OpenStack Keystone CVE-2026-80182

The attacker must hold a valid token issued via one of three specific Keystone delegated authentication mechanisms: an OAuth1 access token, an application credential, or a trust-scoped token. All three are opt-in Keystone features - deployments that have disabled all delegation mechanisms are entirely unaffected. The CVSS 4.0 AT:P metric confirms additional attack requirements are present: the attacker must have prior authenticated access to the Keystone API with a delegated credential (PR:L), meaning fully unauthenticated exploitation is not possible. What limits exploitation: the attacker must already possess a valid delegated token; the target deployment must have at least one delegation mechanism enabled; and the attacker needs network access to the Keystone API endpoint. The critical limiting factor is that this is a privilege escalation path for already-authenticated users, not an unauthenticated remote code execution - the realistic threat actors are compromised service accounts, malicious insiders, or attackers who have already achieved initial access to the cloud tenant.

The CVSS 4.0 score of 7.6 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N) accurately reflects the attack profile: network-exploitable with low complexity once a delegated credential is held, but gated by AT:P - the attacker must already possess a valid OAuth1, application credential, or trust-scoped token before exploitation is possible. The VC:H and VI:H impact metrics correctly capture the consequence: newly minted persistent credentials grant durable, high-fidelity confidentiality and integrity access independent of the original token's lifecycle. No EPSS score was included in the provided intelligence, and the CVE is not currently in CISA KEV, indicating no confirmed active exploitation at time of analysis. The AT:P modifier is the primary dampener on automated or opportunistic exploitation, but targeted abuse by insider threats, compromised service accounts, or post-initial-access actors is plausible with minimal additional barriers once a delegated token is in hand. The absence of a KEV listing and public POC suggests this is not yet being exploited at scale, but the persistence mechanic - credentials that survive token revocation - makes this a high-priority patch target for any OpenStack operator.

An attacker who holds a legitimate but scoped OAuth1 access token - obtained through normal API authorization flows or by compromising a service account - sends crafted requests to Keystone's application credential or OAuth1 delegation endpoints, which the restriction logic incorrectly permits for delegated token types. The attacker successfully creates a new application credential tied to their user account. This credential is long-lived and persists independently of the original OAuth1 token, surviving its expiration or administrative revocation and granting the attacker durable cloud access. No public POC has been identified at time of analysis.