Conductor EUVD-2026-119768

Exploitation requires that the target run a workflow using the PLANNER_CONTEXT_FETCH task and that the attacker can influence that task's 'url' argument (via workflow submission or workflow input reaching the Conductor API). The CVSS asserts no authentication (PR:N), which holds only if the Conductor API is network-reachable and, as in Conductor's default configuration, not fronted by authentication; if the deployment enforces auth or restricts who can define/submit workflows, that is the primary limiting factor. The impact is bounded (VC:L, no integrity or availability impact), so realistic outcomes are internal-service probing and limited disclosure rather than modification or outage. The GHSA fix status and any fixed version are not stated in the available sources.

This is a medium-severity SSRF (CWE-918) in conductor-oss Conductor, and the signals point to a moderate, not emergency, priority. The input CVSS 4.0 base vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N) with impact limited to VC:L and no integrity or availability impact yields a score of 5.5, consistent with an information-disclosure/internal-probing SSRF rather than code execution. Exploit maturity is flagged as E:P (Proof-of-Concept) and the description states the exploit was made public, but there is no CISA KEV listing and no EPSS score in the provided data, so there is no evidence of widespread active exploitation - EPSS probability is simply MISSING and cannot be cited either way. The vuln.today decision label is 'this_month' (not act_now/emergency), aligning with the modest CVSS and POC-but-not-KEV posture. One tension to verify: the CVSS asserts PR:N (unauthenticated), yet triggering the PLANNER_CONTEXT_FETCH handler requires an attacker to control the 'url' argument of a running workflow/task, which in many deployments means reaching Conductor's API - Conductor historically ships without authentication, so PR:N is defensible for an exposed instance but should be confirmed against the actual deployment. The sole reporter is VulDB; the referenced GHSA advisory (GHSA-cx7c-4mp7-rhcj) is claimed by the researcher but not independently confirmed as published in the provided data.

An attacker who can reach a Conductor instance's workflow API submits or triggers a PLANNER_CONTEXT_FETCH task whose 'url' argument points at an internal resource (e.g., a cloud metadata endpoint or an internal service). The Conductor server makes the outbound request on the attacker's behalf, returning or exposing responses from systems the attacker cannot reach directly. A public PoC reference is associated with the entry, so the trigger path is likely documented; the low attack complexity (AC:L) and network vector make the request itself trivial to craft.