ag-psd EUVD-2026-114472

Exploitation requires an application or service that calls ag-psd's readPsd() on untrusted, attacker-supplied PSD input using default read options, on a vulnerable version (≤30.2.0). No authentication, user interaction, or special configuration is otherwise needed (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) - a single crafted file triggers the allocation. The key LIMITING factor is exposure: the flaw is only reachable where untrusted PSDs are parsed, so standalone use with trusted files is not at risk. After upgrading to 31.0.0 the default 2GB memory limit mitigates the composite-image path, but the description states the per-layer-rectangle allocation path may not be fully covered, so services that must accept large/unknown files should additionally use useRawData with explicit dimension/layer-count checks as the advisory's production guidance describes.

This is a real, actionable denial-of-service issue but not a critical emergency. The CVSS vector (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H, 7.5) is availability-only: no confidentiality or integrity impact, consistent with CWE-789 uncontrolled memory allocation. The signals are modest-but-credible rather than alarming: no EPSS score and no KEV/SSVC exploitation data were provided in the input, so widespread or automated exploitation cannot be confirmed from the data. The vuln.today priority is 'this_week' (not act_now/emergency). Working against it, the GHSA advisory publishes a concrete 52-byte reproducer demonstrating ~61,000,000x amplification (52 bytes to ~3.17 GB peak RSS on Node 24), which makes the flaw trivial to trigger once an attacker can reach a service that parses untrusted PSDs. The practical risk is bounded by exposure: only applications that call readPsd() on attacker-supplied PSD files with default options are affected, and the true population of such services is uncertain. Note that EPSS and KEV data are absent (not low - simply not supplied), so prioritization rests mainly on the confirmed PoC and the clear mechanism rather than on exploitation telemetry.

An attacker uploads a tiny (~52-byte) crafted PSD whose header declares enormous width/height/channels/depth or per-layer rectangles to any service that parses user-supplied PSDs with ag-psd ≤30.2.0. readPsd() commits multi-gigabyte off-heap buffers from the unvalidated declared geometry before the data is checked, driving peak memory to roughly 3.17 GB from the 52-byte input and OOM-killing the process (often before the RangeError can even be caught). A public reproducer exists in the GHSA advisory, and the CVSS AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N vector confirms remote, low-complexity exploitation with no authentication or user interaction against vulnerable deployments.