AshGraphql CVE-2026-81636

Three conditions must hold simultaneously: (1) the application uses AshGraphql version 0.16.23 through 1.10.x; (2) the GraphQL schema exposes at least one Relay connection or keyset-paginated field (i.e., fields accepting first or last arguments); and (3) an Absinthe max_complexity limit is configured in the schema - without it, there is no guard to bypass, though unlimited queries were already possible in that case. Exploitation is blocked for applications that use only offset/limit pagination (:limit key), since that code path was correctly implemented. The CVSS vector (PR:N/AV:N/UI:N) confirms no authentication is required; any client that can reach the GraphQL endpoint, including unauthenticated public consumers, can trigger the condition. There are no platform or OS restrictions.

The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VA:H) scores 8.7 and accurately reflects the threat profile: no authentication, no special network position, no user interaction required, and high availability impact against both the application and database tier. EPSS data was not included in the provided intelligence and cannot be cited. No CISA KEV listing exists at time of analysis, and no public exploit code has been identified beyond the attack shape published in the advisory itself. The combination of zero prerequisites and a mechanically straightforward exploit construction means the gap between vulnerability disclosure and first exploitation attempt is likely narrow. The sole natural limiting factor is the niche deployment footprint of the Ash/AshGraphql ecosystem within the broader Elixir community, which reduces the total exposed population compared to a similar flaw in a mainstream framework such as graphql-ruby or Strawberry. There is no conflict between the CVSS network vector and the description - remote unauthenticated access is genuinely sufficient.

An attacker sends an unauthenticated HTTP POST to the application's GraphQL endpoint containing a deeply nested Relay connection query such as posts(first: 500) { edges { node { comments(first: 500) { edges { node { likes(first: 500) { ... } } } } } } }. Absinthe scores this query as near-zero complexity because the first arguments fall through to the child_complexity + 1 catch-all, so it clears any configured max_complexity guard; the database then executes a full fan-out read materializing millions of rows. No public exploit code has been identified, but the attack shape is fully described in the vendor advisory and requires no specialized tooling beyond a standard GraphQL client.