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Telnyx MCP CVE-2026-81098

| EUVDEUVD-2026-67026 CRITICAL
Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306)
2026-08-27 VulnCheck GHSA-j929-p4w2-gfw7
9.3
CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: VulnCheck
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Severity by source

Vendor (VulnCheck) PRIMARY
9.3 CRITICAL
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
vuln.today AI
9.1 CRITICAL

Reachable HTTP port with no credential accepted gives AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N; theft and reuse of stored API keys yields high C and I, no availability impact.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (VulnCheck).

CVSS VectorVendor: VulnCheck

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
X

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Source Code Evidence Fetched
Aug 27, 2026 - 17:48 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
Aug 27, 2026 - 17:48 vuln.today
CVE Published
Aug 27, 2026 - 14:50 cve.org
CRITICAL 9.3

DescriptionCVE.org

The Telnyx MCP server exposed its HTTP transport on every interface and did not require a caller credential. packages/mcp-server/src/http.ts served MCP on the root path with a listener bound to all interfaces and parsed the caller's authentication headers in a mode that did not fail when they were absent, so a request without any credential completed initialisation and dispatched tools. Dispatch forwarded the server's own stored credentials, the Telnyx API key and client secret together with the code-execution key, to the upstream endpoint, so an unauthenticated caller able to reach the port acted with them. The current code defaults the host to loopback, requires a server API key, and enforces it in middleware.

AnalysisAI

Authentication bypass in the Telnyx MCP server (team-telnyx/telnyx-node, through 6.83.0) lets any network-reachable caller invoke MCP tools with no credential. The Streamable HTTP transport bound to all interfaces and parsed auth headers in a non-failing mode, so a request lacking credentials still completed initialisation and dispatched tools - which then forwarded the server's own stored Telnyx API key, client secret, and code-execution key upstream. …

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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata

Access
Reach exposed MCP HTTP port
Delivery
Send request with no credentials
Exploit
Server accepts absent-auth initialise
Execution
Dispatch MCP tools
Persist
Server forwards stored Telnyx keys upstream
Impact
Abuse telecom API and code-execution key

Vulnerability AssessmentAI

Exploitation Exploitation requires the server to be running the Streamable HTTP transport (rather than the default stdio transport) with the vulnerable all-interfaces bind in versions through 6.83.0, and the attacker must have network reachability to that listening port. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment.
Risk Assessment The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N, score 9.3) aligns tightly with the description: remote, low-complexity, no authentication, no user interaction, with high confidentiality and integrity impact. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in.
Exploit Scenario An attacker who can reach the MCP HTTP port - for example on a shared host, an exposed container port, or a flat internal network - sends an MCP initialise and tool-dispatch request with no authentication headers. The server accepts it and executes the requested tools against the upstream Telnyx API using its own stored API key and code-execution key, letting the attacker abuse the victim's telecom account. …
Remediation Upgrade to the fixed release published after 6.83.0 that incorporates PR #450 (https://github.com/team-telnyx/telnyx-node/pull/450) and GHSA-46jp-xr2h-fw7h; the corrected code defaults the host to loopback, requires a server API key, and enforces it in middleware. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report.

Recommended ActionAI

Within 24 hours: Audit your environment for deployments of team-telnyx/telnyx-node versions through 6.83.0; if present, immediately restrict network access to the MCP server via firewall rules to trusted internal networks only. …

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CVE-2026-81098 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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