Severity by source
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Network-reachable broker endpoint, but needs attacker-controlled external IdP account and a prior victim link confirmation, so AC:H, PR:L, UI:R; no availability impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (redhat).
CVSS VectorNVD
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionNVD
A flaw was found in the first broker login flow of Keycloak. When a user confirms an account-linking request from a different browser, a temporary proof is created to validate the link. However, this proof is not properly cleared after the link is established or when the user later manually removes the link. An attacker who controls the external identity can exploit this leftover proof to silently re-establish the link and gain unauthorized access to the victims account without any further confirmation.
AnalysisAI
Keycloak's first broker login flow leaves a temporary account-linking proof behind after a federated identity link is established or manually removed (CWE-613), allowing an attacker who controls the external identity to silently re-establish the link and authenticate as the victim without any further confirmation. The flaw affects Red Hat Build of Keycloak and Red Hat Single Sign-On 7 deployments that use identity brokering, and carries high confidentiality and integrity impact despite a moderate CVSS base of 6.4. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires a Keycloak realm configured with identity brokering - the first broker login flow and at least one external identity provider must be active, which is a non-default deployment mode rather than an out-of-the-box configuration. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N, base 6.4) is internally consistent with the description: the attacker needs network reach to the Keycloak broker endpoint, must control an account at the federated external identity provider (PR:L, attacker is a legitimate but hostile IdP user rather than anonymous), and depends on a prior victim action - confirming an account-linking request from a different browser (UI:R), which drives the AC:H rating. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | No vendor-released patch version appears in the supplied data, so the immediate action is to monitor the Red Hat advisory at https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-92358 for the fixed Red Hat Build of Keycloak and Red Hat Single Sign-On 7 builds and apply them as soon as they are published; treat any upgrade that touches the first broker login flow as the authoritative fix, and verify the patched version after deployment. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-80173
GHSA-prm3-wvj6-64vx