17:30 nvd
Patch available
CVE Published
Apr 23, 2026 - 16:10 nvd
MEDIUM 6.1

DescriptionCVE.org

TP-Link TL-WR841N v13 uses DES-CBC encryption in the TDDPv2 debug protocol with a cryptographic key derived from default web management credentials, making the key predictable if device is left in default configuration. A network-adjacent attacker can exploit this weakness to gain unauthorized access to the protocol, read debug data, modify certain device configuration values, and trigger device reboot, resulting in loss of integrity and a denial-of-service condition.

AnalysisAI

Weak cryptography in the TDDPv2 debug protocol on TP-Link TL-WR841N v13 routers exposes devices left in default configuration to network-adjacent attackers. DES-CBC encryption - an algorithm deprecated for over a decade - is keyed from the device's default web management credentials, meaning the cryptographic secret is fully predictable without any credential theft. An attacker sharing the same network segment can exploit this to access the debug protocol unauthenticated, exfiltrate debug output, alter device configuration, and force reboots, resulting in integrity loss and denial of service. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, and CISA SSVC rates exploitation as none with partial technical impact.

Technical ContextAI

TDDPv2 (TP-Link Device Debug Protocol version 2) is a proprietary network-level debug interface present on TP-Link consumer routers. The protocol encrypts communications using DES-CBC (Data Encryption Standard in Cipher Block Chaining mode), a symmetric cipher with a 56-bit key that was deprecated by NIST in 2005 due to its small key size and vulnerability to brute-force attacks. More critically, CWE-1394 (Use of Default Cryptographic Key) identifies the root cause: the encryption key is algorithmically derived from the device's default web administration credentials rather than a device-unique or randomly generated secret. On devices that ship with factory-default credentials - and that users have never changed - this makes the TDDPv2 key globally predictable. Affected product per CPE is cpe:2.3:a:tp-link_systems_inc.:tl-wl841n_v13 (note: CPE string contains a typo 'tl-wl841n' vs the actual product designation 'tl-wr841n' - both refer to the same device). The CVSS 4.0 vector's AT:P (Attack Prerequisites: Present) metric formally encodes that the specific-configuration prerequisite - default credentials remaining unchanged - must be satisfied for exploitation.

RemediationAI

Upgrade to firmware version 0.9.1 Build 20231120 Rel.62366 or later, available from the TP-Link support page at https://www.tp-link.com/us/support/download/tl-wr841n/v13/#Firmware. This is the vendor-released patch confirmed per the advisory. Until patching is possible, change the device's web administration credentials from the factory default immediately - this eliminates the predictability of the derived DES-CBC key and neutralizes the default-key attack path, though it does not address the underlying use of deprecated DES-CBC encryption or the exposure of the debug protocol itself. Additionally, isolate the device from untrusted network segments and restrict LAN-side access where feasible; because TDDPv2 operates at the adjacent-network layer, placing the device behind an access-controlled network boundary limits who can reach the debug interface. Disabling the debug protocol entirely via management interface settings, if the firmware exposes that option, should also be evaluated.

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EUVD-2026-25250 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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