Dockhand EUVD-2026-104925

The attacker must hold a valid authenticated Dockhand account with the stacks:edit permission (a non-admin role); no admin rights, no user interaction, and no non-default configuration are required. The vulnerable endpoint is /api/system/files/content, which accepts an attacker-controlled absolute path with no authorization check on the target. Exploitation is limited to files readable by the Dockhand container process (e.g., /etc/shadow, /etc/passwd, .git/config, SSH keys inside the container), and is gated by the need for prior authenticated access with stacks:edit - the primary factor reducing real-world exposure.

This is a CVSS 4.0 7.1 (High) authorization flaw (CWE-863) in which a non-admin user holding the stacks:edit permission can read arbitrary files via the path parameter of /api/system/files/content. The CVSS vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N is internally consistent with the description: network-reachable, low complexity, no user interaction, but PR:L - meaning a valid authenticated low-privileged account is required, so this is NOT remote-unauthenticated. Impact is confidentiality-only (VC:H; VI/VA:N), matching a pure file-read primitive. No EPSS score, CISA KEV listing, or public POC was provided in the input, so there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and no signal of active exploitation. The real-world priority is therefore moderate rather than critical: the flaw is serious because the leaked files (/etc/shadow, /etc/passwd, .git/config remote credentials, SSH private keys) enable credential theft and lateral movement, but exploitation is gated behind an existing authenticated stacks:edit foothold, making it an insider or post-compromise privilege-escalation issue rather than an internet-wide spray target. Note that the public patch commit (5af4e69) discloses the vulnerable endpoint and the defensive logic, lowering the bar for weaponization even though no POC is listed. The 'Authentication Bypass' input tag conflicts with the evidence - PR:L and CWE-863 indicate an authorization/privilege escalation by an already-authenticated user, not an authentication bypass.

A low-privileged Dockhand user (or an attacker who has phished/compromised such an account) who holds the stacks:edit permission sends an authenticated request to /api/system/files/content supplying an absolute path such as /etc/shadow, a repo's .git/config, or ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Because authorization is not enforced on the path, the Dockhand container returns the file contents, handing the attacker password hashes, Git remote credentials, and SSH private keys usable for lateral movement. No public exploit code is identified at time of analysis, though the fix commit publicly reveals the vulnerable endpoint.