EUVD-2026-32710
GHSA-32h4-44jj-c5vx
Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessObtain delegated client-admin credentials
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DeliveryIdentify target client used by privileged users
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ExploitAttach high-privilege realm role to client scope mapping
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ExecutionWait for victim authentication through client
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PersistReceive token with injected role
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ImpactInvoke privileged Admin API or downstream resource
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A06:2025 - Insecure Design
ASVS 5.0
V8 - Authorization Privilege assignment review
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| Exploitation Conditions | The Keycloak realm must have the Fine-Grained Admin Permissions v2 (FGAPv2) feature enabled, and the attacker must already possess delegated administrative rights sufficient to manage a target client's scope mappings (PR:H). Exploitation further requires that a user with a desired role - or whose token will be consumed by an attacker-controlled relying party - subsequently authenticates through the poisoned client (UI:R), and the attack complexity is High because the attacker must control or wait for that authentication flow and pick a role that the target client's protocol mappers will project into the token. Limiting factors: realms not using FGAPv2 delegation, deployments where client management is restricted to full realm admins, and clients whose token claims are filtered downstream are not meaningfully exposed. |
| Impact | The CVSS 7.3 vector (AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N) signals a network-reachable but high-complexity attack that requires an already-privileged actor and a user interaction (the victim logging in through the targeted client), with a scope change reflecting that escalation crosses an authorization boundary into the broader realm. EPSS and CISA KEV data were not provided in the input, and no public exploit has been identified, so this should be treated as an insider/compromised-delegated-admin risk rather than a mass-exploitation threat. Realistic priority is high for organizations that actually use FGAPv2 to delegate client administration to lower-trust teams or tenants - the whole point of FGAPv2 is undermined - but lower for deployments that only grant client management to full realm admins, who already hold equivalent power. Note the vector's PR:H combined with UI:R limits opportunistic abuse: an attacker must first obtain delegated client-admin credentials and then wait for a privileged user to authenticate through the poisoned client. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | A delegated tenant administrator who has been granted only 'manage clients' rights on a specific client edits that client's scope mapping and attaches the realm-admin role to it. When any user - for example, a service account or human user with a session - next authenticates through that client, the issued access token carries the realm-admin role, letting the attacker drive privileged Keycloak Admin API calls or downstream applications that trust the token's roles. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – May 28, 2026
Privilege escalation in Keycloak's Fine-Grained Admin Permissions v2 (FGAPv2) allows an administrator with only limited client-management rights to attach arbitrary realm roles - including highly privileged ones - to a client's scope mappings, causing those roles to be injected into user authentication tokens that traverse the modified client. The flaw affects the Red Hat Build of Keycloak per the vendor advisory and has no public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the high-privilege admin pivot makes it operationally significant in multi-tenant identity deployments.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis from the supplied references - monitor https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-9795 and bug 2482462 for the RHSA erratum and apply the patched Red Hat Build of Keycloak release as soon as it is published. As a compensating control, audit which principals hold FGAPv2 'manage-clients' or equivalent client-scoped permissions and temporarily revoke that delegation, granting client edits only to trusted realm administrators (trade-off: loses the multi-tenant delegation benefit FGAPv2 was deployed for). Additionally, review existing client scope mappings for unexpected realm-role assignments and remove any unauthorized entries, and enable admin event logging on role and scope-mapping changes (events RESOURCE_TYPE=CLIENT_SCOPE_MAPPING) so abuse becomes detectable; this adds log volume but is the most direct detection for exploitation attempts.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in maven
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
Keycloak is an open-source identity and access management server (commercialized as Red Hat Build of Keycloak) that issues OIDC/SAML tokens whose claims are shaped by per-client scope mappings. FGAPv2 is the second-generation fine-grained admin permissions model that lets operators delegate narrow administrative capabilities (e.g., 'manage-clients' on a single client) instead of granting realm-admin. CWE-266 (Incorrect Privilege Assignment) describes the root cause: the scope-mapping assignment endpoint validates that the caller can edit the client but does not separately verify that the caller is authorized to confer the specific realm role being attached, so the role-assignment path inherits client-scope authority and skips the role-grant authority check. When a user later authenticates through that client, the role propagates into the access token, defeating the realm's intended separation of duties.
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Severity by source
AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Primary rating from Vendor (redhat).
CVSS VectorVendor: redhat
DescriptionCVE.org
A flaw was found in Keycloak's Fine-Grained Admin Permissions (FGAPv2) feature. An administrator with limited client management permissions can exploit this vulnerability to assign any realm role, including highly privileged roles, to a client's scope mapping. This bypasses intended security controls, allowing the injected role to be projected into a user's authentication token when they access the modified client. This could lead to unauthorized privilege escalation within the Keycloak realm.
Blast Radius
ecosystem impact- 52 maven packages depend on org.keycloak:keycloak-services (20 direct, 32 indirect)
Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 26.6.4.
Executive ViewAI
Red Hat Build of Keycloak's Fine-Grained Admin Permissions v2 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability (CVSS 7.3) enabling limited-privilege administrators to inject high-privilege roles into user authentication tokens. This directly undermines the role-based access control segregation that multi-tenant identity deployments depend on to isolate customer accounts and data access boundaries. Organizations using Keycloak as centralized identity infrastructure face risk of internal privilege escalation and potential cross-tenant data exposure if admin accounts are compromised.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations: (1) restrict Fine-Grained Admin Permissions v2 access to minimal, highly-vetted personnel, (2) implement change approval workflows and immutable audit logging for all scope mapping operations, (3) audit and validate all existing client scope mappings for anomalous high-privilege role assignments, (4) monitor Keycloak administrative activity logs with alerting on role modification events, (5) isolate Keycloak infrastructure and limit admin access pathways until patch is available.
Threat Intelligence Overview
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
VulDB
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Privilege escalation occurs when an attacker leverages flaws in access control mechanisms to gain permissions beyond what they were originally granted.
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