Severity by source
AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Trigger arrives via local terminal output (AV:L), depends on the non-default wslview-failure fallback (AC:H), needs a victim click (UI:R), and command execution crosses WSL into the Windows host (S:C, C/I/A:H).
Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M).
CVSS VectorVendor: GitHub_M
Lifecycle Timeline
4DescriptionCVE.org
Warp is an agentic development environment. From 0.2024.03.12.08.02.stable_01 until 0.2026.05.06.15.42.stable_01, Warp contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the WSL URL-opening fallback. When Warp is running under WSL and cannot open a URL through wslview, it falls back to a Windows command processor path. A URL controlled through terminal output can reach that fallback when the user opens the link. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.2026.05.06.15.42.stable_01.
AnalysisAI
OS command injection in Warp (the agentic terminal/development environment) affects builds from 0.2024.03.12.08.02.stable_01 up to the fix in 0.2026.05.06.15.42.stable_01 when running under Windows Subsystem for Linux. When wslview cannot open a URL, Warp falls back to a Windows command processor (cmd.exe /c start), so a malicious URL emitted into terminal output executes attacker-controlled Windows commands once the user clicks the link. No public exploit identified at time of analysis and the issue is not in CISA KEV, but the fix commit clearly documents the injection path.
Technical ContextAI
The affected component is Warp's URL-opening logic in crates/warpui/src/windowing/winit/delegate.rs (open_url_in_system). Under WSL, Warp first attempts wslview; on failure it previously shelled out to the Windows command interpreter via command::blocking::Command::new("cmd.exe").args(["/c", "start", url]), passing an unsanitized, terminal-derived URL straight onto a Windows command line. This is a classic CWE-78 OS Command Injection: untrusted input (a URL printed by any process whose output reaches the Warp terminal) is concatenated into a command without scheme validation or quoting, allowing argument/metacharacter injection and execution of non-http schemes (file:, ms-msdt:, search-ms:, javascript:). The CPE cpe:2.3:a:warpdotdev:warp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* confirms the application is Warp by warpdotdev. The fix replaces cmd.exe start with rundll32.exe url.dll,FileProtocolHandler and only proceeds if url::Url::parse succeeds and the scheme is http/https, using the re-serialized (percent-encoded) URL so characters like " become %22 before reaching Windows.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: 0.2026.05.06.15.42.stable_01 - upgrade Warp to this version or later, which validates that URLs parse and use only the http/https scheme and switches the WSL fallback from cmd.exe /c start to rundll32.exe url.dll,FileProtocolHandler with a re-serialized, percent-encoded URL. Details are in the advisory GHSA-xmw3-wj6r-48m4 (https://github.com/warpdotdev/warp/security/advisories/GHSA-xmw3-wj6r-48m4) and the fix commit c66cff48afba73bb1f26f82e5d524018bacb748e. If you cannot upgrade immediately, the most effective compensating control is to avoid clicking hyperlinks rendered in the Warp terminal while running under WSL, especially links produced by untrusted command output or remote content; additionally, ensure wslview/wslu is installed and functioning so the vulnerable cmd.exe fallback path is not reached (trade-off: this only avoids the fallback and is not a guaranteed fix), and treat any process that can write to the terminal as capable of delivering a payload. These are stopgaps with usability impact and do not fully close the injection - patching is the only complete remedy.
It was possible to bypass policies configured for Zero Trust Secure Web Gateway by using warp-cli 'set-custom-endpoint'
Command injection in Warp's legacy SSH background command path lets an attacker-controlled remote host inject shell synt
Arbitrary code execution in the Warp agentic development environment (builds 0.2023.10.24.08.03.stable_00 through 0.2026
Arbitrary local file write in Warp terminal (0.2025.03.05.08.02.stable_00 through builds before 0.2026.05.06.15.42.stabl
Using warp-cli command "add-trusted-ssid", a user was able to disconnect WARP client and bypass the "Lock WARP switch" f
Command-execution permission bypass in Warp's default unsandboxed CLI agent profile (versions 0.2025.10.08.08.12.stable_
Command injection in Warp's prompt branch-selector chip lets a crafted Git branch name execute in the victim's shell whe
Clipboard hijacking in the Warp agentic terminal (versions 0.2021.04.25.23.05.stable_00 through 0.2026.05.06.15.42.stabl
Command injection in the Warp agentic development environment (Linux builds 0.2024.02.20.08.01.stable_01 through pre-0.2
OS command injection in Warp's AI Agent code-search tooling allows attacker-controlled inputs to escape read-only search
Due to a hardlink created in the ProgramData folder during the repair process of the software, the installer (MSI) of WA
An unprivileged (non-admin) user can exploit an Improper Access Control vulnerability in the Cloudflare WARP Client for
Same weakness CWE-78 – OS Command Injection
View allSame technique Command Injection
View allShare
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-39012