Tauri HTTP Plugin CVE-2026-95623

Requires: (1) the application bundles and uses tauri-plugin-http (versions before http-v2.7.0) with a configured scope allowlist; (2) an allowed host that the attacker either controls or that hosts an open redirect; and (3) the app frontend actually issuing a fetch to that allowed URL. Exploitation is limited by needing that attacker-influenced allowed origin, by the maxRedirections cap (default 10, and 0 disables following), and by the response only becoming attacker-visible if the initiating frontend exposes or forwards it. Even after patching, the scopeRedirects protection is OPT-IN (planned default only in v3), so unconfigured apps on 2.7.0+ remain exposed by design.

This is a genuine but conditionally-exploitable SSRF (CWE-918) in the Tauri HTTP plugin, and the signals point to a moderate, not urgent, priority. The provided CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N = 5.6) already encodes the friction: high attack complexity and required user/app interaction. No EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no POC were supplied, so exploitation status is 'no public exploit identified at time of analysis' - the finding is JFrog research with a coordinated GHSA advisory (GHSA-2rxp-f4w5-6hjr) and a confirmed vendor patch, not observed in-the-wild activity. One notable inconsistency: the vendor chose AV:A (adjacent), but a redirect-following SSRF is driven by a remote HTTP server the app contacts, which argues for AV:N; this raises the base score modestly if corrected - verify with vendor/JFrog. The impact is also nuanced: the SSRF response returns to the webview, so real confidentiality loss (C:H) presupposes the initiating frontend code forwards or exposes that response, or that the attacker who controls the allowed origin can also observe it. Net: a real defense-in-depth weakness worth patching, but the gating (must use the http plugin, have a scoped allowlist, and fetch an attacker-influenced/open-redirect allowed host) keeps real-world exploitability well below what a raw CWE-918 label suggests.

A Tauri desktop app uses the HTTP plugin with a scope allowlist permitting an external host that the attacker controls (or that has an open redirect). The app's frontend fetches an allowed URL; the server responds with an HTTP 3xx to http://169.254.169.254/ or a localhost/internal service, and because the plugin only validated the initial URL, reqwest follows the redirect and returns the internal response to the webview. No public POC was provided; the issue was reported by JFrog and fixed by the vendor.