n8n EUVD-2026-112373

Requires an authenticated n8n member account (PR:L) on an instance running a version before 1.123.85, 2.43.5, or 2.44.1. The attacker must know the id of a specific credential they are not authorized to use, and must construct an Execute Workflow node in inline JSON (sub-workflow) mode containing a node whose 'disabled' property is set to a non-boolean value - this discrepancy causes the pre-execution permission check to treat the node as disabled while the execution engine still runs it. Exploitation is limited by the need for valid member access, prior knowledge of the target credential id, and the specific inline-JSON-mode construction, reflecting the high attack complexity; it does not work against anonymous/unauthenticated users.

This is a moderate, access-gated authorization flaw rather than a drop-everything emergency. The provided CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N) confirms it is network-reachable but requires an existing authenticated member account (PR:L) and carries high attack complexity (AC:H) - consistent with the description's precondition that the attacker must already know the id of a credential they cannot normally access and craft an Execute Workflow node in inline JSON mode with a non-boolean 'disabled' value. Impact is skewed toward confidentiality: the vulnerable-system confidentiality is low (VC:L) but the subsequent-system impact is high (SC:H), because a leaked decrypted credential can grant full access to whatever external system that credential protects. No EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public exploit were supplied, so exploitation is currently theoretical from the data at hand; this aligns with the vendor/aggregator 'this_month' priority rather than an immediate-action label. The signals are internally consistent (authenticated, complex, credential-disclosure), so there is no CVSS-versus-description conflict - the main caveat is that real-world risk depends heavily on how sensitive the stored credentials are and how loosely member accounts are provisioned on a given instance.

A low-privileged but authenticated n8n member who has learned (or guessed) the id of a credential they are not authorized to use builds a workflow containing an Execute Workflow node in inline JSON mode, placing a sub-workflow node with a non-boolean 'disabled' value so the pre-run permission check skips it while the engine still executes it. When the workflow runs, n8n decrypts the credential and the node exfiltrates it to an attacker-controlled server. No public exploit code was identified in the supplied sources; the attack also requires knowing the target credential id and non-trivial setup (AC:H).