EUVD-2026-53382
GHSA-6x4h-v8cp-whwh
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
PR:L because a standard user account plus Initial Access Token is required; S:C because forged tokens grant control over other clients and realm admin scope, crossing the attacker's original authorization boundary.
Primary rating from Vendor (redhat).
CVSS VectorVendor: redhat
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
A flaw was found in the Dynamic Client Registration (DCR) component of Keycloak, an identity and access management solution. The default DCR policy fails to properly validate the claim path for User Property mappers, allowing them to write values to sensitive internal claim locations. An attacker with a standard user account and a limited Initial Access Token can exploit this to forge administrative roles in their access token. This allows the attacker to take over other clients, steal confidential secrets, and potentially gain full administrative control over the realm.
AnalysisAI
Privilege escalation in Keycloak's Dynamic Client Registration (DCR) component allows attackers with standard user accounts and limited Initial Access Tokens to forge administrative roles directly into their own access tokens. The underlying flaw is a missing claim-path validation in the default DCR policy for User Property mappers, which permits writing attacker-controlled values into sensitive internal claim locations that normally carry role and privilege assertions. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires three simultaneous conditions: the attacker must hold a valid, authenticated standard user account in the target Keycloak realm (CVSS PR:L confirms authenticated access is mandatory - unauthenticated exploitation is not possible); the attacker must possess an Initial Access Token (IAT) granting DCR invocation rights - even a limited or minimally scoped IAT is sufficient; and Dynamic Client Registration must be enabled in the target realm by a realm administrator (DCR is a non-default feature requiring explicit activation). … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The vendor-provided CVSS 3.1 score of 8.1 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N) accurately captures the network-accessible, low-complexity, low-privilege nature of this attack. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker with a standard Keycloak account and a valid (even scoped) Initial Access Token submits a DCR request registering a new OAuth client, embedding a User Property mapper that targets an internal admin role claim path rather than a benign user attribute. Upon authenticating with that registered client, the attacker receives an access token carrying forged realm-admin roles. … |
| Remediation | Consult the Red Hat security advisory at https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-16102 for the authoritative patched release - specific fix version numbers were not present in the provided intelligence data and must be retrieved directly from Red Hat (patch available per vendor advisory). … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours: Identify all Keycloak instances in production and assess their Dynamic Client Registration enablement status; immediately restrict Initial Access Token issuance to trusted administrators only and audit existing IATs for unauthorized use. …
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