gitoxide CVE-2026-82251

Exploitation requires that the target application uses the gitoxide crate (before 0.52.1) or gix crate (before 0.83.0) and invokes the state() or open() functions on submodules sourced from an attacker-supplied .gitmodules file. The attacker must be able to deliver a malicious repository to the target - for example via a pull request, a public repository URL processed by a CI pipeline, or a git clone of attacker-controlled content. No authentication to the victim system is required (PR:N per CVSS 4.0 vector), and in automated pipeline contexts no operator interaction is needed (UI:N). Exploitation is limited to confidentiality - the attacker can confirm the existence of and open repositories at traversed paths, but cannot write data (VI:N/VA:N). Exploitation is constrained to paths reachable from the process's working directory and filesystem permissions; it does not grant arbitrary file read beyond what the repository open() API exposes.

The provided CVSS 4.0 score of 8.7 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) reflects a high-confidence confidentiality impact with no integrity or availability consequence, which aligns well with the described behaviour: an attacker gains the ability to inspect repositories outside .git/modules but cannot write data. The PR:N/UI:N rating is credible in automated contexts such as CI/CD pipelines that clone and inspect untrusted repositories without operator interaction. EPSS data was not provided in the input, so exploitation probability cannot be quantified precisely. The vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV, indicating no confirmed mass exploitation. A public proof-of-concept is attached to the GitHub advisory, meaningfully lowering the barrier to exploitation. Real-world priority is moderate-to-high for organisations running automated git tooling built on gitoxide/gix that processes untrusted repositories; it is low for environments where the library is used exclusively with trusted, internal repositories.

An attacker publishes or submits a git repository whose .gitmodules file declares a submodule with a name containing path traversal segments such as '../../../escaped-target.git'. When a CI/CD pipeline or repository analysis tool built on gitoxide/gix clones the repository and calls state() or open() on its submodules, the unvalidated name escapes .git/modules and the library opens or reports the existence of a repository at an attacker-chosen path on the host filesystem, leaking its common_dir path and confirming the presence of repositories at that location. A working proof-of-concept demonstrating this exact behaviour is attached to GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h.