What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-71289?

CVE-2026-71289 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.8 (Critical). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.4%.

Which versions of NASA-AMMOS ANMS are affected by CVE-2026-71289?

NASA-AMMOS ANMS reference implementation contains an unauthenticated API flaw (port 8089) allowing remote attackers to command critical agent infrastructure without credentials.

How to fix or mitigate CVE-2026-71289?

Within 24 hours, identify all systems running NASA-AMMOS ANMS and confirm whether port 8089 is accessible from untrusted networks; block external access immediately if exposed. Within 7 days, enable the CAM (CCSDS Authentication Manager) authentication gateway to enforce credential checks before the amp-manager API, implement firewall rules to restrict API access to administrative networks only, and audit all connected agents for unauthorized activity. Within 30 days, evaluate alternative ANMS implementations with built-in authentication, implement permanent authentication requirements in your deployment configuration separate from port publishing, and establish network segmentation isolating managed agents from external-facing systems.

NASA-AMMOS ANMS CVE-2026-71289

EUVD-2026-53374 CRITICAL

Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306)

2026-08-05 TuranSec

GHSA-p73q-wm5v-6vh6

Authentication Bypass Docker Anms Nasa Ammos

9.8

CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: TuranSec

Severity by source

Vendor (TuranSec) PRIMARY

9.8 CRITICAL

AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

vuln.today AI

9.8 CRITICAL

Default docker-compose exposes the REST API to the network with a null auth callback (PR:N/AV:N/AC:L), and command-dispatch plus report-clearing yield full C/I/A impact; S:U kept as the vulnerable REST component, though downstream agent control arguably supports S:C.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (TuranSec).

CVSS VectorVendor: TuranSec

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

High

Lifecycle Timeline

Analysis Generated

Aug 05, 2026 - 13:47 vuln.today

CVE Published

Aug 05, 2026 - 12:26 cve.org

CRITICAL 9.8

DescriptionCVE.org

The NASA-AMMOS Asynchronous Network Management System (ANMS) reference implementation's default docker-compose.yml publishes the amp-manager service's REST API directly to the host network interface (port 8089, e.g. "${ION_MGR_PORT:-8089}:8089/tcp") with cap_add: NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SYS_NICE, bypassing the CAM (Configuration and Access Manager) gateway that is otherwise the system's sole authentication boundary. The underlying REST server, implemented with CivetWeb in JHUAPL/dtnma-tools (src/refdm/nm_rest.c), is configured with enable_auth_domain_check set to "no" and registers every route, including the DTNMA agent command-dispatch endpoints (.../agents/{eid|idx}/send, which accept and forward EXECSET-encoded command sets to a registered DTNMA agent), with a null authentication callback. Any network-reachable client can therefore enumerate registered agents, submit arbitrary command sets to them, and clear stored reports, entirely without credentials. This affects NASA-AMMOS/anms and JHUAPL-DTNMA/dtnma-tools as published; both repositories present this as a reference/ground DTN network-management implementation and testbed, and the affected components communicate with DTNMA agents (which may represent simulated or real spacecraft/ground nodes depending on deployment) rather than being flight software running onboard a spacecraft.

Articles & Coverage 1

News Critical Authentication Bypass in NASA-AMMOS ANMS Docker Deployment - CVE-2026-71289 Aug 05, 2026

AnalysisAI

Missing authentication in the NASA-AMMOS ANMS reference implementation exposes the amp-manager REST API (CivetWeb, port 8089) directly on the host network, allowing any network-reachable client to command DTNMA agents without credentials. Because the shipped docker-compose.yml publishes the port and bypasses the CAM authentication gateway, unauthenticated remote attackers can enumerate agents, submit arbitrary EXECSET command sets to them, and clear stored reports. No public exploit identified at time of analysis; the flaw affects the reference/testbed implementation rather than onboard spacecraft flight software, though managed agents may represent real ground or space nodes depending on deployment.

Technical ContextAI

ANMS is a ground-side reference implementation of DTNMA (Delay/Disruption-Tolerant Networking Management Architecture), where an amp-manager coordinates DTNMA agents over the AMP/AMA protocol. The REST front-end is built on the CivetWeb embedded HTTP server in JHUAPL-DTNMA/dtnma-tools (src/refdm/nm_rest.c), which is initialized with enable_auth_domain_check set to "no" and registers every route - including the agent command-dispatch endpoints .../agents/{eid|idx}/send that forward EXECSET-encoded command sets - using a null authentication callback. The intended sole authentication boundary is the separate CAM (Configuration and Access Manager) gateway, but the default container topology publishes 8089 straight to the host with elevated Linux capabilities (NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SYS_NICE), so the CAM is never in the request path. This maps to CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for a Critical Function): a security-critical command interface is reachable with no credential check at all.

RemediationAI

No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis; no fixed version was provided in the input data, so remediation is primarily configuration hardening. Do not expose the amp-manager REST API on an untrusted interface: remove or restrict the "${ION_MGR_PORT:-8089}:8089/tcp" host port mapping in docker-compose.yml so the API is only reachable on an internal Docker network (side effect - external tooling must then route through the intended CAM gateway), and place the REST endpoint behind the CAM (Configuration and Access Manager) authentication gateway rather than bypassing it. As compensating controls, bind 8089 to loopback (127.0.0.1) or a management VLAN and firewall it to trusted operator hosts only (trade-off: remote operators need VPN/jump-host access), and drop the unneeded elevated capabilities (NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SYS_NICE) unless a specific feature requires them. If the codebase supports it, enable CivetWeb authentication by setting enable_auth_domain_check appropriately and registering a real authentication callback instead of the null one in nm_rest.c. Track fixes at https://github.com/NASA-AMMOS/anms and https://github.com/JHUAPL-DTNMA/dtnma-tools.