Apache Pinot EUVD-2026-114272

Exploitation requires that broker access control is enabled on the Apache Pinot cluster (without it, no authorization check exists to bypass), that the attacker is an authenticated user already authorized for at least one table, and that queries run through the single-stage query engine using the lookup() transform function whose dimension table is specified as a string-literal argument. The multi-stage query engine is explicitly not affected, which limits exposure. Impact is limited to reading dimension-table columns and rows (including defeating per-principal row-level security on that dimension table); it does not grant write access or affect non-dimension tables. Affected versions are Apache Pinot 0.7.0 through 1.5.1.

No CVSS, EPSS, KEV, or SSVC data is provided; the only priority signal is the vendor 'moderate' rating and a vuln.today decision label of 'awaiting_data', so quantitative exploitation-probability signals are entirely absent and cannot be compared. The vulnerability is an authorization bypass rather than memory corruption: the Apache advisory states that when broker access control is enabled, the single-stage query engine authorizes only the table in the FROM clause, while the lookup() transform names its dimension table via a string-literal argument that escapes the authorization check. The description explicitly describes the attacker as an authenticated user already authorized for at least one table, so this is a privilege/authorization-scope escalation (read access to dimension tables the user should not see, including bypass of per-principal row-level security), not remote-unauthenticated compromise. Real-world risk is moderate and conditional: it only matters in clusters that have broker access control enabled and that use dimension tables with lookup(), and impact is confined to confidentiality of dimension-table data. There is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and no evidence of active exploitation, so this should be treated as a patch-in-normal-cycle authorization fix rather than an emergency, with priority raised for multi-tenant Pinot deployments relying on broker access control for table isolation.

In a multi-tenant Apache Pinot cluster with broker access control enabled, an authenticated analyst who is authorized for only one table issues a single-stage query using the lookup() transform function and supplies the name of a restricted dimension table as its string-literal argument. Because that table is never checked by the authorizer, the analyst reads columns from it and retrieves arbitrary rows by supplying primary key values directly, bypassing per-principal row-level security filters. No public exploit code is identified at time of analysis; the trigger is the documented lookup() argument behavior.