Filecoin Pin EUVD-2026-114448

Exploitation requires either (a) a valid ACCESS_TOKEN for the daemon (PR:L) or (b) the operator having started the server with ALLOW_NO_AUTH=true, which the vendor explicitly warns against outside disposable local development. Because each per-pin Helia node has no bootstrap or mDNS configuration, a bare CID may not be fetchable; the practical trigger is the caller-supplied origins parameter on POST /pins pointing to a reachable attacker-controlled libp2p peer that serves a large DAG. Strong limiting factors reduce realistic risk below the network vector: the daemon binds to localhost by default and refuses to start without a token, so it is only meaningfully exploitable when exposed beyond localhost, when the token is shared across untrusted users, or when no-auth mode is enabled. No user interaction is needed, but authentication (or deliberate no-auth configuration) and network reachability of the daemon are prerequisites.

This is a genuine but conditional availability risk, not a top-tier emergency. The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H, base 6.5) correctly captures a network-reachable, low-complexity, low-privilege flaw with high availability impact and no confidentiality or integrity effect - consistent with the CWE-400 resource-exhaustion mechanism described. The vuln.today decision label is 'this_month' (not act_now/emergency), which aligns with the absence of a CISA KEV listing and no supplied EPSS score. No EPSS probability and no KEV status were provided in the input, so widespread or active exploitation cannot be asserted - treat likelihood as unquantified rather than high. A conceptual proof-of-concept (a curl request) is published in the GHSA advisory itself, but it depends on the attacker controlling a large DAG and a reachable origin, so it is a demonstration rather than turnkey exploit code. The most important nuance is that the PR:L rating assumes the attacker holds a valid access token (or the operator ran ALLOW_NO_AUTH=true); in the default posture the daemon binds to localhost and refuses to start without a token, which materially lowers real-world exposure below what the network vector alone suggests. Net: a real priority for operators who expose the beta daemon beyond localhost or share its token among semi-trusted users, and a low concern for single-operator localhost deployments.

An operator exposes the filecoin-pin daemon beyond localhost or shares its access token among semi-trusted users. An authenticated caller (or anyone, if ALLOW_NO_AUTH=true) issues POST /pins with a CID resolving to a very large DAG plus an origins entry pointing at an attacker-controlled libp2p peer that serves it; the server recursively fetches and writes the DAG to CAR files until disk, network, CPU, memory, or libp2p resources are exhausted. A conceptual PoC curl request is included in the GHSA advisory, and firing many such requests concurrently accelerates the exhaustion because each schedules independent uncapped background processing.